The Great Victory that never was
Lutzen, 1632

Gustavus Adolphus (left) Wallenstein (right)

In a previous posting I reviewed a book1 on the Thirty Years War. In the review I stated that I felt that the reputation of the Swedish King Gustavus Adolphus was seriously overrated.

In fact this inflation of reputation is such that a sort of massaging of the actual historical record is required. An excellent example of that is the battle of Lutzen, November 16, 1632, during which Gustavus Adolphus got himself killed.

Now the mythologizing about Gustavus Adolphus is to a large extent from him being celebrated by military men and his use in Military colleges and other educational institutions as a an example of military genius. For example “Gustavus Adolphus was the one great captain of this century”2. What is interesting is that the very account of Gustavus Adolphus’ own military operations in the book do not support this assessment at all.3

In the nineteenth century celebrations of Gustavus Adolphus would break all barriers and approach incredible heights of hagiography and hero worship. An excellent example is Gustavus Adolphus, by Theodore Ayrault Dodge.4

This massaging is especially necessary when describing the battle of Lutzen and in fact what happens is in effect outright falsification. However before we go into the falsification let us review what actually happened before and during the battle.

Gustavus Adolphus had after his crushing victory at Breitenfeld, September 17, 1631, gone on to undue most of the successes achieved by the Imperial armies since 1618. In fact Gustavus Adolphus seemed to have become arbitrator of central Europe and on the verge of achieving final victory over the Emperor and giving the Protestant cause hegemony in central Europe.5

Of course those dreams were mere delusions and fantasies. Gustavus Adolphus managed to alienate many of his allies, and he, himself showed a singular lack of diplomatic ability. This was not helped by the fact that the Imperialists led again by Wallenstein staged a remarkable military recovery.6

The campaign that resulted is embarrassing to those who promote the idea that Gustavus Adolphus was a “Great Captain”. In a campaign of maneuver and entrenchments Wallenstein out thought Gustavus Adolphus.

Basically Wallenstein maneuvered Gustavus Adolphus into the city of Nuremburg and so stymied him that Gustavus Adolphus, his army wasting away from disease etc., in exasperation attacked Wallenstein’s entrenched army at Alte Veste, September 3 & 4, 1632. Gustavus was defeated losing at least 2,400 casualties, (probably more than 3,000). Wallenstein lost less than 1,000. Further c. 29,000 men had died in the Swedish camp and after the battle 11,000 men deserted his army. Shortly afterwards Gustavus Adolphus retired from Nuremberg intending to winter in Swabia, in southern Germany. Wallenstein instead of going into winter quarters invaded Saxony and by threatening to cut Gustavus Adolphus’ communications with Sweden forced the Swedish King to come north.7

So far in the contest between Wallenstein and Gustavus Adolphus, Wallenstein was winning.

The Saxons had sent most of their army into Silesia and so were almost entirely defenceless when Wallenstein invaded. He very quickly occupied large areas of the duchy.8

Gustavus Adolphus with his communications threatened had no choice but to go north, he also had to prevent his most important ally Saxony from making peace or going over to the Imperials. Further Gustavus Adolphus’ prestige had been seriously undermined by the campaign so far.

In this situation Gustavus decided he had to seek and win a battle to restore his prestige and shore up his faltering system of alliances.

Wallenstein had other ideas. Winter had set in and he was dispersing his army for winter quarters. Wallenstein just did not think Gustavus Adolphus would try for battle at this time of cold and when food was hard to find. Further Wallenstein had detached c. 5,000 men under Pappenheim, (at Pappenheim’s request) to reinforce Imperial garrisons in Westphalia and Wallenstein sent 2,500 men to watch the city of Torgau. Gustavus was almost desperate for a battle and Wallenstein, very ill, did not think anyone would want to fight a battle under the conditions prevailing.

Wallenstein when he found out that Gustavus Adolphus was marching on him gathered together what troops he could. Even so he only had c. 12,350 against Gustavus Adolphus’ c. 19,200. Wallenstein not surprisingly sent urgent requests to Pappenheim to return as soon as possible.9

It is entirely in order to praise Gustavus Adolphus for surprising Wallenstein at this stage and forcing a battle with him having a numerical advantage. For once Gustavus Adolphus had outsmarted Wallenstein. Gustavus Adolphus however proceeded to lose most of the advantage gained.

First Gustavus Adolphus was delayed for one day by a small cavalry detachment and second of all Wallenstein guessed what Gustavus Adolphus would do and planned accordingly.

Map of Battle of Lutzen
Swedes White, Imperials Black

Wallenstein took up position next to the village of Lutzen. He stationed troops in the village and posted musketeers in the road just out side his front lines. He organized his camp followers to suggest his army was larger than it was. Wallenstein guessed that Gustavus Adolphus would try to outflank him and so organized his army that Gustavus Adolphus would gain nothing from his manoeuvre except having to make another frontal attack. Of course Wallenstein sent another urgent message to Pappenheim and expected him to arrive just before or during the battle.10

The battle started at c. 10:00am in the morning when Gustavus Adolphus mounted an all out attack. This frontal attack made little progress has Gustavus Adolphus’ troops were unable to take Lutzen or the hill in front of it, (Windmill hill) where Wallenstein had posted artillery. Gustavus Adolphus’ troops were able to make progress on the other flank, but by then smoke from fire and gunpowder was making it difficult to see what was going on. About 1:00pm Pappenheim returned with 2,300 cavalry and drove the Swedes back on the flank that they had been pushing back. Pappenheim was killed in the attack. The battle now degenerated into mishmash of small units attacking and defending and both Gustavus Adolphus and Wallenstein largely lost control of the battle.

In the confusion Gustavus Adolphus was wounded twice by bullets the second wound killing him. His body was not retrieved until later. Moral in the Swedish army was adversely affected by Gustavus Adolphus’ death. It appears that at least some of the Swedish commanders suggested retreat but Bernard, a German in Swedish service, managed to get the Swedes to agree to more attacks. These attacks finally took Windmill hill and captured some of Wallenstein’s artillery.

Fighting subsided and finally ended around 5:00pm. About an hour later Pappenheim’s 3,000 infantry arrived. Wallenstein had suffered 3,000 casualties. The Swedes had suffered c. 6,000 casualties.

Wallenstein, ill and shaken by his severe casualties and unsure that Gustavus Adolphus was actually dead decided to retreat; abandoning his artillery. Interestingly the Swedes where on the point of retreat when they found out the Imperial army had withdrawn.11

So basically the battle was tactically indecisive although because of the Imperial retreat the Swedes were able to claim victory and certainly the imperial evacuation of Sweden’s ally Saxony after the battle would seem to indicate a strategic Swedish victory. However this “victory” had cost the life of Sweden’s King, created a dangerous situation in Germany for Sweden and put Gustavus Adolphus’ 8 year old daughter Christina on the throne.12

It was only Wallenstein’s retreat that allowed the Swedes to claim victory and that was likely the worst military decision Wallenstein ever made. Otherwise Wallenstein had managed to recoup quite successfully from being caught with his pants down and despite being outnumbered through out the battle, (this includes the reinforcements that arrived during it) had fought the battle to a draw and inflicted significantly greater casualties on his enemies. Gustavus Adolphus’ generalship just before and during the battle are not impressive. Gustavus Adolphus seems to have tried simply to use his large superiority of numbers to crush his enemy in an unimaginative frontal assault. Wallenstein was overall better that Gustavus Adolphus just before and during the battle. It was after the battle that Wallenstein lost it so to speak.13

Now calling this mess of a battle “a great Swedish victory”14 seems at best to be an exaggeration and most likely simply false.

Now my account of the battle is largely from Wilson’s book on the Thirty Years War,15 and it appears to be overall accurate. What do other accounts say?

Now accounts that describe the battle has a less than a stunning Swedish victory do exist and are not new.16 So this is hardly revisionism. It appears that the sources of this error are the result of a whole series of mistakes and revisions that work to inflate the Swedish kings reputation.

For example various accounts state that the Imperials either out numbered the Swedes or had equal numbers to them at the beginning of the battle. Even some of the accounts that dispute the idea of a “great Swedish victory” accept this. To give a few examples. Fuller gives Wallenstein 25, 000 men excluding Pappenheim who he says had 8,000 with him. He gives Gustavus Adolphus 18,000 men.17

The Dupuys give Wallenstein 20,000 men excluding Pappenheim’s 8,000. Gustavus Adolphus is given 18,000 men.18

Dodge says:

It is only certain that Gustavus’ army was much weaker than Wallenstein’s. It may have numbered eighteen thousand men, while the Imperialists can scarcely have had less than twenty-five thousand; and this number was to be reinforced by fully eight thousand more, whenever Pappenheim should come up.19

Parker states that both sides had about the same number of men; 19,000. It is unclear if Parker is including the forces of Pappenheim that arrived during and just after the battle. If it does the statement is true if it is meant to just indicate forces that each side had at the beginning of the battle it is incorrect.20

Wedgwood gives Swedish forces as c. 16,000 strong and gives Wallenstein including Pappenheim 26,000 men. Assuming that Wedgwood thought Pappenheim had c. 8,000 men this would give Wallenstein 18,000 men to Gustavus Adolphus’ 16,000.21

Thus Gustavus Adolphus’ actual out numbering Wallenstein by more than 50% at the beginning of the battle is turned into being slightly outnumbered or significantly outnumbered by Wallenstein. Even historians who do not buy the “great Swedish victory” myth accept part of the myth of at least equal odds at the beginning of the battle.

Further is the idea that all of Pappenheim’s 8,000 men during the battle arrived at once is stated in some accounts.22 This is false 2,300 arrived during the battle and 3,000 just after it ended. I further note that the forces Pappenheim brought to join Wallenstein did not number 8,000 but 5,300. Altogether with Pappenheim’s reinforcements Wallenstein had 17,650 men brought to the battlefield. As against Gustavus Adolphus’ 19,200 men.23

Now the matter of casualties Fuller gives the number as the Imperials losing 3-4,000 dead and the Swedes 1,500.24 Dodge gives Imperial casualties as between 10-12,000 and Swedish as comparable.25 Dupuy & Dupuy, give Imperial casualties has c. 12,000 and Swedish has c. 10,000.26 Parker gives the Imperial dead has 6,000 but gives no other casualties.27

The above figures have one thing in common they greatly inflate the actual casualties of the battle. As indicated above it appears that Swedish casualties were about double Imperial (6,000 against 3,000). Given the size of the armies involved these are certainly severe losses. But the figures giving more Imperial losses than Swedish are simply wrong and part of the effort to inflate the battle as “a great Swedish victory”. In fact rather than inflicting more losses than they suffered the Swedes in fact suffered double the losses of their enemy. But of course in order for it to be “a great Swedish victory” casualties must be large and the "loser" must lose more than the "winner".

Finally accounts of the battle must be amended Fuller for example says:

The King’s body was recovered, Wallenstein’s guns were retaken, then lost and captured again, but after this the Swedes carried all before them and the Imperial army broke up and scattered as night crept over the field.28

Well the part about recovering the King’s body and taking the guns is correct but the rest did not occur in this Universe but in an alternate one. Dodge however manages to be really over the top:

One more effort was made for the manes of the dead hero, and the charge was given with the vigor of loving despair. The decimated ranks of the Northlanders closed up shoulder to shoulder, the first and second lines were merged into one, and forward they went in the foggy dusk, with a will which even they had never shown before. Nothing could resist their tremendous onset. On right, centre, left, everywhere and without a gap, the Swedes carried all before them. The imperial army was torn into shreds and swept far back of the causeway, where so many brave men had that day bitten the dust. At this moment some ammunition chests in rear of the imperial line exploded, which multiplied the confusion in the enemy's ranks. Darkness had descended on the field; but the Swedes remained there to mourn their beloved king, while the imperial forces sought refuge from the fearful slaughter and retired out of range.29

No the Swedes did NOT sweep all before them. The Imperial army was NOT torn into shreds. Dodge is describing a battle that never happened. Dodge’s purple prose about the spirit of the dead hero Gustavus Adolphus and his men avenging his death is charming to read but not history but hagiography. Dodge then writes:

Lutzen has been called a drawn battle. It was unequivocally a Swedish victory.30

Well if you say so (sic). Dodge than goes on to give bogus imperial casualties, (12,000) and refer to Imperial units fleeing the battlefield. All of it quite mythical. Has I said before the Imperial army suffered about ½ the casualties of the Swedish army and withdrew it did NOT flee. But then Dodge’s hero Gustavus Adolphus must have a great victory in death even when he did not. Dodge is not finished however:

The Swedes had destroyed the last army of the emperor. At the opening of the year Ferdinand had been at the end of his resources, when Wallenstein came to his aid; and the great Czech had now been utterly defeated.31

This is a collection of falsehoods. The Swedes had NOT destroyed the “last” army of the Emperor. That army was still largely intact. Further the Emperor did have other armies although Dodge does not seem aware of them. Wallenstein was NOT utterly defeated in any sense. It is arguable that Wallenstein was not defeated at all. In fact in the coming year Wallenstein although gravely ill and probably not having much time to live would reach the height of his power, before a combination of his own arrogance and double dealing would lead to him being assassinated with the Emperor’s approval in early 1634.32

Dodge was engaged in what can only be described as telling a big lie that due to constant repetition is believed by so many. In this case the lie is the alleged great victory. Well there never was a great victory at Lutzen. Instead we have a bloody inconclusive battle that ended in a sort of victory for the side losing more men because the other side withdrew from the battlefield.

Gustavus Adolphus is credited with originating many of the features of modern armies, with creating a military machine of unique sophistication vastly superior to the armies of his enemies.33 An unbiased look at his campaigns and battles reveals that this is very overdrawn. His armies were not vastly superior to his enemies. The battle of Lutzen clearly indicates that Swedish superiority was not huge and that whatever elements Gustavus Adolphus’ army had that were superior could be countered. Further it does appear that Gustavus Adolphus although a very competent general was not greatly, if at all, superior to Wallenstein as a general.34

Dodge among many others contends that Gustavus Adolphus would have imposed peace and only his unfortunate death prevented it.35 This is pure fantasizing. This is the idea of the “Great Man” as Saviour and Messiah. It speaks of hero worship and yes again of hagiography. It does not belong in sober historical writing.

Of course a lot of this reflects the stunning long term success of the Swedish and their allies propaganda system that boosted the Swedish king and his accomplishments.36

Wedgwood in her book wrote a sober assessment of Gustavus Adolphus37 that should be required reading for all those who genuflect to the ghost of Gustavus Adolphus. In it Wedgwood writes of the relief of so many of Sweden’s allies in Germany and elsewhere that the Swedish king was dead. That his inability to make or implement practical or even reasonable diplomacy would no longer screw things up; that this bull in the china shop was gone. Wedgwood concludes:

…he [Gustavus Adolphus] could break the Habsburg Empire, but he could build nothing, and he left German politics, as he left her fields, a heap of shards.38

In the end peace was finally made in 1648 at Westphalia with much of the Empire in ruins and everyone exhausted.

In order to properly rate Gustavus Adolphus the battle of Lutzen must be properly evaluated and in this case what actually happened was not what so many since have thought happened. Thus did the real battle of Lutzen disappear down a memory hole to be replaced by a mythical “great victory” that never happened.

Europe in 1648 at the Peace of Westphalia

1. Wilson, Peter H., The Thirty Years War: Europe’s Tragedy, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MASS, 2009.

2. Dupuy, R. Ernest, & Dupuy, Trevor N., The Encyclopedia of Military History, Revised Edition, Harper & Row, Pub., New York, 1977, p. 522.

3. IBID, pp. 537-539, 573-574, 577.

4. Dodge, Theodore Ayrault, Gustavus Adolphus, Houghton Mifflin and Co., New York, 1895. See especially pp. 398-411.

5. Wilson, pp. 476-487, Fuller, J. F.C., A Military History of the Western World, v. II, Da Capo Press Inc., New York, 1955, pp. 64-66.

6. Wilson, pp. 485-487, IBID, Fuller, Wedgwood, C.V., The Thirty Years War, Penguin Books, London, 193, pp. 268-278.

7. Wedgwood, pp. 283-286, Wilson, pp. 501-506.

8. IBID.

9. Wilson, pp. 507-508, Fuller, pp. 68-69.

10. Wilson, pp. 506-508.

11. Wilson, pp. 507-511, Fuller, pp. 69-71, Wedgwood, pp. 287-291.

12. Wilson, pp. 512-519, Wedgwood, pp. 296-302.

13. Wilson, pp. 510-511.

14. Dupuy, Trevor N., The Military Life of Gustavus Adolphus, Scholastic Library Pub., New York, 1969, p. 147.

15. Wilson, pp. 507-511.

16. Wedgwood, pp. 289-291, Parker, Geoffrey, The Thirty Years War, Second Edition, Routledge, New York, 1997, pp. 117-118, also same author, Europe in Crisis, Fontana Books, London, 1979, p. 228. It is interesting to report that although Parker 1997, although reporting the battle has indecisive in the text has a map, (after p. 202 map 3 of the war) which lists the battle has a Swedish victory. Polisensky, J. V., The Thirty Years, New English Library, London, 1970, p. 212.

17. Fuller, pp. 69-70.

18. Dupuy & Dupuy, pp. 538-539.

19. Dodge, p. 384.

20. Parker, 1997, p. 117.

21, Wedgwood, pp. 287-288.

22. Dupuy & Dupuy, p. 539, Fuller p. 71.

23. Wilson, pp. 507-511.

24. Fuller, p. 71. Fuller’s account of the battle is very brief pp. 68-71.

25. Dodge, p. 396-397.

26. Dupuy & Dupuy, p. 539.

27. Parker, 1997, p. 118.

28. Fuller, p. 71.

29. Dodge, p. 396.

30. IBID.

31. IBID. p. 397.

32. Parker, 1997, pp. 123-125.

33. Dupuy & Dupuy, pp. 522-524.

34. See Wilson, pp. 492-511.

35. Dodge, p. 397.

36, Parker, 1997, Plates 9-15, pp. 99-100, 112, Wilson, pp. 475-476, 511.

37. Wedgwood, pp. 291-295.

38. IBID, p. 295.

Pierre Cloutier

A Note on Numbers and Military Probabilities

in Ancient Sources.

A common problem with trying to sort out the history of the Greco-Roman era is trying to make sense of the numbers given in the different accounts of, for example, the size of armies.

In this essay reference as already has been made to the problem of wildly exaggerated numbers given by the Greek historians. This is a very wide ranging topic so the author will stick to Ktesias , Herodotus and Diodorus .

Regarding Herodotus the main question is where to begin. So a start will be his numbers for the invasion of Greece. We get the following:

1,207 Triremes, with 241,000 men & 36,210 Marines
3,000 other ships with 240,000 men
1,700,000 infantry & 80,000 cavalry
A camel and chariot corps for another 20,000
Total 2,317,610 men
Add 120 ships, with 24,000 men
300,000 more men
Total 2,641,610
men + Servants equal to above total
Grand total 5,283,320 men; Total ships 1,327 Triremes

This does not include camp women, wives, cooks, etc., of course.1

Island of Salamis, Greece

The numbers from Ktesias for the invasion of Greece are as follows:

800,000 men excluding servants
1,000 Triremes2

For the Egyptian Expedition the numbers are:

400,000 men in one army
80 Triremes in one fleet
500,000 men in another army
300 Triremes in another fleet3

The numbers from Diodorus for the invasion of Greece are as follows:

1210 "Warships", probably Triremes
1,000,000 men.4

Battle of Salamis

For the Egyptian Expedition the numbers are:

300,000 men in one army
300,000 in another army
300 Triremes5

Egyptian Delta

The above are the figures given for Persian forces in both the invasion of Greece and the Egyptian Expedition by several sources. The figures for men are simply absurd not to be taken seriously. They give the feel about being plucked out of thin air.

Herodotus for example in his careful listing of his figures for men, and in how he calculates them gives the appearance of being both exact and careful. The problem is it makes his figures look if anything even more absurd. For example Herodotus says:

Meanwhile Xerxes at Doriscus was occupied in numbering his troops. As nobody has left a record, I cannot state the precise number of men provided by each separate nation, but the grand total, excluding the naval contingent, turned out to be 1,700.000. The counting was done by first packing ten thousand men as close together as they could stand and drawing a circle round them on the ground; they were then dismissed, and a fence, about navel-high, was constructed round the circle; finally other troops were marched into the area thus enclosed and dismissed in their turn, until the whole army had been counted.6

This truly weak attempt by Herodotus to make his figures look plausible only succeeds in enmeshing Herodotus further in the absurdity of his figures. It appears Herodotus realized that at least some people hearing or reading his numbers would not believe them so this explanation was put in. It is hardly surprising that later writers criticized Herodotus for either gullibility or out-right lying. However it seems that:

He (Herodotus–Author) does seem to have believed in the traditional figures, if his arithmetical labours are any indication. That these numbers are a sheer physical impossibility does not seem to have occurred to him.7

Although it should be pointed out ancient writers, to the best of our knowledge, did not criticize Herodotus for including absurdly high figures for Persian armies and fleets.

No attempt to sort out, analyze etc., such figures can save them, certainly not Herodotus ' absurd explanations. For example dividing by 10, or a hundred. Herodotus’ figures for the number of men cannot be saved by such procedures. The bottom line is that they are pure invention is more likely than that they are not. In fact this is just one more example of Herodotus’ lack of understanding of military affairs.8

Regarding the number of ships here the figures are not quite as absurd. The 80 and three hundred ships recorded for the Egyptian Expedition certainly are plausible. But here we run into problems. The three hundred figure reads like a stereotype, not a real figure and the 80 could be nothing but a doubling of the Athenian 40.9

As for Herodotus' figure of 1,327 triremes this implies a total force of 301,610 men. Accepting Herodotus' figure of 200 men per ship.10 This figure is implausible, especially if we add in the supporting vessels.

Herodotus' figures for ships are not implausible if we accept that the figure he gives for triremes is for total ships. This is so because it was easier to supply and move men by ship than over land and on the sea the very expensive, both financially and logistically, cavalry was not a factor. Further food supplies could be moved much cheaper by sea than overland. Still there were limits so Herodotus' total figures are still implausible for the full fleet. Although it is probable that there were more men in the fleet than in the land army. As for the navy feeding the army it would have had enough problems feeding its self with trying to feed the army as well.11

If Herodotus' figures are, despite his efforts to justify and explain them, impossible, then neither the figures of Diodorus or Ktesias are in the least reliable. Both Diodorus and Ktesias seemed to have selected impressive large figures, quite literally, out of thin air and made no attempt or justify or explain them.

The best way to approach this is in terms of logistics, not crunching numbers taken from dubious sources. Since if the literary sources cannot be taken seriously than what we have left is probability.

Before we leave the "Oriental" hordes behind a good check on these numbers is the forces lead by Napoleon in his invasion of Russia, which totalled, along with reinforcements, about 612,000 men.12 Despite considerable logistic support and trying to live off the land, Napoleon's army was mainly destroyed by logistical and supply problems. Spread out over a vastly larger area than Ancient Greece and one that was more productive, Napoleon's army could not properly feed itself and was destroyed.13 If Napoleon could not feed and supply his army in Russia in 1812, with vastly superior logistic and supply resources it is hard to believe that the huge hordes of Persians mentioned by the Greek historians could have been supplied successfully.14

Logistically the problem, until very recently, has been that the size of an army depended not just on the resources of the nation, empire creating the army but on the local resources of the area where the army would be operating. It is clear that:

In the ancient world, where logistics placed severe constraints on the size and mobility of armies, even a small force, when disciplined and determined, could pose a threat.15

What this means, for example, is that despite the huge size of the Persian empire in relation to Greece, the main limit on the size of the Persian Army invading Greece was not the size of the empire but the size of the resources in Greece that could support an army. Since the army would have to be supplied locally it was Greece's ability to support the army that counted not the size of the Persian Empire. The relative strength of states counted in these circumstances not in terms of being able to mobilize vast armies on a battlefield, because logistics set limits on that, but the ability of states to finance and sustain and replace losses in war. Thus if the Persian Empire could only send an army of 50,000 men against a enemy because that was all the area could supply, it could still do so again and again, both financially and in manpower. Whereas its enemy may not be able to sustain such an effort or replace its losses to the same extent.

In one of Thucydides speeches, he puts in the mouth Hermocrates, a politician, during the debate at Syracuse about whether to resist the Athenians, the following:

There have certainly not been many great expeditions, either Hellenic or foreign, which have been successful when sent far from home. They cannot come in greater numbers than the inhabitants of the country and their neighbours, all of whom will unite through fear.16

It appears, given the likely-hood, that this represented Thucydides’ views that this also represents his general opinion about Persian numbers against Greek numbers. Further this shows that the general principal of a limit on the size of invasion / expeditionary forces was recognized by some thinkers in antiquity.

How large were the armies that invaded Greece and Egypt ?17 Two conclusions can be drawn. First the numbers given by the Greek Historians cannot be taken seriously has figures for the size of the Persian armies, except has evidence of what the Greeks believed. Second Thucydides decision not to give figures at all of the size of the Persian armies is probably the best course, because we do not know and baring some "find" can not know, the actual size of the Persian armies.

Greeks Fighting Persians
1. Herodotus, Herodotus: The Histories, Penguin Books, London, 1954, Book 7, s. 184-186.

2. Ktesias in Photius, The Library of Photius, Vol. 1, SPCK, London, 1920, Book 72, s. 27.

3. IBID. Book 72, s. 36-37.

4. Diodorus, Diodorus Siculus, v. 4, William Heinemann, London, 1989, Book 11, s. 3-5.

5. IBID. Book 11, s. 74-75.

6. Herodotus , Book 7, s. 60.

7. Waters, K. H., Herodotus the Historian, Croom Helm, London, 1985. p. 152.

8. Buckley, Terry, Aspects of Greek History, 750-323 B.C., Routledge, London, 1996, pp. 15-16. For a Critical discussion of Herodotus' accouint of the Persian Wars see Buckley, pp. 161-188.

9. Bigwood, J. M., Ctesias' Account of the Revolt of Inarus, Phoenix, v. 32, 1976, pp. 11.

10. Herodotus, Book 7, s. 184.

11. See Lazenby, J. F., The Defence of Greece, Aris and Phillips, Warminister, England, 1993, pp. 88-92.

12. Riehn, Richard K., 1812, Napoleon's Russian Campaign, John Wiley & Sons Ltd., Toronto, 1991, p. 395.

13. IBID. pp. 138-155.

14. It is a common, but incorrect belief that Napoleon's army was destroyed by the Russian winter. This is only partly true. By far the worst losses were in the advance to Moscow, from disease, starvation etc. See Riehn, pp. 199-201, 404-407.

15. Daniel, Elton L., The History of Iran, Greenwood Press, London, 2001, p. 48.

16. Thucydides, Thucydides: History of the Peloponesian War, Penguin Books, London, 1954, Book 6, s. 33.

17. For a thoroughly unconvincing attempt to partially justify Herodotus' figures for the land army see Cook, J. M., The Persian Empire, Schocken Books, New York, 1983, pp. 114-116. Cook does not deal with the considerable logistic problems of such a large force or the added burden of such a large armies’ camp followers.

Pierre Cloutier

Sargon the Great

Bronze head of a Akkadian King possibly Sargon

1. Sargon, the mighty king, king of Akkadê am I,
2. My mother was an entum; my father I did not know;
3. The brother of my father dwelt in the mountain.
4. My city is Azupiranu, which is situated on the bank of the Purattu [Euphrates],
5. My mother the entum conceived me, in secret she brought me forth.
6. She placed me in a basket of reeds; she closed my entrance with bitumen,
7. She cast me upon the rivers which did not overflow me.
8. The river carried me; it brought me to Akki, the irrigator.
9. Akki, the irrigator, in the goodness of his heart lifted me out,
10. Akki, the irrigator, as his own son brought me up;
11. Akki, the irrigator, as his gardener appointed me.
12. When I was a gardener the goddess Ishtar loved me,
13. And for four and … years I ruled the kingdom.
14. The black-headed peoples I ruled, I governed;
15. Mighty mountains with axes of bronze I destroyed (?).
16. I ascended the upper mountains;
17. I burst through the lower mountains.
18. The country of the sea I besieged three times;
19. Dilmun I captured (?).
20. Unto the great Dur-ilu I went up, I . . . . . . . . .
21 . . . . . . . . . .I altered. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
22. Whatsoever king shall be exalted after me,
23. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
24. Let him rule, let him govern the black-headed peoples;
25. Mighty mountains with axes of bronze let him destroy;
26. Let him ascend the upper mountains,
27. Let him break through the lower mountains;
28. The country of the sea let him besiege three times;
29. Dilmun let him capture;
30. To great Dur-ilu let him go up.2

Such is the piece of writing called The Legend of Sargon. Which a few centuries after the death of Sargon the Great illustrates the legends that had began to encrust his life.

Sargon the Great, (2334-2279 B.C.E.) or Sharru-kin, was ruler of the city of Kish and created, as far as we can tell, of the worlds first true empire.3

Sargon was apparently of humble origin one account says as follows:

Then Sargon -- his city was the city of ……, his father was La’ibum, his mother …… -- Sargon …… with happy heart. Since he was born …….4

Other accounts make him the son of a date grower. Other accounts give his father the name Akki. Although the later legend recorded in The Legend of Sargon make him a gardener and his home town the city of Azupiranu not to far from Kish. Somehow, we not sure how, he became the cup-bearer of Urzababa king of Kish in Babylonia and one of the most powerful cities in Babylonia. A version of events is has follows:

One day, after the evening had arrived and Sargon had brought the regular deliveries to the palace, Ur-Zababa was sleeping (and dreaming) in the holy bed-chamber, his holy residence. He realized what the dream was about, but did not put into words, did not discuss it with anyone. After Sargon had received the regular deliveries for the palace, Ur-Zababa appointed him cup bearer, putting him in charge of the drinks cupboard. Holy Inanna did not cease to stand by him.5

It appears that Urzababa was involved in efforts to get rid of Sargon.6 A document from a later time say:

In those days, writing on tablets certainly existed, but covering tablets with envelopes did not exist. King Urzababa wrote to Sargon, chosen of the gods, a tablet which would cause his own death, and dispatched it to Lugalzagesi in Uruk.7

These efforts failed and Sargon took the throne after disposing of, probably violently, of Urzababa. Apparently one of the first things he did was take the name Sharru-kin (Sargon) meaning righteous and / or legitimate ruler probably has a way of dealing with his patent usurpation of the throne of Kish. What Sargon’s “real” name was is unknown.8

The most powerful ruler that Sargon had to deal with next was Lugalzagesi king of Uruk, ruler of most of southern Babylonia and apparently involved in the plot to kill Sargon with Urzababa. An inscription from a later period records events as follows:

(Sargon, the king of Agade, the … of Inanna [Ishtar], king of Kish, anointed of Anu [sky-god], king) of lands, governor of Enil, [supreme Sumerian deity] conquered the city of Uruk and destroyed its walls. He challenged (the man of) Uruk in battle and took Lugalzagesi, the king of Uruk, prisoner in the course of the battle; he lead him in a wooden collar to the gate of Enil.

Sargon, king of Agade, challenged (the man of) Ur in a battle and defeated the city and destroyed its walls. He defeated E-Nin-kimara (town probably between Ur and Lagash) and destroyed its walls and conquered its land from Lagash to the sea. He washed his weapons in the sea. He challenged Umma in a battle (and defeated the city and destroyed its walls).

To Sargon, king of lands, Enil gave no rival: Enil gave him the Upper Sea and the Lower Sea. From the Lower Sea, citizens of Agade held the government. Mari and Elam were subject to Sargon, King of lands. Sargon, king of lands, restored Kish and made (its fugitive inhabitants re)occupy the city.9

Another record of the Reign of Sargon is the Sumerian King List which records the events of Sargon’s ascension has follows:

In Unug [Uruk], Lugalzagesi became king; he ruled for 25 (other ms. have 34) years. 1 king; he ruled for 25 (other ms. Have 34) years. Then Unug was defeated (other ms. Have Then the reign of Unug was abolished.) and the kingship was taken to Agade.

In Agade, Sargon, whose father was a gardener, the cup bearer of Urzababa, became king, the king of Agade, who built Agade (other ms. has Under whom Agade was built); he ruled for 56 (other ms. 55 or 54) years.10...  

 Mesopotamian Seal

Sargon built the first great ancient Royal city that of Agade. The location of which is unfortunately still unknown. He also instituted a system of royal governors to police and keep the subject kings under control. He also apparently began the process of greatly increasing the sanctity of the ruler. It appears for example that he claimed to be the lover of Ishtar (in Sumerian Inanna).11
 

It appears that alone with Royal Governors, (Ensi) Sargon established a system of garrisons with a permanent standing army. It appears that Sargon had generals (Sagina) under his command who were separate from the civil administration. There appear to have been bureaucratic staff and record keepers associated with the upkeep and maintenance along with the creation of a permanent bureaucracy, to organize the maintenance of the administrative structure of the empire and to ensure the payment of tribute.
 

As mentioned in the quotes above Sargon tried to ensure compliance with the Imperial will by among other things destroying the wall of cities he conquered so has to make rebellion far more difficult. The settling in place of a cadre of Royal officials also helped to ensure loyalty.
 

These officials were granted personal estates to both ensure their loyalty and to enable them to fulfill financially their duties. It appears that land was acquired by conquest and that the land owned by the previous dynasty of cities conquered was expropriated by Sargon for himself and his family.12
 

We know that some high officials owned great amounts of land for example one Mesag, who was Governor of Umma, held about 1,270 hectares of land.13 The governor was responsible for agriculture, distribution of the harvest, labour and draft animals, human labourers, sheep and goats, hunting and fishing, oils fats and perfumes and manufacturing, food production and commerce.
 

Some land was held directly for the king although in all cases the harvest was carefully monitored probably to make sure that the portion going to the king and his servants was fully paid up. Cargoes that went to Agade were carefully inspected and sealed to prevent tampering and theft. It appears that the system was designed to breakdown local loyalties and create an elite that would be loyal to the ruling dynasty, by creating a mass extended royal household.14
 

It appears for example from the archives found so far that such things as fishing and hunting were closely regulated with the royal governors distributing mass quantities of food stuffs as many as 60,000 at a time.15 Even the baking of bread and mass production of pottery was controlled by the governors along with carpenters and smiths also on the state ration list.
 

The records indicate a uniformity of governmental system across the empire. In some areas colonies of Mesopotamians were established and centres like Susa in Southern Iran) established to maintain control over conquered areas.16

This state certainly sounds very bureaucratic, authoritarian and frankly “statist”. I doubt however the people of Sargon’s empire would have made the distinction between public and private enterprise that we would make. Aside from Elam it appears that the empire of Sargon controlled Sumer, Assyria northern Mesopotamia, parts if not all of Syria and parts of Asia Minor. Later accounts would credit him with conquests in Crete and Egypt. Those are not likely to be true.17
 

It appears that Sargon by taking control of Kish had established himself in a very powerful position in that it appears that Kish dominated central Mesopotamia for centuries compared to the far more divided south. Also Kish may have had a more centralized, authoritarian kingship along with possibly sanctifying, sacralizing it more.18
 

It also appears that Sargon’s empire was likely the culmination of efforts to achieve the creation of empire based on efforts of his Sargon’s predecessors. Sargon, however, seems to have been vastly more successful.
 

Although Sargon established his rule through Akkadian governors over the largely Sumerian southern cities and used Akkadian, a Semitic language, as the language of administration it appears that there were little what we call ethnic hostility between the groups. What evidence we have seems to indicate that virtually every city state in central and Southern Babylonia at this time had both Semitic and Sumerian speakers and ethnic discord played little if any role in the politics of that time.19
 

In fact Sargon had his daughter Enheduanna made a priestess (Entum) of the Nanna, the moon god of the southern city of Ur. A position of considerable power and authority. Later centuries attributed a whole series of hymns in Sumerian to the goddess Inanna (Ishtar), who was her fathers personal deity and supposedly his lover, to her making her the first author in history who we can name. For hundreds of years after predominant Mesopotamian rulers would make one of their daughters the priestess of Nanna at Ur.20

Portrait of Enheduanna

We have samples of the hymns attributed to Enheduanna, for example:

“My own trial is not yet over, but a stranger sentence surrounds me as though it were my sentence. (complaint) To the radiant bed, I did not stretch out my hand. Nor did I reveal the words of Ningal to that ‘someone’ The radiant en-priestess of Nanna am I, (protest) My Queen, beloved of An, may your heart be calmed for me.

…

“you are even greater than your own mother, full of wisdom, foresight, queen over all lands, who allows existence too many, I now strike up your fate-determining song! All powerful divinity, suitable for the ME, that which you have said magnificently is the most powerful! Of unfathomable heart, oh highly driven woman, of radiant heart, your ME I will list for you now!”21

Sargon finally built the great royal city of Agade apparently with temple palaces to the various gods of Mesopotamia including, not surprisingly Ishtar (Inanna).22

Sargon reigned for c. 55 years towards the end of his reign a great revolt happened and as an ancient account say:

All the lands revolted against him, and they besieged him in Agade. …He went forth to battle and defeated them; he knocked them over and destroyed their vast army…Subartu [nomads] in their might attacked, but they submitted to his arms, and Sargon settled their inhabitants, and he smote them grievously.23

So Sargon was able to bequeath his empire to his successors and it reached its height under the reign of his grandson Naram-Sin. Shortly after Naram-Sin’s death it collapsed leaving to subsequent generations a myth of power and glory and of a series of “God-Kings”. 24

In a later Sumerian poem called The Curse of Agade, which denounces the corruption and pride of Agade and of Naram-Sin especially has leading to the Gods arranging the destruction of the city there is still this invocation of Agade during the reign of Sargon:

In those days the dwelling of Agade were filled with gold,
Its bright-shining houses were filled with silver,
Into its granaries were brought copper, lead (and) slabs of lapis lazuli,
Its silos bulged at the sides,
Its old women were endowed with counsel,
Its old men were endowed with eloquence,
Its young men were endowed with the “strength of weapons”,
Its little children were endowed with joyous hearts,
The nurse raised children of the governors, played on the algarsur instruments,
Inside the city (was full of) tigi music,
Outside it (was full of) reed pipe (and) zamzam music,
Its quay where the boats docked were all abustle,
All lands lived in security,
Their people witnessed (nothing but) happiness…25

 Head of Akkadian King

 

1. an Entum is a female cultic functionary of high status. See Kuhrt, Amelie, The Ancient Near East: c. 3000-330 BC, v. 1, Routledge, London, 1995, p. 58.
 

2. George A. Barton, Archaeology and The Bible, 3rd Ed., (Philadelphia: American Sunday-School Union, 1920), p. 310. Prof. Arkenberg of Cal. Tech. has modernized the text. See Ancient History Source Book, Here. I have made a few more changes to the translation using other translations. Such as Legend of Sargon, at Here. See also translation in Pritchard, James B., Editor, The Ancient Near East: An Anthology of Texts, v. 1, Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ, 1958, pp. 85-86.
 

3. Roux, Georges, Ancient Iraq, Penguin Books, London, 1992, pp. 151-155, 500, Saggs, H.W.F., The Greatness that was Babylon, New American Library, New York, 1962, pp. 66-68, Kuhrt, pp. 58-60, Yoffee, Norman, Myths of the Archaic State, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1005, pp. 142-144, Lloyd, Seton, The Archaeology of Mesopotamia, Revd. Edition, Thames and Hudson, London, 1984, pp. 137-138, Michalowski, Piotr, Memory and Deed, in Akkad The First World Empire, Ed. Liverani, Mario, Tipografia Poligafica Moderna, Padua, 1993, pp. 69-90.
 

4. See ETCSL, at Here
 

5. IBID.
 

6. Roux, pp. 152-153, Kuhrt, pp, 48-49. Urzbaba’s attempts to get rid of Sargon are given as follows in an ancient account:

After five or 10 days had passed, King Ur-Zababa …… and became frightened in his residence. Like a lion he urinated, sprinkling his legs, and the urine contained blood and pus. He was troubled, he was disturbed like a fish living in brackish water. 

It was then that the cup bearer of Ezina's wine-house, Sargon, lay down not to sleep, but lay down to dream. In the dream, holy Inanna drowned Ur-Zababa in a river of blood. The sleeping Sargon groaned and gnawed the ground. When King Ur-Zababa heard about this groaning, he was brought into the king's holy presence, Sargon was brought into the presence of Ur-Zababa (who said:) "Cupbearer, was a dream revealed to you in the night?" Sargon answered his king: "My king, this is my dream, which I will tell you about: There was a young woman who was as high as the heavens and as broad as the earth. She was firmly set as the base of a wall. For me, she drowned you in a great river, a river of blood." 

Ur-Zababa chewed his lips, he became seriously afraid. He spoke to ……, his chancellor: "My royal sister, holy Inanna, is going to change (?) my finger into a …… of blood; she will drown Sargon, the cup bearer, in the great river. Beliš-tikal, chief smith, man of my choosing, who can write tablets, I will give you orders, let my orders be carried out! Let my advice be followed! Now then, when the cupbearer has delivered my bronze hand-mirror (?) to you, in the E-sikil, the fated house, throw them (the mirror and Sargon) into the mould like statues." 

Beliš-tikal heeded his king's words and prepared the moulds in the E-sikil, the fated house. The king spoke to Sargon: "Go and deliver my bronze hand-mirror (?) to the chief smith!" Sargon left the palace of Ur-Zababa. Holy Inanna, however, did not cease to stand at his right hand side, and before he had come within five or 10 nindan of the E-sikil, the fated house, holy Inanna turned around toward him and blocked his way, (saying:) "The E-sikil is a holy house! No one polluted with blood should enter it!" Thus he met the chief smith of the king only at the gate of the fated house. After he delivered the king's bronze hand-mirror (?) to the chief smith, Beliš-tikal, the chief smith, …… and threw it into the mould like statues. 

After five or 10 days had passed, Sargon came into the presence of Ur-Zababa, his king; he came into the palace, firmly founded like a great mountain. King Ur-Zababa …… and became frightened in his residence. He realized what was it about, but did not put into words, did not discuss it with anyone. Ur-Zababa became frightened in the bed-chamber, his holy residence. He realized what was it about, but did not put into words, did not discuss it with anyone.

From ETCSL, at Here

7. Cooper, Jerrold S., Paradigm and Propaganda: The Dynasty of Akkade in the 21st Century, in Ed. Liverani, pp. 23, p. 18.
 

8. See Footnote 6.
 

9. Kuhrt, p. 49.
 

10. See ETCSL, at Here
 

11. See Footnote 3.
 

12. Foster, Benjamin R., Management and Administration in the Sargonic Period, in Ed. Liverani, pp. 25-39.
 

13. IBID. p. 29.
 

14. IBID. pp. 29-31.
 

15. IBID. pp. 31-32.
 

16. IBID. pp. 32-34.
 

17. See Footnote 3, Michalowski, Roux, Kuhrt.
 

18. Steinkeller, Piotr, Early Political Development in Mesopotamia and the Origins of the Sargonic Empire, in Ed. Liverani, pp. 107-129, at pp.118-121.
 

19. See Roux, pp. 146-155.
 

20. Kuhrt, p. 50, Roux p.153.
 

21 Enheduana, website Here
 

22. Roux. p. 152.
 

23, Roux, p. 155.
 

24 Roux, pp. 155-160, Kuhrt, pp. 50-55, Saggs, pp. 66-70.
 

25, Pritchard, James B., The Ancient Near East: A New Anthology of Texts, v. 2, Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ, 1975, p. 206.
 

Pierre Cloutier