Hannibal’s Mistake?

Hannibal

In Livy’s series of books about the Second Punic War (218-201 B.C.E.) there is a scene in which after the battle of Cannae in which a commander of the Carthaginian cavalry Maharbal has a conversation with Hannibal, who was in command of the Carthaginian army in Italy.

The Battle of Teutoburg Wald

A Brief Update Note on a TV Program

and a Brief Look at two books about it

Battle at Kalkriese / Teutoburg Wald

In a previous posting I discussed the Battle of Teutoburg Wald where the German leader Arminius destroyed a Roman army.1 and by doing so put an end, it turned out permanently to Roman attempts to conquer Germany. Here I will discuss a television program on the battle. It is part of the series Perfect Storms. The episode is called The Lost Legions.2 

Guns in the Narrow Sea

The Armada’s Fire Power and the English Navy’s

Battle During the Armada Campaign

One of the most perplexing problems in Military history is the question of just how did the Armada campaign fail? The after all it was called “The Invincible Armada”. The Spanish were upon the sailing of the Armada almost comically confident but it ended in disaster and defeat.

The Battle of The Little Bighorn

A Note



Battle of the Little Bighorn

The battle of The Little Bighorn as produced an industry of books, and articles and has become a canonical / iconic event. This is sort of surprising given that the event wasn’t much more than a skirmish and in the great scheme of things not really all that important.

In fact the largely inordinate amount of attention given to this event is in itself a fascinating topic. However it seems to be one that attracts little attention. Instead the battle of The Little Bighorn has been dissected, analysed and evaluated and written about over and over again. In fact this small battle has been analysed to death. I suspect that the real reason for the fascination with the battle is not the battle itself but its context. By context I mean two factors, both closely linked; one is historical and the other is mythical.

Imperial Overstretch

 Movie Poster for The Eagle

SPOILERS AHEAD!

YOU HAVE BEEN WARNED!!

Recently I saw the film The Eagle, which concerned the efforts of a young Roman military officer to get back the lost Roman Eagle of the Ninth Legion Hispana.

In the story Marcus, the Roman military officer is the son of the Commander of the 9th Hispana Legion that was lost in the northern Britain, (modern day Scotland) late in the reign of the Emperor Trajan or early in the reign of Emperor Hadrian, (c. 117-120 C.E.). Young Marcus is appointed a commander of one of the garrisons along Hadrian’s Wall in the north of Britain and in repelling an assault by local Britons he is seriously wounded.

Medieval Logistics:

An Overview

Italian Knight c. 1400 C.E.

Logistically Medieval armies of the 12th and 13th century tended to live off the land which made them veritable plagues of locusts to the locals who where unfortunate enough to be where the armies were. Crop surpluses were very low. Generally yields of crops were on the order of 1 to 3 to 1 to 6, in some cases it was a very bad 1 to 2. the above figures are the ratio of planted grain to yield. I.E. for every 1 grain planted you got 3 or more grains. This meant that a sizable portion of the harvest had to be saved as seed grain for the next planting. Of course the peasants also had taxes to pay and dues owing to their lords. Both of which were frequently quite substantial. This made living fairly precarious. Add an army marching through to the mix and life became vastly more difficult if not impossible. Peasants usually viewed armies as a curse and punishment from heaven, even if the army was their army. Areas through which armies went through were usually swiftly devastated. Added to this Peasants were frequently forcibly conscripted to provide labour services to armies, men forcibly billeted on them. Not surprisingly regions in which armies appeared were often depopulated as people fled, and often took decades to recover.

The Decisive Battle that Never Happened

One of the traditions of western historiography is the tradition of the decisive battle. Supposedly the decisive battle is what determines that history will take one particular course rather than another. The general tenor of the decisive battle trope is the idea that history is progressive and that the decisive battle establishes that history will go in that progressive positive direction. It is rare that a historian will talk about a decisive battle making things worst or that the whole concept, which frequently reduces war to moving pieces on a chess board, is dubious.1

Allied with this concept is the notion in western historiography of the Asiatic horde. In this concept the "West" as been frequently threatened by "Asiatic hordes" that threaten to overwhelm Europe with hugely superior numbers and subject the west to Asiatic despotism. Thus battles from Marathon, 490 B.C.E., to Vienna, 1683 C.E., are characterized as fights against Europe i.e., the “West”, being overwhelmed by the hordes of Asia.2 “Asia” is the big bogyman other that threatens the innocent progressive “West”. Of course what exactly is “Asia” is poorly defined if at all. It is simply a cliche of little real content but much propagandistic hyperbole. Allied to this the concept of the Asiatic horde necessarily requires that the “Asiatic” armies be huge and the plucky European armies, fighting for truth, virtue and the European way be much smaller, but of course by pluck, luck and skill they defeat the huge Asiatic horde and save Europe from a fate worst than death, i.e., Asiatic sloth, corruption and decadence. Of course it is a collection of cliches that go back to the Greeks and they are of course of little validity.2

European armies are not only characterized as much smaller than the Asiatic horde but they are almost always characterized as more efficient and professional, which is what supposedly enables them to defeat the huge Asiatic hordes. Asia is always that which from outside Europe is threatening to overwhelm poor small Europe.3 Allied to this is the poisonous and utterly false notion that that the “West” is the unique heir of Greco-Roman civilization and that civilizations like the Islamic are “Asiatic” and outside that tradition. This is nonsense. Islam is the heir to Greece and Rome just as much as the “West” is. Further it is curious that although “Western” civilization is frequently described as Judeo-Christian; Middle Eastern civilization is never described as Judeo-Christian-Islamic. The need to cast Islamic civilization as the “Asiatic” other is rather obvious.

Now the above mentioned cliches can be criticized at every level. For example, lumping all the cultures of Asia under the term “Asiatic” is stunningly simpleminded. Further isn’t Europe a part of Asia and so “Asiatic”? As mentioned above the separation of Islam as wholly separated from the “west” and “Asiatic” is also dubious. Such things as the concept of the huge “Asiatic” army, relying solely on numbers against the smaller professional European army are cliches not realities of the past.4

Other conceits like the idea that everything that happens is for the best and history represents an upward process of progress are also in this view of the past. But one thing is omnipresent the small free professional European army that beats the huge unprofessional despotic, decadent army of “Asiatics” through sheer skill and fighting ability and thus preserves “Western” civilization from being destroyed or turned into just another stronghold of “Asiatic” despotism.5

However in this story of the triumph of the “West” towards it “inevitable” rise to global supremacy which by virtue of its considerable merits it undoubtedly deserved that happened an event that must with great effort be excised and made harmless and wholesome. It cannot be ignored but it must be purged as a decisive event because of what it reveals about the real state of the “West” at the time and the actual realities of the world then. Of course I am being facetious about the “West’s” domination being deserved out of the “West’s” intrinsic merits that is just a conceit worthy of ridicule although taken seriously as recently as a century ago.6 The event that should actually be a centrepiece in the history of the world but has been purged out as a central event because it reveals both the military and cultural weakness of the “West” at the time is the Mongol invasion of Europe 1237-1241 C.E.

Mongol Warrior
Here was no decisive battle that saved the “West” no grand demonstration of “Western” military superiority instead what was revealed was the political, military and yes cultural weakness of the “West” when faced with the armies of the Mongols. The patent and pathetic inability of the armies of the “West” to hold off the Mongols is a graphic demonstration of the marginality and weakness of the “West” in comparison to the rest of the world at that time. It has become customary among some to talk about a “Western” way of war and by implication at least, to talk about the superiority of this method of war fighting. The argument being that “Western” ways of war fighting are superior. This is bluntly dubious. The Mongols are a glaring example about how false that is. Of course the usual reaction is talk about the Mongols being “exceptions”. This is poppycock. Instead one should be examining weather or not the very idea of a superior “Western” way of war is in fact true. But then a superior “Western” way of war goes with the concept of small, professional European armies defeating huge “Asiatic” hordes of warriors ruled by decadent, despotic elites. In other words it is flattering to European notions of superiority.7

As I said the Mongol invasions are quite brutal indications of the reality of war making in that period. The simple fact is that the Mongol armies were crushingly and massively superior to the armies of the Europeans and they demonstrated it repeatedly during the campaign. The following is a brief run through of the Mongol campaign in Europe.

In the years 1221-1224 C.E. Genghis Khan sent an army under one of his general’s, Subotai, to check out the lands further west. After going through northern Iran and travelling through the Caucasus, were they crushed the Georgians, they emerged in the plains of southern Russian where they engaged the nomadic Cumans in a war during which the Mongols were victorious. Afterwards they invaded the Crimea where they stormed several Genoese trading settlements. During the winter of 1222-1223 while they wintered besides the Black sea spies were sent to scout out the situation in Europe. In the year 1223 as the Mongols were preparing to return to Mongolia. A combined Russian-Cuman army advanced on them. In a fit of extraordinary stupidity the envoys that Subotai sent to make a deal with the Russian – Cuman army were murdered. By then the Mongols simply wanted to retire from the area with no conflict. The result was disaster.

At the battle of the Kalka river, superior Mongol strategy and tactics resulted in an overwhelming Mongol victory. The murder of the Mongol envoys ensured that the battle was followed by a wholesale massacre. The commanders of the army that the Mongols captured were brutally pressed to death. Most figures for the battle give the Mongols c. 25,000 men and their enemies up to 75,000. This is false. It is unlikely that the Mongols were up to full strength; by then they probably numbered less than 15,000 and it unlikely that the Russian-Cuman army numbered much more than 30,000 men. Afterwards the Mongols after an indecisive battle with the Volga Bulgars withdrew to Mongolia.8

Kalka Aftermath
The knowledge that the Mongols gained in this incursion would help them in their next invasion. But in the meantime the Mongols were engaged in a war with the Chin empire that controlled northern China and so were delayed in returning to the west.

It wasn’t until 1235 C.E. that the new Mongol Khan Ogatai who had succeeded his father Genghis in 1227 decided to follow up the reconnaissance of 1221-1224 C.E.

The army was under the nominal command of Batu a grandson of Genghis Khan, the actual commander was Subotai who had lead the reconnaissance of 1221-1224 C.E.

Mongol Invasion of Europe 1237-1242 C.E.
In December of 1237 C.E. The Mongols invaded across the Volga river. Some accounts give their numbers as 150,000 men. This is false the actual total seems to be c. 50,000. The Volga Bulgars were swiftly obliterated and their chief towns stormed. In the winter of 1237-1238. Previous to this the Mongols had conquered the region between the Kama and the Volga right down to the Caspian and Black sea. In a matter of a few months the Mongols stormed through central Russia wiping out several armies and storming city after city. Only a sudden thaw in February 1238 prevented the Mongols from taking Novgorod. It was a campaign of astounding swiftness during which the Mongols marched well over a thousand miles and stormed dozens of different strongholds and fortresses. Most of Russia not out right conquered submitted to the Mongols.9

For the next 2 years Subotai consolidated his conquests and planned his next move along with sending large numbers of spies to gather intelligence about Europe. During all this intelligence gathering Subotai discovered that the Europeans were fatally, almost suicidally divided and at each other’s throats. After several years of preparation Subotai moved in December 1240 C.E.

Subotai had at most 50,000 men and probably less than 40,000 it seemed an incredibly small number with which to contemplate the conquest of Europe but it was enough as the following events were to show.

Kiev was stormed and destroyed along with other fortresses and cities in southern Russia. Than Subotai advanced to the passes of the Carpathian mountains. There he divided his army into several parts.

One section went north to deal with the Poles, Lithuanians and Germans. The southern section went around the Carpathians to invade Hungary from the south. The main section crossed the passes of the Carpathians and advanced on Budapest.

The northern section, lead by the Mongol general Kaidu, probably numbering no more than 15,000 men at most and likely c. 10,000 divided into several section one swept through Lithuania where it tore apart several Lithuanian armies and stormed fortress after fortress. It then devastated Prussia, then controlled by the Teutonic Knights and smashed yet again several armies it then cut through Pomerania, It then joined the forces invading Poland invaded Poland. The united section smashed the army of Boleslav V of Poland at Krakow and then stormed the city. The section invaded Silesia where Prince Henry of Silesia tried to stop them at Liegnitz with an army composed of Poles, Germans, Teutonic knights and some Czechs, probably numbering c. 15,000-20,000 men. The Mongols at most numbered 10,000 men. The Battle of Liegnitz, (April 9, 1241), was a disaster, Prince Henry was killed and his army annihilated. The Mongols then proceed to methodically devastate Silesia and storm one town after the other. King Wenceslas of Bohemia withdrew his army into Saxony. The Mongols followed up and devastated large sections of Saxony. The Mongol army instead of continuing west suddenly turned south to unite with the central army under Subotai. They past through Moravia, which devastated by fire and sword and many of its towns stormed and ravaged.

Meanwhile Subotai was engaged with the Hungarians led by Bela IV. Probably the ablest of the opponents of the Mongols during the invasion Bela IV was completely out classed the Mongols. While Subotai devastated the area around the Budapest other sections of the Mongol army devastated Transylvania and southern Hungary. Storming town after town.

Reuniting most of his army Subotai withdrew to the Sajo river c. 100 miles from Budapest. Bela IV showing both caution and initiative followed. The army he brought with him probably numbered c. 20,000-30,000. Subotai whose army probably by then numbered 20,000 decided to comprehensively annihilate the Hungarian army. Bela IV, showing a surprising amount of energy, had seized a bridgehead over the river and fortified it. Subotai launched a holding attack on the bridgehead and quickly overwhelmed it. Then as the Hungarians came out of their fortified camp to repel the attack they were attacked in flank by the main Mongol force. By deliberately leaving a hole in their encircling forces the Mongols cause the Hungarian army to disintegrate into a mob of fugitives who were then relentlessly pursued. The Battle ended in a horrible massacre of the fugitives. So ended the Battle of the Sajo River, (April 11, 1241).

In the relentless pursuit that followed, Budapest was stormed and so was any Hungarian fortress that resisted. Bela IV fled to Dalmatia where he was relentlessly purued. Bela IV eventually was able find safety in Germany. The Austrian Duke instead of helping Bela IV imprisoned him to get some cash out of him before letting him go. An outstanding example of the suicidal divisions among the Europeans.

At the same time in several battles Transylvania was subdued and most of its town’s conquered.10 The astounding speed of this invasion and the fact that in a matter of months all eastern Europe was ravaged and conquered is one of the most stunning military campaigns in history.

Subotai spent most of the late spring, summer and fall consolidating his conquests and preparing for the next stage in the conquest of Europe. The Europeans during this brief interval were utterly unable to coordinate any of their defensive efforts as Subotai worked out his plans for invading Austria, Germany and Italy in the coming winter.

In late 1241, shortly after Christmas Mongol armies crossed the alps into northern Italy, while other forces devastated the area around Vienna. It is hard to believe that the campaign of 1241-1242 would not see the conquest of Germany and Italy at least. To be followed by France, Spain and England and then some moping up. All probably to take less than 5 more years. Possibly considerably less if the Europeans sensibly stopped fighting and submitted.

It was not to be. Instead of Europe saved by some last minute military feat, Europe was saved by the fact that the Mongol Khan Ogatai drank too much. In a night of drunken excess in the fall of 1241 Ogatai drank too much and died. THe news took a couple of months to reach the armies in Europe. But when it did the law of Genghis Khan stated.11

..after the death of the ruler all offspring of the House of Genghis Khan, wherever they might be, must return to Mongolia to take part in the election of the new Khakhan.12

Khan Ogatai
There was considerable arguing among the commanders of the Mongol army. The details are fascinating in that the three Mongol Princes wanted to stay and continue the war or at least leave their armies there under subordinates to continue the war. Subotai, the military genius responsible for this spectacularly successful campaign argued for a withdrawal from central and eastern Europe, leaving some forces in southern Russia and too renew the campaign at a later date. The rest would return to Mongolia for the selection of a new Khan.

As the Mongols withdrew they went through Serbia and Bulgaria in 1242 C.E., where they, once again, cut up various armies, devastated large areas and stormed many towns and fortresses leaving behind a wasteland.13

The Europeans promptly started their suicidal infighting again, basically unmindful that the Mongols might come back. Fortunately the Mongols never did come back.

Basically the Mongols were preoccupied by internal disputes and they decided to concentrate on the conquest of all of China, a vastly more profitable and difficult challenge than Europe. This took many decades. (Until 1279 C.E.). By then the Mongol realm was divided and the Khanate of the Golden Horde that controlled the Steppes of Russia was not strong enough on its own to conquer Europe and also frankly not interested.14

The true state of actual power relations at the time is revealed by the fact that not only did it take the Mongols decades to conquer all of China, (almost 70 years), but the armies they used were vastly larger in the order of 150,000 – 200,000 men by 1270 C.E. Further there was no equivalent in the conquest of China of a spectacular conquest like that of Eastern Europe in 1240-1241 C.E. There a Mongol army of c. 50,000 sufficed to crush eastern Europe in a few months whereas Mongol armies of a similar size had trouble conquering a single Chinese province. Compared to China Europe at the time was weak and no match for the Mongols. It is fortunate for Europe that the Mongols after this invasion were so fixated on China that it consumed their main efforts for decades. By the time China was conquered the Mongols were both unable and unwilling to renew the conquest of Europe. So in a way China saved Europe from the Mongols.

Traditionally the nomadic armies of the steppes could be quite formidable their chief weakness was lack of logistic support and the inability to storm cites and strongholds.

Genghis Khan solved those problems in combination of ways. The Mongol armies were highly mobile; each fighting man had at least 4-5 and usually more spare mounts. Discipline was ferocious and training comprehensive. The Mongol armies were able to move at truly spectacular speeds due to their vast array of horses and other support animals to cart supplies etc. The logistic problems of gathering supplies were solved by an efficient commissariat that used the bureaucratic techniques of the Chinese with Chinese technical experts to organize such things. Giving the Mongols an effective logistical setup. Further Chinese bureaucratic expertise enabled the Mongols to organize an efficient intelligence gathering i.e., spy system and to collate and analyse the information effectively. Also Chinese technicians provided the support and expertise in siege craft, machines etc., for how to effectively and quickly storm cities and fortresses. In Europe this was especially useful in that compared to Chinese cities and fortresses European cities and fortresses were not very challenging to take. In effect Mongol war making was a combination of steppe nomad traditional war making and Chinese technical / bureaucratic expertise. The combination proved to be brutally formidable and something the Europeans of the day had no answer too.15

The usual figures given even now, in my opinion, greatly exaggerate the size of the Mongol armies. Confusing paper strength with actual strength for one thing. Given that the Mongol armies were heavily horsed and mobile it is very unlikely that they would number over 100,000 for the invasion of Europe, even 50,000 is likely too large. Interestingly the Mongol armies invading China had large infantry units. Given that each fighting man would have at least 4 horses, (some accounts say 16) and that support forces would have at least 50% of the number of horses of the fighting men. That would mean an army of 50,000 men would have a minimum of 300,000 horses, to say nothing of mules donkeys etc. Given also that all cavalry armies are almost always much smaller than largely infantry armies, (because of the extra logistic support all those horses require), it is hard to believe that the Mongol armies invading Europe were very large.16

One of the half truths that is popular today is the idea of a “Western Way of Warfare”.17 The idea is that there is an especially different “Western" way of warfare that is more deadly and formidable than other ways. In other words another way of flattering “Westerners” i.e., Europeans on their supposed superiority. I rather think that an unbiased look the history of warfare would call into question any notion that the “Western Way of Warfare” is in fact necessarily superior, assuming such a concept is in fact for real. It also feeds into the European notion of the “Oriental Horde” defeated by the small European army in a decisive battle that saves the “West” from the horrors of a decadent Asia.

It did not happen in this case then backwater Europe was saved by a mere fluke, a stroke of luck that the Europeans did nothing to take advantage of. Only later developments in central Asia and China prevented the renewal of the conquest of Europe. There is no decisive battle to write up in collections of decisive battles. The battles of Liegnitz and Sajo would likely have marked the decisive battles in the conquest of Europe except for a fluke event. Even so it is passing ironic that Subotai who organized one of the great campaigns of military history was the one responsible for calling it off. It appears that he expected to come back to it in a couple of years. Fortunately for Europe he never came back and Liegnitz and Sajo are simply decisive battles that might have been.

Sometimes small things have huge effects and in this case Ogatai’s decision to drink a few extra cups of wine may be one of the most important decisions in the last thousand years.

1. See Keegan, John, The Face of Battle, Penguin Books, London, 1976, pp. 13-77, for a critique of the concept of the decisive battle.

2. See Creasy, Sir Edward S., The Fifteen Decisive Battles, London, 1908, and Fuller, J. F. C., A Military History of the Western World, v. 1-3, Da Capo Press, New York, 1954, 1955, 1956, Dupuy, R. Ernest, & Dupuy, Trevor N., The Encyclopedia of Military History, Revised Edition, Harper & Row Pub., New York, 1977, for many examples of this sort of thinking.

3. IBID, Fuller.

4. Fuller does this a lot and so do Dupuy & Dupuy.

5. Footnote 1.

6. See Creasy for example.

7. The idea of a “Western Way of War”, is from Hanson, V., The Western Way of War, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1989. Although the book is excellent he does not in any sense prove his idea that the “Western Way of War” is superior or that it is unique to the “West”. John Keegan in his A History of Warfare, Vintage, New York, 1993, uses the idea with great care and sense.

8. Dupuy, pp. 338-339, Prawdin, Michael, The Mongol Empire, 2nd Edition, The Free Press, New York, 1961, pp. 210-220, Mote, F. W., Imperial China 900-1800, Harvard University Press, Harvard CONN, 1999, pp. 432-433, Turnbull, Steven, Genghis Khan and the Mongol Conquests, Osprey Pub., 2003, pp. 74-75, Buell, Paul E., Historical Dictionary of the Mongol World Empire, The Scarecrow Press Inc., Oxford, 2003, pp. 35-36, 255-258, Shpakovsky, V., & Nicolle, D., Kalka River 1223, Osprey Pub., 2001, pp. 50-82.

9. Prawdin, pp. 250-252, Dupuy, 347, Mote, 435-436, Buell, pp. 45-46, 233-234, Turnbull, pp. 44-48.

10. Prawdin, 252-269, Dupuy, 347-350, Mote, 435-436, Buell, pp. 46-47, 186-187, 235, 257-258, Turnbull, pp. 48-54, 75.

11. Ögedei Khan, from Wikipedia, Here, Dupuy, p. 350, Prawdin, p. 269, Mote, p. 436, Turnbull, p. 55, Dawson, Raymond, Imperial China, Penguin Books, London, 1972, p. 215. There were rumours that Ogatai was poisoned. These rumours are almost certainly not true.

12. Dupuy, quoting the law p. 350.

13. Dupuy, p. 350.

14. Mote, 444-460, Turnbull, pp. 55-56, 60-61, Dawson, pp. 212-221.

15. Dupuy, 340-345, Keegan 1993, 200-207, Dawson, 204-212, Shpakovsky, pp. 23-35, Turnbull, pp. 17-18, Buell, pp. 112-113.

16. Mote, pp. 427-428, Turnbull, p. 18, Buell, pp. 109-110. Dupuy and Dupuy are especially guilty in this respect giving very exaggerated figures for both the Mongol armies and the European armies opposing them, see pp. 347-350.

17. See Hanson Footnote 7.

Pierre Cloutier

The Degree of Themistocles and Military Probability

Degree of Themistocles
One of the most significant events in history was the successful Greek defence against Persia in 480-479 B. C.E. The decisive event was the naval battle of Salamis just off the coast of Attica near Athens, where the Greeks defeated the Persian navy.

The most important Greek naval contingent was that of Athens and the most influential Greek Naval leader was the Athenian statesman Themistocles, who engineered the Greek victory at Salamis.

The Greeks had tried to stop the Persians at the pass of Thermopylae, with naval forces stationed at nearby Artemisium. The plan failed when the Persians broke through by outflanking the pass. The Persians advanced and ravaged Athens and Attica. The Chief account of this is that of Herodotus who describes panic and what amounts to hysteria in Athens. The Athenians evacuate their women and children to the island of Salamis and parts of the Peloponnesus and man their fleet with the men. The Greek fleet assembles at Salamis to cover the evacuation. The Persian fleet bottles up the Greek Fleet at Salamis and in the panic some of the Greek leaders contemplate withdrawal. By a judicious combination of diplomacy and blackmail Themistocles keeps the fleet together and eggs on the Persians to attack. The result is the battle of Salamis. Afterwards the Persians withdraw part of their forces and fleet withdraws also to Asia Minor. The next year the Greeks defeat the Persians at Plataea ending the Persian threat.1

Map of Greece
Such is the story as usually told.

In 1959 at Troezen in the part of Greece called the Peloponnesus was found an inscription that was supposed to be a 3rd century B.C.E., copy of a 5th century B.C.E., degree of the Athenian Assembly dated 480 B.C.E.2 It dealt with plans for the defence of Greece from the Persian Invasion and goes has follows:

(1) [Gods]. It was resol[ved] by the boule and the people: Themis[tokl]es son of Neokles of Phrearrhioi proposed the motion: [to en]tr[u]st th[e] ci[ty] to Athena [who protlects, Athens (5) a[nd to all the other gods to guard an[d] ke[ep off the ba]rbar[i]an in defence of the country; and that [a]l[l] Athenian[s and the foreig]ners living in Athens should place [their chil]dre[n and wives i[n] Troizen [ .... ? in the protection of Theseus] the founder of the land; and that they should pla[ce] (10) t[he old people and the] moveable possessions on Salamis[; and that the treasurers and the priestesses should remain on the acropolis guarding the belongings of th]e gods; and that all the other Athenians and the foreigners who have reached adulthood should embark o[n the prepared 200 ships and (15) resi[st] t[he barbarian on behalf of freedom, both their own [and that of the other Greeks], along with the Spartans and Corin[thians and Aeginetans] and the others who wish] to sh[are in the danger; and that the gene[r]al[s] should appoint [200] trierar[chs, one for] each ship, (20) [beginning tomorrow, from those who o[w]n both la[nd a]nd [hom]e in Ath[e]ns and who have legit[imate] childr[en and are not more th]an fifty years of age, an[d] should [a]ss[ign t]he ships t[o t]hem by lot; vv they should also choose [t]en ma[r]ines [for each ship from those between twenty [and (25) thirty years of age and four archers; they should [a]lso ap[point by lot] the officers for the ships when they al[so] appoint [the trierar]chs by lot; the generals should als[o] list [the others ship] by ship on notice4boards, the Athenians according to the deme (lexiarchic) registers (30) and the] foreigners from those registered wi[t]h the [pole]m[archj they should list them, assigning them [t]o 200 divisions of [u]p to 100 men each and inscribe for each [divis]ion the name of the trireme and the trierarch and the offi[ce]rs so that they may know on which trireme (35) e[a]ch [d]ivision should e[m]bark; and when al[1] the divisions have been assigned and allocated to the triremes, the boule and t[h]e general[s] are to man a[l]l the 200 ships after [sa]crificing to propitiate Zeus the Almighty (Pankrates) and Athena and Victory (Nike) and Poseidon (40) the Preser[v]er (Asphaleios); and when the ships are manned, with 100 of th[e]m they are to assist Artemis[i]on in Euboea, and with the other 100 around Salamis and the rest of Attica they are to lie in wait and guard the country. So that all Athenians may be united (45) in resisting the barbarian, those who have changed their residence for [ten] years are to go to Salamis and stay there until the people should decide about them; and those [deprived of civic rights ....]3

Not surprisingly the document has been controversial. It for example clearly contradicts Herodotus’ account on a number of points. The most important being as follows:

1. That the Athenian assembly voted to evacuate non-combatants before the battles of Thermopylae and Artemisium and in fact the evacuation began then.

2. The Athenians held back part of their fleet at Salamis. Sending only 100 to Artemisium and keeping 100 at Salamis.

3. The Athenians in fact only intended Artemisium and Thermopylae has temporary holding actions and were preparing for a decisive action at Salamis.

Now one of the problems is that in the 4th and 3rd century B.C.E., there were a number of faked Athenian degrees allegedly from earlier times. Further the language and form of the lettering is in some respects early 3rd century B.C.E. Given that at the very least this degree if its based on an authentic degree of 480 B.C.E., the document has been modified / edited.4

As mentioned above this scenario contradicts Herodotus’ account which is over all quite believable if problematic on details. It is hard to believe that Herodotus could have missed this if it was true. Of course this is not decisive it is simply a problem.5

However the chief problems with the degree are simple military ones. If this was the Athenian plan, or more precisely Themistocles’, then it was an unbelievably stupid plan. And on top of it is very hard to believe that the Athenian assembly would have agreed to such a plan to say nothing of Athens’s allies.

Some of Athens’s allies lived in the area just south of the pass of Thermopylae, just what would they have thought about Athenian commitment to defence against Persia knowing that Athens was already planning to evacuate its non-combatants and abandon Attica and Athens to Persia and keeping ships behind at Salamis. One wonders just what the Spartans would have thought of such plan. Almost certainly it would have infuriated them.

Regarding the Athenian Assembly. Is it remotely serious as even a flight of fancy that even before Artemisium and Thermopylae had been breached that the Assembly would have agreed to open up their city, farms etc., to be looted and devastated by Persian troops has part of some hair-brained scheme of defence? It would be clear that acting out of simple self interest that the Assembly would want the Persians halted as far away from Athens as reasonably possible.

From a psychological point of view it is hard to think up a strategy more effective in demoralizing a population before hand and infuriating your allies.

It is generally recognized that the Greek land and naval forces at Artemisium and Thermopylae were intended to halt the Persian forces permanently. Certainly Herodotus’ account would seem to indicate this.6 Attempt to find a trace of a version of events similar to the degree in Herodotus center on the second oracle of Delphi prophecy given to Athenian emissaries before the battle of Salamis. Part of it goes has follows:

Yet Zeus the all-seeing grants to Athene’s prayer
That the wooden wall only shall not fail, but help you and your children
But await not the host of horse and foot coming from Asia,
Nor be still, but turn your back and withdraw from the foe.
Truly come when you will meet him face to face.
Divine Salamis, you will bring death to women’s sons
When the corn is scattered, or the harvest gathered in.7

Aside from the question of whether or not this prophecy was ever uttered for real or if it is a post-hoc creation; it is a rather slender reed to build on and it still faces the problem that the plan for defence as outlined in the degree is military idiocy.

To illustrate some of the problems with this document look at this photo of the island of Salamis.

Arial Photo of Salamis and surrounding area

The fact is the bay of Salamis is a trap. You can see in the left center the narrow strait between the island of Salamis and the mainland. In antiquity it was even narrower and shallower. It is unlikely that the Greek fleet could have escaped through it or even navigate it!8 All the Persians had to do was block the main strait and blockade the Greek fleet in its trap and sooner or latter the Greeks would have been forced to capitulate or come out and fight in far more open waters were the greater numbers and speed of the Persian fleet would have given the Persians the advantage.

Any plan to set up Salamis has an ultimate defensive position is simply moronic. In fact it appears that the plan was simply for the Greek fleet to cover the evacuation of the population of Athens and Attica to the island of Salamis and the Peloponnesus. I have little doubt that the Persian Admirals were simply ecstatic to find the Greek fleet at Salamis, where it could be blockaded and the transports of the fleet had used to transport part of the army directly to the Peloponnesus out flanking the wall, manned by the Spartans and others across the Isthmus of Corinth.

Now an argument can be made that ignoring the Greek fleet at Salamis was not an option, possible flank attacks, and that the lateness of the campaign season would have forced the Persians to retire to winter quarters.9

I rather doubt that all the Persian fleet would have been required to keep the Greeks bottled up. Only a portion of the fleet was necessary and of course with the Greek fleet at Salamis it would have been easy for Persian transports carrying troops to invade the island of Aegina , (second greatest Greek sea power) and the Peloponnesus. Further the Athenians had abandoned Attica just before harvest. Some food would have been available for Persian troops. Also the Persians had the alliance of Thebes which gave them a substantial Greek ally in central Greece. It is debatable whether or not the Persians were under any real military pressure to attack.

Finally the Greek alliance was fragile, with each city state extremely suspicious of each other and ready at virtually any moment to accuse each other of betrayal. In fact Herodotus’ account of the events in the Greek camp before Salamis indicate an alliance on the point of collapse, with massive mutual recrimination. Herodotus’ account describes in fair detail how the Greeks were ready to flee to their respective homes with their ships and how Themistocles through a combination of trickery and blackmail managed to thwart their efforts.10 It is hard to believe that the Persians were not aware of this from their spies. If anything it was the Greeks who needed a battle soon to save their crumbling alliance.

Herodotus gives to Artemisia, ruler of Halicarnassus, the following words:

Let me tell you how I think things will now go with the enemy; if only you are not in too great a hurry to fight at sea – if you keep the fleet on the coast where it now is – then, whether you stay here or advance into the Peloponnese, you will easily accomplish your purpose. The Greeks will not be able to hold out against you for long; you will soon cause their forces to disperse – they will soon break up and go home. I hear they have no supplies in the island where they now are; and the Peloponnesian contingents, at least are not likely to be very easy in their minds if you march with the army towards their country – they will hardly care to fight in defence of Athens.11

Now it is virtually certain that Artemisia never uttered those words but in my opinion they represent an accurate overview of the situation before the battle of Salamis.

It is interesting that Herodotus says that Themistocles sent a secret message to the Persians telling them that the Greeks were completely disunited and would offer little resistance and that the Persians would have a easy victory if they attacked.12

Strait of Salamis where the battle occurred
The end result of all of this was the Greek victory at Salamis. Even if one doubts certain aspects of the story like Themistocles message to the Persians; the picture it gives of an alliance hanging together by a thread rings true. It also indicates desperation for a battle as soon has possible before the alliance collapses into mutual recriminations.

Themistocles was one of the most astute politicians of his time and it appears he pulled of the equivalent of a military / political miracle. It is rather ironic that he ended up as governor of Magnesia in Asia Minor for the Persian King Artxerxes son of King Xerxes who he had defeated at Salamis!13

It is a common place that in war things hardly ever go according to plan and it is very hard to believe that the apparent plan indicated in the degree would have worked out so well; given its glaring defects and lack of common sense. Further any such degree passed before Artemisium and Thermopylae would have told the Persians well ahead of time Greek, or at least Athenian strategy.

It is virtually certain that at the very least the degree we have is not an exact / accurate copy of the Athenian degree passed at the time and that its more controversial sections that contradict Herodotus should simply not be taken seriously.

1. Sealey, Raphael, A History of the Greek City States: 700 – 338 B.C.E., University of California Press, Los Angles, 1976, pp. 208-228, Buckley, Terry, Aspects of Greek History: 750 – 323 B.C., Routledge, London, 1996, pp. 170-188, Ehrenberg, Victor, From Solon to Socrates, 2nd Edition, Routledge, London, 1973, pp. 152-174, For Herodotus see Herodotus, The Histories, Revd Edition, Penguin Books, London, 2003. For the panic in Athens see Book 8, s. 40-48, See also The Rise and Fall of Athens, Plutarch, Penguin Books, London, 1960, Themistocles, s. 9-10, Fuller, J.F.C., A Military History of the Western World, v. 1, Da Capo Press, New York, 1954, pp. 26-52, Burn, A.R., The Pelican History of Greece, Penguin Books, London, 1965, pp. 177-192.

2. Buckley, p. 174.

3. Dillon, Matthew, & Garland, Lynda, Ancient Greece: Social and Historical Documents from Archaic times to the Death of Socrates, 2nd Edition, Routledge, London, 2000, p. 203. Other translations include, Lewis, Naphtali, Greek Historical Documents, The Fifth Century B.C., A.M. Hakkert Ltd., Toronto, 1971, pp. 4-5, Meiggs, R., & Lewis, D., A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions to the End of the Fifth Century B.C., University of Oxford Press, Oxford, 1969, No. 23, Fornara, Charles W., Translated Documents of Greece and Rome 1: Archaic times to the end of the Peloponnesian War, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2nd Edition, 1983, No. 55, pp. 54-55.

4. Buckley, p. 174, Lewis, p. 4, Ehrenburg, pp. 156, 426 n. 59, Sealey, pp. 214-216.

5. See Buckley, pp. 170-175, Sealey, pp. 208-221.

6. IBID. Buckley, and Herodotus, Book 7, s. 196-239.

7. Herodotus, Book 7, s. 141.

8. Sealey, p. 220.

9. Buckley, p. 178.

10. Herodotus, Book 8, s. 50-65.

11. IBID. Book 8, s. 68.

12. IBID. Book 8. s. 75-77.

13. Plutarch, Themistocles, s. 27-32.

Pierre Cloutier

A Note on Numbers and Military Probabilities

in Ancient Sources.

A common problem with trying to sort out the history of the Greco-Roman era is trying to make sense of the numbers given in the different accounts of, for example, the size of armies.

In this essay reference as already has been made to the problem of wildly exaggerated numbers given by the Greek historians. This is a very wide ranging topic so the author will stick to Ktesias , Herodotus and Diodorus .

Regarding Herodotus the main question is where to begin. So a start will be his numbers for the invasion of Greece. We get the following:

1,207 Triremes, with 241,000 men & 36,210 Marines
3,000 other ships with 240,000 men
1,700,000 infantry & 80,000 cavalry
A camel and chariot corps for another 20,000
Total 2,317,610 men
Add 120 ships, with 24,000 men
300,000 more men
Total 2,641,610
men + Servants equal to above total
Grand total 5,283,320 men; Total ships 1,327 Triremes

This does not include camp women, wives, cooks, etc., of course.1

Island of Salamis, Greece

The numbers from Ktesias for the invasion of Greece are as follows:

800,000 men excluding servants
1,000 Triremes2

For the Egyptian Expedition the numbers are:

400,000 men in one army
80 Triremes in one fleet
500,000 men in another army
300 Triremes in another fleet3

The numbers from Diodorus for the invasion of Greece are as follows:

1210 "Warships", probably Triremes
1,000,000 men.4

Battle of Salamis

For the Egyptian Expedition the numbers are:

300,000 men in one army
300,000 in another army
300 Triremes5

Egyptian Delta

The above are the figures given for Persian forces in both the invasion of Greece and the Egyptian Expedition by several sources. The figures for men are simply absurd not to be taken seriously. They give the feel about being plucked out of thin air.

Herodotus for example in his careful listing of his figures for men, and in how he calculates them gives the appearance of being both exact and careful. The problem is it makes his figures look if anything even more absurd. For example Herodotus says:

Meanwhile Xerxes at Doriscus was occupied in numbering his troops. As nobody has left a record, I cannot state the precise number of men provided by each separate nation, but the grand total, excluding the naval contingent, turned out to be 1,700.000. The counting was done by first packing ten thousand men as close together as they could stand and drawing a circle round them on the ground; they were then dismissed, and a fence, about navel-high, was constructed round the circle; finally other troops were marched into the area thus enclosed and dismissed in their turn, until the whole army had been counted.6

This truly weak attempt by Herodotus to make his figures look plausible only succeeds in enmeshing Herodotus further in the absurdity of his figures. It appears Herodotus realized that at least some people hearing or reading his numbers would not believe them so this explanation was put in. It is hardly surprising that later writers criticized Herodotus for either gullibility or out-right lying. However it seems that:

He (Herodotus–Author) does seem to have believed in the traditional figures, if his arithmetical labours are any indication. That these numbers are a sheer physical impossibility does not seem to have occurred to him.7

Although it should be pointed out ancient writers, to the best of our knowledge, did not criticize Herodotus for including absurdly high figures for Persian armies and fleets.

No attempt to sort out, analyze etc., such figures can save them, certainly not Herodotus ' absurd explanations. For example dividing by 10, or a hundred. Herodotus’ figures for the number of men cannot be saved by such procedures. The bottom line is that they are pure invention is more likely than that they are not. In fact this is just one more example of Herodotus’ lack of understanding of military affairs.8

Regarding the number of ships here the figures are not quite as absurd. The 80 and three hundred ships recorded for the Egyptian Expedition certainly are plausible. But here we run into problems. The three hundred figure reads like a stereotype, not a real figure and the 80 could be nothing but a doubling of the Athenian 40.9

As for Herodotus' figure of 1,327 triremes this implies a total force of 301,610 men. Accepting Herodotus' figure of 200 men per ship.10 This figure is implausible, especially if we add in the supporting vessels.

Herodotus' figures for ships are not implausible if we accept that the figure he gives for triremes is for total ships. This is so because it was easier to supply and move men by ship than over land and on the sea the very expensive, both financially and logistically, cavalry was not a factor. Further food supplies could be moved much cheaper by sea than overland. Still there were limits so Herodotus' total figures are still implausible for the full fleet. Although it is probable that there were more men in the fleet than in the land army. As for the navy feeding the army it would have had enough problems feeding its self with trying to feed the army as well.11

If Herodotus' figures are, despite his efforts to justify and explain them, impossible, then neither the figures of Diodorus or Ktesias are in the least reliable. Both Diodorus and Ktesias seemed to have selected impressive large figures, quite literally, out of thin air and made no attempt or justify or explain them.

The best way to approach this is in terms of logistics, not crunching numbers taken from dubious sources. Since if the literary sources cannot be taken seriously than what we have left is probability.

Before we leave the "Oriental" hordes behind a good check on these numbers is the forces lead by Napoleon in his invasion of Russia, which totalled, along with reinforcements, about 612,000 men.12 Despite considerable logistic support and trying to live off the land, Napoleon's army was mainly destroyed by logistical and supply problems. Spread out over a vastly larger area than Ancient Greece and one that was more productive, Napoleon's army could not properly feed itself and was destroyed.13 If Napoleon could not feed and supply his army in Russia in 1812, with vastly superior logistic and supply resources it is hard to believe that the huge hordes of Persians mentioned by the Greek historians could have been supplied successfully.14

Logistically the problem, until very recently, has been that the size of an army depended not just on the resources of the nation, empire creating the army but on the local resources of the area where the army would be operating. It is clear that:

In the ancient world, where logistics placed severe constraints on the size and mobility of armies, even a small force, when disciplined and determined, could pose a threat.15

What this means, for example, is that despite the huge size of the Persian empire in relation to Greece, the main limit on the size of the Persian Army invading Greece was not the size of the empire but the size of the resources in Greece that could support an army. Since the army would have to be supplied locally it was Greece's ability to support the army that counted not the size of the Persian Empire. The relative strength of states counted in these circumstances not in terms of being able to mobilize vast armies on a battlefield, because logistics set limits on that, but the ability of states to finance and sustain and replace losses in war. Thus if the Persian Empire could only send an army of 50,000 men against a enemy because that was all the area could supply, it could still do so again and again, both financially and in manpower. Whereas its enemy may not be able to sustain such an effort or replace its losses to the same extent.

In one of Thucydides speeches, he puts in the mouth Hermocrates, a politician, during the debate at Syracuse about whether to resist the Athenians, the following:

There have certainly not been many great expeditions, either Hellenic or foreign, which have been successful when sent far from home. They cannot come in greater numbers than the inhabitants of the country and their neighbours, all of whom will unite through fear.16

It appears, given the likely-hood, that this represented Thucydides’ views that this also represents his general opinion about Persian numbers against Greek numbers. Further this shows that the general principal of a limit on the size of invasion / expeditionary forces was recognized by some thinkers in antiquity.

How large were the armies that invaded Greece and Egypt ?17 Two conclusions can be drawn. First the numbers given by the Greek Historians cannot be taken seriously has figures for the size of the Persian armies, except has evidence of what the Greeks believed. Second Thucydides decision not to give figures at all of the size of the Persian armies is probably the best course, because we do not know and baring some "find" can not know, the actual size of the Persian armies.

Greeks Fighting Persians
1. Herodotus, Herodotus: The Histories, Penguin Books, London, 1954, Book 7, s. 184-186.

2. Ktesias in Photius, The Library of Photius, Vol. 1, SPCK, London, 1920, Book 72, s. 27.

3. IBID. Book 72, s. 36-37.

4. Diodorus, Diodorus Siculus, v. 4, William Heinemann, London, 1989, Book 11, s. 3-5.

5. IBID. Book 11, s. 74-75.

6. Herodotus , Book 7, s. 60.

7. Waters, K. H., Herodotus the Historian, Croom Helm, London, 1985. p. 152.

8. Buckley, Terry, Aspects of Greek History, 750-323 B.C., Routledge, London, 1996, pp. 15-16. For a Critical discussion of Herodotus' accouint of the Persian Wars see Buckley, pp. 161-188.

9. Bigwood, J. M., Ctesias' Account of the Revolt of Inarus, Phoenix, v. 32, 1976, pp. 11.

10. Herodotus, Book 7, s. 184.

11. See Lazenby, J. F., The Defence of Greece, Aris and Phillips, Warminister, England, 1993, pp. 88-92.

12. Riehn, Richard K., 1812, Napoleon's Russian Campaign, John Wiley & Sons Ltd., Toronto, 1991, p. 395.

13. IBID. pp. 138-155.

14. It is a common, but incorrect belief that Napoleon's army was destroyed by the Russian winter. This is only partly true. By far the worst losses were in the advance to Moscow, from disease, starvation etc. See Riehn, pp. 199-201, 404-407.

15. Daniel, Elton L., The History of Iran, Greenwood Press, London, 2001, p. 48.

16. Thucydides, Thucydides: History of the Peloponesian War, Penguin Books, London, 1954, Book 6, s. 33.

17. For a thoroughly unconvincing attempt to partially justify Herodotus' figures for the land army see Cook, J. M., The Persian Empire, Schocken Books, New York, 1983, pp. 114-116. Cook does not deal with the considerable logistic problems of such a large force or the added burden of such a large armies’ camp followers.

Pierre Cloutier