Over-Rated Military “Geniuses” Part I  

The following is a list, with a brief discussion of two Military, so-called “Geniuses”, who in my opinion are spectacularly overrated.
 

Gustavus Aldolphus 1594-1632.

Gustavus Aldolphus

Gustavus Aldolphus was the Swedish King who led, for a short period of time, the “Protestant” side in the Thirty Years War. I have referred to him in previous posts, more specifically one discussing his non-existent “Great Victory” at the battle of Lutzen in 1632. In which it was pointed out that the story of a “Great Victory” relies on myth, hero worship and what amounts to outright fabrication to concoct. But then Gustavus Aldolphus’ entire reputation is based on myth making and what amounts to fabrication.

Several writers have elevated Gustavus Aldolphus into one of the “Great Captains” of history. In other words one of a small number of the greatest commanders of all time.1 What they base it on is not the actual doings of Gustavus Aldolphus but the doings of a fictional, largely nonexistent Gustavus Aldolphus.

For example Gustavus Aldolphus is given the entire credit for allegedly revolutionizing his military armed forces and creating a virtual military revolution.2 Aside from the fact, and it is a fact, that this alleged military revolution is overdrawn, The changes in the military forces of Sweden were NOT from the brain of the King but mainly from those around him and Gustavus Aldolphus had little to do with them. But then giving the King credit for other peoples achievements is part of the myth of the fictional Gustavus Aldolphus.

As for Gustavus Aldolphus’ actual conduct of operations. Well a very studied and cultivated effort is required to ignore what actually happened in those operations. A major effort must be made NOT to understand the actual conduct of those operations except through the prism of accepting that Gustavus Aldolphus is one of the greatest soldiers ever. Thus a most determined effort is required to not understand what actually happened and what it tells us about Gustavus Aldolphus’ conduct of military operations. Thus ignorance and blindness is demanded least reality intrude.

Thus Gustavus Aldolphus’ actual conduct of the Livonian war, 1617-1629, is ignored in favour of fantasy, and airy phrases take the place of actual analysis of the King’s operations in the war. In point of fact Gustavus Aldolphus’ handling of the operations while competent was not brilliant. In fact Gustavus Aldolphus was repeatedly thwarted and defeated in open battle on more than one occasion. Nothing in his handling of his army during this 12 year war indicates military genius, much less Gustavus Aldolphus being one of the greatest generals in history.3

Once Gustavus Aldolphus entered the Thirty Years War, he became a figure of myth, which was elaborated and turned into a veritable cult that reached truly spectacular depths of sycophantic hero worship after Gustavus Aldolphus’ death in 1632.

During that war Gustavus Aldolphus won one truly spectacular victory. The battle of Breitenfeld, in 1631, which elevated him to heights of worship few humans have enjoyed before of since. Afterwards Gustavus Aldolphus faced the great Czech general Wallenstein who right until the day Gustavus Aldolphus died at Lutzen in 1632, usually out manoeuvred, out thought and out fought Gustavus Aldolphus. Now since Wallenstein is almost always rated far far lower on the totem pole of military excellence than Gustavus Aldolphus just how was this possible?4

For example after Breitenfeld, the Emperor recalled Wallenstein who rebuilt the Imperial army and embarked on a war of manoeuvre against Gustavus Aldolphus. The central part of this war of manoeuvre was Wallenstein manoeuvring Gustavus Aldolphus into the city of Nuremburg where Gustavus Aldolphus suffered heavy losses due to starvation and disease and eventually desertion. Wallenstein’s plan was to force Gustavus Aldolphus into attacking his fortified camp. Gustavus Aldolphus was eventually compelled to do so and was defeated.5

After that Gustavus Aldolphus abandoned Nuremberg and thinking the campaign over for the year settled into winter quarters. Wallenstein instead invaded Saxony, Gustavus Aldolphus’ ally and compelled Gustavus Aldolphus to come north to save his ally. The result was the battle of Lutzen where Gustavus Aldolphus got killed and it appears that once again Wallenstein’s general ship was better than Gustavus Aldolphus’.6

As I mentioned before nothing in Gustavus Aldolphus’ previous military career, objectively indicates military brilliance, so it can’t be said that Gustavus Aldolphus was simply off his game or past his peak. The simple fact is that Wallenstein was better than Gustavus Aldolphus at general ship. This of course has to be either denied or more usually simply ignored.

In the 19th century the campaigns etc, of Gustavus Aldolphus became a cliché at military staff colleges; acclaimed as the height of military skill and genius by a determined act of self lobotomy, which was required in order to ignore what the actual facts were telling you.

Douglas McArthur 1880-1964.

Douglas McArthur

General Douglas, “I will return” McArthur is overrated mainly by Americans who like those who celebrated Gustavus Aldolphus manage to not understand actual events and take refuge in childish notions that “Great” men do everything.

Perhaps the best example of this the Manchester’s hagiography American Caesar.7 The book is basically a tendentious collection of press excerpts from McArthur’s fan club.

McArthur’s reputation is based on his conduct during World War II in the pacific and his conduct during the Korean war, as seen to the prism of McArthur’s effective propaganda machine which never tired of celebrating his alleged brilliance and stroking McArthur’s vast ego.

To get to his conduct during World War II in the pacific first, (1941-1945). It is amazing to me that so many modern writers just do not seem to understand that in modern warfare a general is largely a chief of staff and that his main task is to organize; actual command is minimal. So McArthur is given credit for the island hoping campaign to isolate major Japanese garrisons and leave them to wither on a vine, so to speak. In actual fact this idea originated in Washington among military planners and McArthur had nothing to do with it. Further much of the planning of his campaigns was done in Washington and he merely carried out orders. Further his staff did most of the planning of operations with McArthur spending much of his time at photo-ops and propaganda leaving the actual conduct of operations largely to his staff. There was no one McArthur loved more than himself and he could be sure to take the credit regardless.8

As for his conduct of the Korean war. Well it all boils down to certain writers getting wet dreams because of the Inchon landing. What is ignored is that given American naval and air superiority a landing in the rear of the North Koreans was damn obvious. There was nothing brilliant about that. What was brilliant was the decision to land at Inchon, 1950. Why? Because the area was fairly lightly defended because it was a most unfavourable place to have a seaboard landing. Whether or not this was McArthur’s brainwave or some one’s else’s is not clear. Regardless Macarthur went with it a forced it through over considerable opposition. The result was spectacular success.9

Now it should be obvious that one example of brilliant general ship does not turn the general involved into a military genius. However McArthur supporters seem to forget that. Some even think he is a “Great Captain”.10 McArthur than proceeded to illustrate that truism by being thoroughly and completely out generaled, out fought and out thought. And who out thought him? Why the Chinese and their general Peng DeHuai.

McArthur’s behaviour before and during the Chinese intervention in the Korean War beggar’s belief. It is among the most extraordinary examples of self delusion and sheer incompetence of all time. Surrounded by yes men and living in a cloud cuckoo land of fantasy, McArthur ignored key intelligence, made incompetent dispositions and with almost unbelievable arrogance let stream from his lips in public a steady stream of absurdities and idiocies. McArthur spent more time preening himself for the press than in managing his armies.11

To make matters clear it should be realized just who McArthur was facing. The Chinese were just emerging from over a generation of civil war and foreign invasion. They had little stomach for foreign adventures. However McArthur’s very public statements about widening the war and invading Manchuria scared them. The Chinese armies were compared to the American forces severely lacking in motorized transport of any kind, lacking in tanks of any kind, lacking in anti-tank guns, heavy artillery, lots of ammunition, and lacking an air force of much use. The American led forces had all those things in abundance, giving them crushing fire power superiority, and this was combined with near total air supremacy. Although the Chinese had superior numbers, (contrary to myth making at the time it was not huge), that was much more than offset by the very large logistic and fire power superiority of the Americans. The result of any contest between the Chinese and the Americans should have been crushing victory for the Americans.12

It didn’t happen that way. The Chinese were very good at camouflage, and tried to move at night and further managed to have their supplies moved mostly by human and animal power. Further their skills at concealment, infiltration and surprise were excellent. They also had learned over the preceding 40 years how to find ways of dealing with enemies with superior logistics and firepower.13

Of course the Chinese’s greatest advantage was McArthur’s stubborn refusal to face facts or listen to intelligence and his belief that the Chinese would at most intervene with only a few divisions and that the Chinese military was hopelessly inferior to his own and would be easily crushed. Even in the face of a preliminary Chinese offensive in late October 1950 that set the Americans back and seriously shook up their forces, McArthur continued to live in cloud cuckoo land. Then McArthur renewed his “end the war” offensive in late November 1950 the Chinese attacked and despite the massive logistic and firepower superiority, to say nothing of the near total air supremacy of the Americans, managed to badly defeat the Americans and push them back into South Korea.14

Since McArthur’s career does not with the possible exception of the Inchon landing provide any support for the idea that he was “one of the Great Captains” of history, and that his defeat in North Korea is one of the most amazing defeats in modern history in terms of the mismatch between who won and who lost for which McArthur was largely responsible, and given that his victories in the Pacific during World War II were over a enemy he had a huge logistic and firepower superiority over and also that his actual responsibility for those achievements is debatable, he should NOT be considered a great military genius. What McArthur was a genius at was self publicity.

At another time I may do a posting about other overrated generals.

1. Dupuy, R. Ernest, & Dupuy, Trevor N., The Encyclopedia of Military History, Revised Edition, Harper & Row, Publishers, New York, 1977, p. 522.

2. IBID, pp. 523-524, 526-530.

3. IBID, pp. 573-574, 537-539, see also Wilson, Peter H., Europe’s Tragedy, Penguin Books, London, 2009, pp. 459-511.

4. See Wilson, pp. 492-511.

5. IBID, pp. 501-506.

6. IBID, pp. 507-511.

7. Manchester, William, American Caesar, Dell, New York, 1983.

8. Spurr, Russell, Enter The Dragon, Henry Holt and Company, New York, 1988, pp. 174-178, Toland, John, The Rising Sun, Bantam Books, New York, 1970, pp. 599-602.

9. Spurr, pp. 87-89.

10. Dupuy, p. 1204.

11. Spurr, pp. 158-163.

12. IBID, pp. 77-85, 116-119.

13. IBID, pp. 132-157.

14. Spurr, pp. 127-151, 172-218.

Pierre Cloutier

The Great Victory that never was
Lutzen, 1632

Gustavus Adolphus (left) Wallenstein (right)

In a previous posting I reviewed a book1 on the Thirty Years War. In the review I stated that I felt that the reputation of the Swedish King Gustavus Adolphus was seriously overrated.

In fact this inflation of reputation is such that a sort of massaging of the actual historical record is required. An excellent example of that is the battle of Lutzen, November 16, 1632, during which Gustavus Adolphus got himself killed.

Now the mythologizing about Gustavus Adolphus is to a large extent from him being celebrated by military men and his use in Military colleges and other educational institutions as a an example of military genius. For example “Gustavus Adolphus was the one great captain of this century”2. What is interesting is that the very account of Gustavus Adolphus’ own military operations in the book do not support this assessment at all.3

In the nineteenth century celebrations of Gustavus Adolphus would break all barriers and approach incredible heights of hagiography and hero worship. An excellent example is Gustavus Adolphus, by Theodore Ayrault Dodge.4

This massaging is especially necessary when describing the battle of Lutzen and in fact what happens is in effect outright falsification. However before we go into the falsification let us review what actually happened before and during the battle.

Gustavus Adolphus had after his crushing victory at Breitenfeld, September 17, 1631, gone on to undue most of the successes achieved by the Imperial armies since 1618. In fact Gustavus Adolphus seemed to have become arbitrator of central Europe and on the verge of achieving final victory over the Emperor and giving the Protestant cause hegemony in central Europe.5

Of course those dreams were mere delusions and fantasies. Gustavus Adolphus managed to alienate many of his allies, and he, himself showed a singular lack of diplomatic ability. This was not helped by the fact that the Imperialists led again by Wallenstein staged a remarkable military recovery.6

The campaign that resulted is embarrassing to those who promote the idea that Gustavus Adolphus was a “Great Captain”. In a campaign of maneuver and entrenchments Wallenstein out thought Gustavus Adolphus.

Basically Wallenstein maneuvered Gustavus Adolphus into the city of Nuremburg and so stymied him that Gustavus Adolphus, his army wasting away from disease etc., in exasperation attacked Wallenstein’s entrenched army at Alte Veste, September 3 & 4, 1632. Gustavus was defeated losing at least 2,400 casualties, (probably more than 3,000). Wallenstein lost less than 1,000. Further c. 29,000 men had died in the Swedish camp and after the battle 11,000 men deserted his army. Shortly afterwards Gustavus Adolphus retired from Nuremberg intending to winter in Swabia, in southern Germany. Wallenstein instead of going into winter quarters invaded Saxony and by threatening to cut Gustavus Adolphus’ communications with Sweden forced the Swedish King to come north.7

So far in the contest between Wallenstein and Gustavus Adolphus, Wallenstein was winning.

The Saxons had sent most of their army into Silesia and so were almost entirely defenceless when Wallenstein invaded. He very quickly occupied large areas of the duchy.8

Gustavus Adolphus with his communications threatened had no choice but to go north, he also had to prevent his most important ally Saxony from making peace or going over to the Imperials. Further Gustavus Adolphus’ prestige had been seriously undermined by the campaign so far.

In this situation Gustavus decided he had to seek and win a battle to restore his prestige and shore up his faltering system of alliances.

Wallenstein had other ideas. Winter had set in and he was dispersing his army for winter quarters. Wallenstein just did not think Gustavus Adolphus would try for battle at this time of cold and when food was hard to find. Further Wallenstein had detached c. 5,000 men under Pappenheim, (at Pappenheim’s request) to reinforce Imperial garrisons in Westphalia and Wallenstein sent 2,500 men to watch the city of Torgau. Gustavus was almost desperate for a battle and Wallenstein, very ill, did not think anyone would want to fight a battle under the conditions prevailing.

Wallenstein when he found out that Gustavus Adolphus was marching on him gathered together what troops he could. Even so he only had c. 12,350 against Gustavus Adolphus’ c. 19,200. Wallenstein not surprisingly sent urgent requests to Pappenheim to return as soon as possible.9

It is entirely in order to praise Gustavus Adolphus for surprising Wallenstein at this stage and forcing a battle with him having a numerical advantage. For once Gustavus Adolphus had outsmarted Wallenstein. Gustavus Adolphus however proceeded to lose most of the advantage gained.

First Gustavus Adolphus was delayed for one day by a small cavalry detachment and second of all Wallenstein guessed what Gustavus Adolphus would do and planned accordingly.

Map of Battle of Lutzen
Swedes White, Imperials Black

Wallenstein took up position next to the village of Lutzen. He stationed troops in the village and posted musketeers in the road just out side his front lines. He organized his camp followers to suggest his army was larger than it was. Wallenstein guessed that Gustavus Adolphus would try to outflank him and so organized his army that Gustavus Adolphus would gain nothing from his manoeuvre except having to make another frontal attack. Of course Wallenstein sent another urgent message to Pappenheim and expected him to arrive just before or during the battle.10

The battle started at c. 10:00am in the morning when Gustavus Adolphus mounted an all out attack. This frontal attack made little progress has Gustavus Adolphus’ troops were unable to take Lutzen or the hill in front of it, (Windmill hill) where Wallenstein had posted artillery. Gustavus Adolphus’ troops were able to make progress on the other flank, but by then smoke from fire and gunpowder was making it difficult to see what was going on. About 1:00pm Pappenheim returned with 2,300 cavalry and drove the Swedes back on the flank that they had been pushing back. Pappenheim was killed in the attack. The battle now degenerated into mishmash of small units attacking and defending and both Gustavus Adolphus and Wallenstein largely lost control of the battle.

In the confusion Gustavus Adolphus was wounded twice by bullets the second wound killing him. His body was not retrieved until later. Moral in the Swedish army was adversely affected by Gustavus Adolphus’ death. It appears that at least some of the Swedish commanders suggested retreat but Bernard, a German in Swedish service, managed to get the Swedes to agree to more attacks. These attacks finally took Windmill hill and captured some of Wallenstein’s artillery.

Fighting subsided and finally ended around 5:00pm. About an hour later Pappenheim’s 3,000 infantry arrived. Wallenstein had suffered 3,000 casualties. The Swedes had suffered c. 6,000 casualties.

Wallenstein, ill and shaken by his severe casualties and unsure that Gustavus Adolphus was actually dead decided to retreat; abandoning his artillery. Interestingly the Swedes where on the point of retreat when they found out the Imperial army had withdrawn.11

So basically the battle was tactically indecisive although because of the Imperial retreat the Swedes were able to claim victory and certainly the imperial evacuation of Sweden’s ally Saxony after the battle would seem to indicate a strategic Swedish victory. However this “victory” had cost the life of Sweden’s King, created a dangerous situation in Germany for Sweden and put Gustavus Adolphus’ 8 year old daughter Christina on the throne.12

It was only Wallenstein’s retreat that allowed the Swedes to claim victory and that was likely the worst military decision Wallenstein ever made. Otherwise Wallenstein had managed to recoup quite successfully from being caught with his pants down and despite being outnumbered through out the battle, (this includes the reinforcements that arrived during it) had fought the battle to a draw and inflicted significantly greater casualties on his enemies. Gustavus Adolphus’ generalship just before and during the battle are not impressive. Gustavus Adolphus seems to have tried simply to use his large superiority of numbers to crush his enemy in an unimaginative frontal assault. Wallenstein was overall better that Gustavus Adolphus just before and during the battle. It was after the battle that Wallenstein lost it so to speak.13

Now calling this mess of a battle “a great Swedish victory”14 seems at best to be an exaggeration and most likely simply false.

Now my account of the battle is largely from Wilson’s book on the Thirty Years War,15 and it appears to be overall accurate. What do other accounts say?

Now accounts that describe the battle has a less than a stunning Swedish victory do exist and are not new.16 So this is hardly revisionism. It appears that the sources of this error are the result of a whole series of mistakes and revisions that work to inflate the Swedish kings reputation.

For example various accounts state that the Imperials either out numbered the Swedes or had equal numbers to them at the beginning of the battle. Even some of the accounts that dispute the idea of a “great Swedish victory” accept this. To give a few examples. Fuller gives Wallenstein 25, 000 men excluding Pappenheim who he says had 8,000 with him. He gives Gustavus Adolphus 18,000 men.17

The Dupuys give Wallenstein 20,000 men excluding Pappenheim’s 8,000. Gustavus Adolphus is given 18,000 men.18

Dodge says:

It is only certain that Gustavus’ army was much weaker than Wallenstein’s. It may have numbered eighteen thousand men, while the Imperialists can scarcely have had less than twenty-five thousand; and this number was to be reinforced by fully eight thousand more, whenever Pappenheim should come up.19

Parker states that both sides had about the same number of men; 19,000. It is unclear if Parker is including the forces of Pappenheim that arrived during and just after the battle. If it does the statement is true if it is meant to just indicate forces that each side had at the beginning of the battle it is incorrect.20

Wedgwood gives Swedish forces as c. 16,000 strong and gives Wallenstein including Pappenheim 26,000 men. Assuming that Wedgwood thought Pappenheim had c. 8,000 men this would give Wallenstein 18,000 men to Gustavus Adolphus’ 16,000.21

Thus Gustavus Adolphus’ actual out numbering Wallenstein by more than 50% at the beginning of the battle is turned into being slightly outnumbered or significantly outnumbered by Wallenstein. Even historians who do not buy the “great Swedish victory” myth accept part of the myth of at least equal odds at the beginning of the battle.

Further is the idea that all of Pappenheim’s 8,000 men during the battle arrived at once is stated in some accounts.22 This is false 2,300 arrived during the battle and 3,000 just after it ended. I further note that the forces Pappenheim brought to join Wallenstein did not number 8,000 but 5,300. Altogether with Pappenheim’s reinforcements Wallenstein had 17,650 men brought to the battlefield. As against Gustavus Adolphus’ 19,200 men.23

Now the matter of casualties Fuller gives the number as the Imperials losing 3-4,000 dead and the Swedes 1,500.24 Dodge gives Imperial casualties as between 10-12,000 and Swedish as comparable.25 Dupuy & Dupuy, give Imperial casualties has c. 12,000 and Swedish has c. 10,000.26 Parker gives the Imperial dead has 6,000 but gives no other casualties.27

The above figures have one thing in common they greatly inflate the actual casualties of the battle. As indicated above it appears that Swedish casualties were about double Imperial (6,000 against 3,000). Given the size of the armies involved these are certainly severe losses. But the figures giving more Imperial losses than Swedish are simply wrong and part of the effort to inflate the battle as “a great Swedish victory”. In fact rather than inflicting more losses than they suffered the Swedes in fact suffered double the losses of their enemy. But of course in order for it to be “a great Swedish victory” casualties must be large and the "loser" must lose more than the "winner".

Finally accounts of the battle must be amended Fuller for example says:

The King’s body was recovered, Wallenstein’s guns were retaken, then lost and captured again, but after this the Swedes carried all before them and the Imperial army broke up and scattered as night crept over the field.28

Well the part about recovering the King’s body and taking the guns is correct but the rest did not occur in this Universe but in an alternate one. Dodge however manages to be really over the top:

One more effort was made for the manes of the dead hero, and the charge was given with the vigor of loving despair. The decimated ranks of the Northlanders closed up shoulder to shoulder, the first and second lines were merged into one, and forward they went in the foggy dusk, with a will which even they had never shown before. Nothing could resist their tremendous onset. On right, centre, left, everywhere and without a gap, the Swedes carried all before them. The imperial army was torn into shreds and swept far back of the causeway, where so many brave men had that day bitten the dust. At this moment some ammunition chests in rear of the imperial line exploded, which multiplied the confusion in the enemy's ranks. Darkness had descended on the field; but the Swedes remained there to mourn their beloved king, while the imperial forces sought refuge from the fearful slaughter and retired out of range.29

No the Swedes did NOT sweep all before them. The Imperial army was NOT torn into shreds. Dodge is describing a battle that never happened. Dodge’s purple prose about the spirit of the dead hero Gustavus Adolphus and his men avenging his death is charming to read but not history but hagiography. Dodge then writes:

Lutzen has been called a drawn battle. It was unequivocally a Swedish victory.30

Well if you say so (sic). Dodge than goes on to give bogus imperial casualties, (12,000) and refer to Imperial units fleeing the battlefield. All of it quite mythical. Has I said before the Imperial army suffered about ½ the casualties of the Swedish army and withdrew it did NOT flee. But then Dodge’s hero Gustavus Adolphus must have a great victory in death even when he did not. Dodge is not finished however:

The Swedes had destroyed the last army of the emperor. At the opening of the year Ferdinand had been at the end of his resources, when Wallenstein came to his aid; and the great Czech had now been utterly defeated.31

This is a collection of falsehoods. The Swedes had NOT destroyed the “last” army of the Emperor. That army was still largely intact. Further the Emperor did have other armies although Dodge does not seem aware of them. Wallenstein was NOT utterly defeated in any sense. It is arguable that Wallenstein was not defeated at all. In fact in the coming year Wallenstein although gravely ill and probably not having much time to live would reach the height of his power, before a combination of his own arrogance and double dealing would lead to him being assassinated with the Emperor’s approval in early 1634.32

Dodge was engaged in what can only be described as telling a big lie that due to constant repetition is believed by so many. In this case the lie is the alleged great victory. Well there never was a great victory at Lutzen. Instead we have a bloody inconclusive battle that ended in a sort of victory for the side losing more men because the other side withdrew from the battlefield.

Gustavus Adolphus is credited with originating many of the features of modern armies, with creating a military machine of unique sophistication vastly superior to the armies of his enemies.33 An unbiased look at his campaigns and battles reveals that this is very overdrawn. His armies were not vastly superior to his enemies. The battle of Lutzen clearly indicates that Swedish superiority was not huge and that whatever elements Gustavus Adolphus’ army had that were superior could be countered. Further it does appear that Gustavus Adolphus although a very competent general was not greatly, if at all, superior to Wallenstein as a general.34

Dodge among many others contends that Gustavus Adolphus would have imposed peace and only his unfortunate death prevented it.35 This is pure fantasizing. This is the idea of the “Great Man” as Saviour and Messiah. It speaks of hero worship and yes again of hagiography. It does not belong in sober historical writing.

Of course a lot of this reflects the stunning long term success of the Swedish and their allies propaganda system that boosted the Swedish king and his accomplishments.36

Wedgwood in her book wrote a sober assessment of Gustavus Adolphus37 that should be required reading for all those who genuflect to the ghost of Gustavus Adolphus. In it Wedgwood writes of the relief of so many of Sweden’s allies in Germany and elsewhere that the Swedish king was dead. That his inability to make or implement practical or even reasonable diplomacy would no longer screw things up; that this bull in the china shop was gone. Wedgwood concludes:

…he [Gustavus Adolphus] could break the Habsburg Empire, but he could build nothing, and he left German politics, as he left her fields, a heap of shards.38

In the end peace was finally made in 1648 at Westphalia with much of the Empire in ruins and everyone exhausted.

In order to properly rate Gustavus Adolphus the battle of Lutzen must be properly evaluated and in this case what actually happened was not what so many since have thought happened. Thus did the real battle of Lutzen disappear down a memory hole to be replaced by a mythical “great victory” that never happened.

Europe in 1648 at the Peace of Westphalia

1. Wilson, Peter H., The Thirty Years War: Europe’s Tragedy, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MASS, 2009.

2. Dupuy, R. Ernest, & Dupuy, Trevor N., The Encyclopedia of Military History, Revised Edition, Harper & Row, Pub., New York, 1977, p. 522.

3. IBID, pp. 537-539, 573-574, 577.

4. Dodge, Theodore Ayrault, Gustavus Adolphus, Houghton Mifflin and Co., New York, 1895. See especially pp. 398-411.

5. Wilson, pp. 476-487, Fuller, J. F.C., A Military History of the Western World, v. II, Da Capo Press Inc., New York, 1955, pp. 64-66.

6. Wilson, pp. 485-487, IBID, Fuller, Wedgwood, C.V., The Thirty Years War, Penguin Books, London, 193, pp. 268-278.

7. Wedgwood, pp. 283-286, Wilson, pp. 501-506.

8. IBID.

9. Wilson, pp. 507-508, Fuller, pp. 68-69.

10. Wilson, pp. 506-508.

11. Wilson, pp. 507-511, Fuller, pp. 69-71, Wedgwood, pp. 287-291.

12. Wilson, pp. 512-519, Wedgwood, pp. 296-302.

13. Wilson, pp. 510-511.

14. Dupuy, Trevor N., The Military Life of Gustavus Adolphus, Scholastic Library Pub., New York, 1969, p. 147.

15. Wilson, pp. 507-511.

16. Wedgwood, pp. 289-291, Parker, Geoffrey, The Thirty Years War, Second Edition, Routledge, New York, 1997, pp. 117-118, also same author, Europe in Crisis, Fontana Books, London, 1979, p. 228. It is interesting to report that although Parker 1997, although reporting the battle has indecisive in the text has a map, (after p. 202 map 3 of the war) which lists the battle has a Swedish victory. Polisensky, J. V., The Thirty Years, New English Library, London, 1970, p. 212.

17. Fuller, pp. 69-70.

18. Dupuy & Dupuy, pp. 538-539.

19. Dodge, p. 384.

20. Parker, 1997, p. 117.

21, Wedgwood, pp. 287-288.

22. Dupuy & Dupuy, p. 539, Fuller p. 71.

23. Wilson, pp. 507-511.

24. Fuller, p. 71. Fuller’s account of the battle is very brief pp. 68-71.

25. Dodge, p. 396-397.

26. Dupuy & Dupuy, p. 539.

27. Parker, 1997, p. 118.

28. Fuller, p. 71.

29. Dodge, p. 396.

30. IBID.

31. IBID. p. 397.

32. Parker, 1997, pp. 123-125.

33. Dupuy & Dupuy, pp. 522-524.

34. See Wilson, pp. 492-511.

35. Dodge, p. 397.

36, Parker, 1997, Plates 9-15, pp. 99-100, 112, Wilson, pp. 475-476, 511.

37. Wedgwood, pp. 291-295.

38. IBID, p. 295.

Pierre Cloutier

The Crackup

Books about the Thirty Years War in English are not exactly common which is why the arrival of the above book1 is an occasion for rejoicing. This is especially true in that systematic and decently through scholarly overviews of the entire war are rare in English. In fact until this book systematic overviews of the military events of the war were hard to find. Although most accounts had detailed accounts of certain campaigns.

Things were not so bad as 70+ years ago when C.V. Wedgwood wrote her book on the Thirty Years War because of a almost complete dearth of English accounts.2 It was and remained the the only even remotely comprehensive account in English for quite some time. In fact the book under review may be in fact the account that supersedes it at last. There are are of course other accounts but they are in comparison brief, sketchy and tend to provide great detail on some aspects of the war but none or barely any at all on other aspects.

This account is first of all fairly long with c. 850 pages of text it provides much more detailed coverage of the war especially military events of the last phases of the war than Wedgwood's account. In fact the general tendency is for accounts in most languages to neglect the last 13 years of the war, after France openly declared war on the Habsburgs.

The book has a fairly long section, (265 pages) devoted to giving the background to the conflict, which the author feels was rooted in not just the confessional struggle between Catholics and Protestants, but disputes within the Habsburg family and the debate over the actual powers and prerogatives of the Empire \ Emperors.

The Habsburgs were not simply lords of the lands they controlled they were also Emperors of what was called the Holy Roman Empire. Usually dismissed by modern historians as a collection of independent principalities under the nominal rule of the Habsburg Emperors. The author here of the book under review makes the case that it did have some institutions (like the Reichstag) a system of courts, etc., that functioned with a fair degree of efficiency.

The most telling indication of that efficiency on some level was the peace that existed in much of the Empire. War was basically confined to the peripheries of the empire. This peace had lasted since c. 1552 C.E. The conflict had arisen from the confessional dispute between Catholics and Protestants. Despite the virulent nature of this dispute the compromises worked out then had proven to be successful and the great majority of the Empire had enjoyed 2 generations of peace.

When the crackup happened the results were terrible. Blindly the protagonists blundered into a hellish conflict that that they all seemed incapable of ending.

The Empire in 1618 was not just German it had French, Danish, Czech, Italian speakers also. When the empire plunged into its long night of war it dragged the surrounding countries into it has they sought to take advantage of the internal problems of the Empire. What they generally got was being enmeshed in a costly horrible struggle they could not easily get out of.

The war had a long list of colourful characters such as, Archduchess Isabella of Belgium, Maximilian of Bavaria, Oxenstierna and Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden, General Wallenstein, Emperors Ferdinand II and III, Cardinal Richelieu, Count Olivares of Spain. They all got tangled in this interminable war.

In some respects this book as a revisionistic cast. For example it does not engage in the usual writhing about the genius of the Swedish King Gustavus Adolphus, or the usual gasping, awestruck hero worship of the 'Lion of the North'.3 For example going against over a century of conventional opinion the author does not characterize the battle of Lutzen, 1632, during which Gustavus got himself killed, as a great Swedish victory; but correctly describes it has a draw.4 The simple fact is that Gustavus' wars and foreign policy got Sweden involved in several costly wasteful wars that Sweden could ill afford and were well beyond her strength; all in pursuit of grandiose, unrealistic religious and political goals. Only Sweden's ability to plunder Germany for men and money combined with massive French assistance enabled Sweden to carry on at all. Sweden as a great power was an illusion built on bluff and the weakness of her neighbours. Gustavus saddled Sweden with this status that cost Sweden much until the illusion was finally burst at Poltava in 1709.

Within a few years of Sweden entering the war more than two thirds of the soldiers, and usually more than three quarters were non Swedes \ Finns. In fact most were Germans, including the officers. Most of cost of paying for the war was borne by exploiting and pillaging Germany. Even so Sweden was impoverished and suffered heavy losses during the war.5

Aside from the above mentioned fairly detailed descriptions of the last c. 13 years (1635-1648) of the war which are usually covered briefly this book provides fairly detailed coverage of the policies and plans of perhaps the most important personality of the war and probably its most important figure; the french politician, statesman Cardinal Richelieu. Generally known today through bad film adaptions of Alexandre Dumas Musketeers tales as a cardboard villain he was in fact a stunningly capable, cold-blooded practitioner of realistic policy.

It was mainly through Cardinal Richelieu that the forces keeping the anti-Habsburg coalition kept going. In most respects almost from the beginning the struggle was between Bourbon and Habsburg for hegemony in Europe. Cardinal Richelieu was terrified at the prospect of the establishment of effective Habsburg rule over the Empire which would lead in his estimation to Habsburg hegemony in Europe.

In this respect when in 1635 open war between Bourbon and Habsburg finally started, only then did the real point of dispute of the war come into the open. It is of interest that only the at first covert and then open intervention of Catholic France prevent the Protestant powers from defeat. But then Cardinal Richelieu was never one to allow religion to interfere with what he perceived to be the true interests of France.

The confessional aspects of the struggle were in many respects mere window dressing; although useful for propaganda. Although the war ended with significant Protestant retreat in much of central Europe; it also froze the confessional divide and lead to the re-establishment of of toleration in much of the Empire with the exception of most of the Habsburg hereditary lands were Catholicism was imposed by force.

It is of interest that by 1635 the Habsburgs had largely given up their efforts to impose a one sided confessional and constitutional solution on the Empire. That was the year of the Peace of Prague. It was the interference of foreign powers France, Sweden and Spain that prolonged the war for another 13 years. In the end the peace finally agreed to (Wesphalia 1648) was not much different from Prague although France and Sweden got more and the Emperor less.6

In fact one of the myths that this book dispels is the story that the Empire was made impotent and the Emperors weak. In fact this is a exaggeration and the Habsburgs quickly regained a great deal of influence very quickly.7 In fact the idea that the Habsburgs experienced a comprehensive defeat is a myth. The Habsburgs lost but they were not crushed and the peace was in many respects a compromise by enemies who were mutually exhausted.

In the section describing the aftermath, Wilson rightly questions the myth of the all destructive fury of the war. The nonsense about two thirds dying etc. He points out how some areas were devastated repeatedly and other areas escaped u nharmed. How one area might be ravaged and then escape any more devastation and so forth. Still the picture is sombre after all it appears that over all the population of the Empire fell by 15-20%. Some areas suffered much worst like Bohemia and Moravia. That is a frightening picture and much worst than the decline during the Second World War.8

People died not so much of direct violence, although that killed a large number, but of disease, plague and hunger. The devastation, anarchy produced by the fighting, the breakdown of order produced mass death.9 In fact in some places peasant guerrillas emerged that attacked the soldiers of both sides in a desperate effort to achieve some security.10

The negotiations in Westphalia took years and the paroxysms throughout the Empire of joy that greeted the signing of the peace in 1648 are some of the most extraordinary events in European history. Even more remarkable was the rapid economic \ demographic recovery after the war and a long period of peace in most of the Empire.11

The war left an indelible cultural memory of horror in Central Europe which as inspired works of art to this day.12 Only in the first half of the 20th century did horrors on the scale of the Thirty Years War return to Europe.

For a glimpse into a war all too few English speaking people know about I heartily recommend this book.

1. Wilson, Peter H., The Thirty Years War, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MASS., 2009.

2. Wedgwood, C. V., The Thirty Years War, NYRB Classics, New York, 2005, (original pub. 1938).

3. Wilson, pp. 459-511.

4. IBID, pp. 510-511.

5. IBID, pp. 791, gives c. 110,000 Swedish \ Finnish dead during the war. For a country of c. 1.2 million this is quite terrible. Wilson, same page, gives a figure of at least 400,000 for Germans and others who died in Swedish service.

6. IBID, pp. 758-773.

7. IBID, pp. 773-776.

8. IBID, pp. 786-795. Bohemia's population declined from 1,400,000 to 1,000,000, a decline of 29%, Moravia's population declined from 650,000 to 450,000, a decline of 31%. From Wilson, p. 788.

9. IBID.

10. IBID, pp. 532-534.

11. IBID. pp, 805-806.

12. For Example Brecht's Mother Courage and Her Children.

Pierre Cloutier