Losing all by Winning all

 Page of Treaty of Troyes

One of the greatest humiliations in French history was the Treaty of Troyes, signed May 21, 1420, by which Charles VI and the Burgundian party in the then French civil war between the Armagnacs and Burgundians agreed to disinherit Charles VI’s son Charles VII and to make Henry V of England heir to the French Kingdom and to marry Charles VI’s daughter Catherine de Valois to Henry V.

Henry V, one of the most formidable of English kings, had recently restarted the Hundred Years War and had, in 1415, achieved the crushing and one-sided victory over the French at Agincourt. The Civil war between the French along with his own considerable military talents had enabled Henry to conquer the Duchy of Normandy in 1417-1420.

At the time Henry’s aim seems to have been extensive lands in France in full sovereignty, i.e., without having to acknowledge the overriding authority of the French crown.

In France the English successes seems to bring together the two factions. One led by the Burgundians had control over the Royal court and Paris and was led by Jean sans peur, (John the Fearless) Duke of Burgundy. The other faction had been led by first Louis Duke of Orleans and then Bernard Count of Armagnac, who in 1418 gained control of the young Charles VII, the Dauphin. The bad blood between the factions was considerable, characterized by tit for tat slaughters.

The crises had been precipitated originally by the intermittent madness Charles VI; which has he grew older became permanent. In this situation court factions developed and fought over control of the state because the king was incapable of governing some of the time and then all of the time.

In 1407 Jean sans peur arranged to have Louis Duke of Orleans assassinated. By threats and force majeur Jean was able to get a royal pardon for his murderous deed, from the now quite ill king. By 1410 government in France was paralyzed by infighting and the civil war had begun. Only occasionally in the next 10 years were the French able to act together. The resulting divisions helped produce the English victory at Agincourt.

The aftermath of said battle was mutual recriminations between the Armagnac faction and the Burgundian faction. The result was all out civil war between the factions. The result was much fighting and in Paris first one faction and then the other engaging in horrible massacres. The climax came in 1418 when the Burgundians regained control of Paris and thousands of Armagnacs and their supporters were butchered including most of the leaders. The remaining Armagnacs still had control of the young Dauphin Charles VII.

Jean and the Armagnacs were frightened by the English advance and tried to negotiate a truce and then an alliance. Several agreements were solemnized and as a final seal on the new agreement a meeting was arranged between the Dauphin, Charles VII, and Jean sans peur at a bridge located at the town of Montereau, c. 45 miles from Paris.

Apparently anxious to avenge their murdered leaders and friends the Armagnacs murdered Jean sans peur on the bridge.

The involvement of Charles VII in the plot to murder Jean sans peur is not clear. It is hard to believe that he didn’t at least know about it ahead of time and at the same time it appears that at this juncture he was very much the puppet of the Armagnac faction. In other words it is hard to believe that he was behind the plan to murder Jean sans peur. Certainly Charles VII had little reason to seek personal vengeance against Jean sans peur. It is more likely he went along with the plan. Charles VII turned into an intelligent and rather devious politician so it is hard to believe that he would see that murdering Jean sans peur was in the context of the situation of 1419 anything but a really bad idea.

The results were predictable. The gulf between the factions became much, much larger and Henry V took immediate advantage and drove a very hard bargain. Jean sans peur son Philip called le bel, the good, was not surprisingly utterly furious. The result was an unexpected opportunity for Henry V to get everything. The price of his support was that he be recognized as heir to the kingdom of France.

As for Jean sans peur himself. Given his crimes and general foulness it is very hard to see his violent death as anything but well deserved. However regardless of his personal criminality the fact remains that murdering him was a mistake and doubly so under the circumstances prevailing. The remnants of the Armagnac faction had let their personal, understandable though it was, hatred cloud sober political judgment and made things much worst for themselves and France. For not only did the murder turn many Frenchmen against them, murdering Jean sans peur at a parley, with oaths of safe conduct violated etc., was regarded as particularly loathsome. Involving the Dauphin, Charles VII, in the murder greatly damaged his position, and even worst gave an opening to the English king Henry V.1

A little over a century later a monk showing then French king Francois I the tombs of the Burgundian dukes in Dijon remarked when picking up Jean sans peur badly damaged skull:

This is the hole through which the English entered France.2

In the ensuing debacle Henry V was able to get the Royal court and the Burgundian faction to accept him as the heir to Charles VI as king of France and of course to disinherit the Dauphin Charles VII. As a diplomat Henry V had played his hand brilliantly. As for why he asked for the big prize, becoming king of France, rather than lands in full sovereignty in France? I suspect Henry felt that this was a too good opportunity to waste to get everything. So why not get everything?

Later I will go into the problems with the treaty here I will print a copy of the treaty as printed in The Chronicles of Monstrelet. The sections below in brackets are from an incomplete, copy of the treaty printed in, A Source Book of Medieval History.3

De Monstrelet was a Burgundian chronicler of the first half of the 15th century and was contemporary with the events he describes. His version of the Treaty of Troyes was slightly different in wording in some respects from the actual treaty which is why some of the clauses have alternative variations below them in brackets.4

Charles, by the grace of God, king of France, to all our bailiffs, provosts, seneschals, and to all the principal of our officers of justice, or to their lieutenants, greeting. Be it known, that we have this day concluded a perpetual peace, in our town of Troyes, with our very dear and well-beloved son Henry king of England, heir and regent of France, in our name and in his own, in consequence of his marriage, with our well-beloved daughter Catherine, and by other articles in the treaty concluded between us, for the welfare and good of our subjects, and for the security of the realm; so that henceforward our subjects, and those of our said son, may traffic and have a mutual intercourse with each other, as well on this as on the other side of the sea.

1. It has been agreed that our said son king Henry, shall henceforth honour us as his father, and our consort the queen as his mother, but shall not by any means prevent us from the peaceable enjoyment of our crown during our life.

2. Our said son king Henry, engages that he will not interfere with the rights and royalties of our crown so long as we may live, nor with the revenues, but that they may be applied as before to the support of our government and the charges of the state; and that our consort the queen shall enjoy her state and dignity of queen, according to the custom of the realm, with the unmolested enjoyment of the revenues and domains attached to it.

3. It is agreed that our said daughter Catherine shall have such dower paid her from the revenues of England as English queens have hitherto enjoyed, namely, sixty thousand crowns, two of which are of the value of an English noble.

4. It is agreed that our said son king Henry, shall, by every means in his power, without transgressing the laws he has sworn to maintain, and the customs of England, assure to our said daughter Catherine the punctual payment of the aforesaid dower of sixty thousand crowns from the moment of his decease.

5. It is agreed, that should it happen that our said daughter survive our said son, king Henry, she shall receive, as her dower from the kingdom of France, the sum of forty thousand francs yearly; and this sum shall be settled on the lands and lordships which were formerly held in dower by our very dear and well beloved the lady Blanche, consort to king Philip of France, of happy memory, our very redoubted lord and great grandfather.

6. It is agreed that immediately on our decease, and from thenceforward, our crown and kingdom of France, with all its rights and appurtenances, shall devolve for ever to our said son king Henry, and to his heirs.

(6. After our death [Charles VI], and from that time forward, the crown and kingdom of France, with all their rights and appurtenances, shall be vested permanently in our son [son-in law], King Henry [of England], and his heirs.)

7. Because we are for the greater part of our time personally prevented from attending to the affairs and government of our realm with the attention they deserve, the government of our kingdom shall in future be conducted by our said son king Henry, during our life, calling to his assistance and council such of our nobles as have remained obedient to us, and who have the welfare of the realm and the public good at heart, so that affairs may be conducted to the honour of God, of ourself and consort, and to the general welfare and security of the kingdom ; and that tranquillity may be restored to it, and justice and equity take place everywhere by the aid of the great lords, barons, and nobles of the realm.

(7.....The power and authority to govern and to control the public affairs of the said kingdom shall, during our lifetime, be vested in our son, King Henry, with the advice of the nobles and wise men who are obedient to us, and who have consideration for the advancement and honor of the said kingdom....)

8. Our said son shall, to the utmost of his power, support the courts of parliament of France, in all parts that are subject to us, and their authority shall be upheld and maintained with rigour from this time forward.

9. Our said son shall exert himself to defend and maintain each of our nobility, cities, towns and municipalities in all their accustomed rights, franchises, and privileges, so that they be not individually nor collectively molested in them.

10. Our said son shall labour diligently, that justice be administered throughout the realm, according to the accustomed usages, without exception of anyone, and will bodily defend and guard all our subjects from all violence and oppression whatever.

11. It is agreed that our said son king Henry shall appoint to all vacant places, as well in the court of parliament as in the bailiwicks, seneschalships, provostships, and to all other offices within our realm, observing that he do nominate fit and proper persons for such offices, fully acquainted with the laws and customs of the country, so that tranquility may be preserved, and the kingdom flourish.

12. Our said son will most diligently exert himself to reduce to our obedience all cities, towns, castles and forts, now in rebellion against us, and of the party commonly called Dauphinois or Armagnac.

13. For the more secure observance of these articles, and the more effectually to enable our said son king Henry to carry them into execution, it is agreed that all the great lords, as well spiritual as temporal, all the cities, towns, and municipalities within our realm, and under our obedience, shall each of them take the following oaths: They shall swear obedience and loyalty to our said son king Henry, in so much as we have invested him with the full power of governing our kingdom of France in conjunction with such counsel of able men as he may appoint. They will likewise swear to observe punctually whatever we, in conjunction with our consort the queen, our said son king Henry, and the council, may ordain. The cities, towns, and municipalities, will also swear to obey and diligently follow whatever orders may particularly affect them.

14. Instantly on our decease the whole of the subjects of our kingdom shall swear to become liegemen and vassals to our said son king Henry, and obey him as the true king of France, and, without any opposition or dispute, shall receive him as such, and never pay obedience to any other as king or regent of France but to our said son king Henry, unless our said son should lose life or limb, or be attacked by a mortal disease, or suffer diminution in person, state, honour, or goods. But should they know of any evil designs plotted against him, they will counteract them to the utmost of their power, and give him information thereof by letters or messages.

15. It is agreed that whatever conquests our said son may make from our disobedient subjects shall belong to us, and their profits shall be applied to our use; but should any of these conquests appertain to any noble who at this moment is obedient to us, and who shall swear that he will faithfully defend them, they shall be punctually restored to him as to the lawful owner.

16. It is agreed that all ecclesiastics within the duchy of Normandy and the realm of France, obedient to us, to our said son, and attached to the party of the duke of Burgundy, who shall swear faithfully to keep and observe all the articles of this treaty, shall peaceably enjoy their said benefices in the duchy of Normandy, and in all other parts of our realm.

17. All universities, colleges, churches, and monasteries, within the duchy of Normandy or elsewhere, subject to us, and in time to come to our said son king Henry, shall freely enjoy all rights and privileges claimed by them, saving the rights of the crown and of individuals.

18. Whenever the crown of France shall devolve by our decease on our said son king Henry, the duchy of Normandy, and all the other conquests which he may have made within the kingdom of France, shall thenceforward remain under the obedience and jurisdiction of the monarchy of France.

19. It is agreed that our said son king Henry, on coming to the throne of France, will make ample compensation to all of the Burgundian party who may have been deprived of their inheritances by his conquest of the duchy of Normandy, from lands to be conquered from our rebellious subjects, without any diminution from the crown of France. Should the estates of such not have been disposed of by our said son, he will instantly have the same restored to their proper owners.

20. During our life all ordinances, edicts, pardons and privileges, must be written in our name, and signed with our seal; but as cases may arise which no human wisdom can foresee, it may be proper that our said son king Henry should write letters in his own name, and in such cases it shall be lawful for him so to do, for the better security of our person, and the maintaining good government ; and he will then command and order in our name, and in his own, as regent of the realm, according as the exigency of the occasion may require.

21. During our life our said son king Henry will neither sign nor style himself king of France, but will most punctually abstain there from so long as we shall live.

22. It is agreed that during our life we shall write, call and style our said son king Henry as follows: Our very dear son Henry, king of England, heir to France and in the Latin tongue, Noster praecharissimus filius Henricus rex Anglias heeres Franciae.

(22. It is agreed that during our life-time we shall designate our son, King Henry, in the French Language in this fashion, Nortre tres cher fils Henri, roi d’angleterre, heritier de France; and in the Latin Language Noster praecarissimus filius Henricus, rex Angliae, heres Francae.)

23. Our said son king Henry will not impose any taxes on our subjects, except for a sufficient cause, or for the general good of the kingdom, and according to the approved laws and usages observed in such cases.

24. That perfect concord and peace may be preserved between the two kingdoms of France and England henceforward, and that obstacles tending to a breach thereof (which God forbid) may be obviated, it is agreed that our said son king Henry, with the aid of the three estates of each kingdom, shall labour most earnestly to devise the surest means to prevent this treaty from being infringed: that on our said son succeeding to the throne of France, the two crowns shall ever after remain united in the same person, that is to say, in the person of our said son, and at his decease, in the persons of those of his heirs who shall successively follow him: that from the time our said son shall become king of France the two kingdoms shall no longer be divided, but the sovereign of the one shall be the sovereign of the other, and to each kingdom its own separate laws and customs shall be most religiously preserved.

(24.....[It is agreed] that the two kingdoms shall be governed from the time that our said son, or any of his heirs shall assume the crown, not divided between different kings at the same time, but under one person who shall be king and sovereign lord of both kingdoms; observing all pledges and all other things to each kingdom its rights, liberties or customs, usages and laws, not submitting in any manner one kingdom to the other.)

25. Thenceforward, therefore, all hatreds and rancour that may have existed between the two nations of England and France shall be put an end to, and mutual love and friendship subsist in their stead: they shall enjoy perpetual peace, and assist each other against all who may any way attempt to injure either of them. They will carry on a friendly intercourse and commerce, paying the accustomed duties that each kingdom has established.

26. When the confederates and allies of the kingdoms of France and of England shall have had due notice of this treaty of peace, and within eight months after shall have signified their intentions of adhering to it, they shall be comprehended and accounted as the allies of both kingdoms, saving always the rights of our crown and of that of our said son king Henry, and without any hindrance to our subjects from seeking that redress they may think just from any individuals of these our allies.

27. It is agreed that our said son king Henry, with the advice of our well-beloved Philip duke of Burgundy, and others of the nobles of our realm, assembled for this purpose, shall provide for the security of our person conformably to our royal estate and dignity, in such wise that it may redound to the glory of God, to our honour, and to that of the kingdom of France and our subjects; and that all persons employed in our personal service, noble or otherwise, and in any charge concerning the crown, shall be Frenchmen born in France, and in such places where the French language is spoken, and of good and decent character, loyal subjects, and well suited to the offices they shall be appointed to.

28. We will that our residence be in some of the principal places within our dominions, and not elsewhere.

29. Considering the horrible and enormous crimes that have been perpetrated in our kingdom of France, by Charles, calling himself dauphin of Vienne, it is agreed that neither our said son king Henry, nor our well beloved Philip duke of Burgundy, shall enter into any treaty of peace or concord with the said Charles, without the consent of us three and of our council, and the three estates of the realm for that purpose assembled.

(29. In consideration of the frightful and astounding crimes and misdeeds committed against the kingdom of France by Charles, the said Dauphin, it is agreed that we, our son Henry, and also our very dear son Philip, duke of Burgundy, will never treat for peace or amity with the said Charles.)

30. It is agreed, that in addition to the above articles being sealed with our great seal, we shall deliver to our said son king Henry, confirmatory letters from our said consort the queen, from our said well-beloved Philip duke of Burgundy, and from others of our blood royal, the great lords, barons, and cities, and towns under our obedience, and from all from whom our said son king Henry may wish to have them.

31. In like manner, our said son king Henry, on his part, shall deliver to us, besides the treaty itself sealed with his great seal, ratifications of the same from his well-beloved brothers, the great lords of his realm, and from all the principal cities and towns of his kingdom, and from any others from whom we may choose to demand them.

In regard to the above articles, we, Charles king of France, do most solemnly, on the word of a king, promise and engage punctually to observe them; and we swear on the holy Evangelists, personally touched by us, to keep every article of this peace inviolate, and to make all our subjects do the same, without any fraud or deceit whatever, so that none of our heirs may in time to come infringe them, but that they may be for ever stable and firm.

In confirmation whereof, we have affixed our seal to these presents.

Given at Troyes, 21st day of May, in the year 1420, and of our reign the 40th.

Sealed at Paris with our signet, in the absence of the great seal.

Signed by the king in his grand council.

Countersigned,

J. Millet

The treaty provided for the creation of a dual monarchy united only in the person of the monarch. The treaties as many provisions that clearly indicate the two realms are to be kept separate, with their own laws and customs, and personal. Henry agreed to employ Frenchmen in France and Englishmen in England. On both sides there was fear of one side coming to dominate the other.

Hence the clauses guaranteeing the rights and privileges of various groups and institutions. Including but not limited too, nobility, towns, universities etc.

The extent of French humiliation is indicated in the various clauses mentioning Normandy. Those clauses indicated that Normandy would continue to be separately governed by Henry V and would not be reincorporated back into the French realm until after Henry V had succeeded Charles VI as king of France. Further the Burgundians who had lost land in Normandy during the English conquest, which Henry V had distributed to his supporters, (overwhelmingly English) would not get it back.

The actual defects of the Treaty as a legal document are patently obvious which probably explains the emphasis in the document on oath taking. Which were designed to make breaking the oath to accept the treaty very hard.

The most obvious defect was that one of signatories, Charles VI, king of France was insane and quite incapable of entering into valid contracts. As such any treaty with his signature on it was so much, legally speaking, waste paper.

Secondly it is too put it mildly very dubious that the king of France could dispose of his kingdom as if it was a personal possession and disinherit the legitimate heir. Of course the fact, mentioned above, that Charles VI was also quite mad at the time made the whole thing even more dubious.5

It is the above problem that accounts for the treaties many statements regarding oaths and getting the approval of the various estates, parliaments, the different classes of people, etc. Of course given that more than half of France rejected the treaty such approval as Henry V got from the various estates etc., was legally dubious.

Also for a treaty designed to be a peace treaty it talked a lot about war and enforcing obedience. There are clauses calling for continual war against the Dauphin, Charles VII and his supporters until they are subdued. In other words it called for continued war. And of course disinheriting Charles VII virtually assured a prolonged bloody war. That clause (29) making it impossible to make a separate peace with the Dauphin was also a call to perpetual war.

Further the treaty called for the Burgundians to be compensated for land taken by Henry V in Normandy with land captured from the Dauphin’s supporters. Which again was a call for perpetual war.

Also the treaty wasn’t quite clear about what would happen if Henry V predeceased Charles VI. Which Henry V did. This rather sophistical argument was later given as one of the reasons for Philip le bel to break the treaty.6

Another reason, and by far the most important one, given by Philip le bel to break the treaty was the limitation on making peace with the Dauphin, Charles VII. Philip le bel’s legal experts considered this clause to be such a violation of a Princes Christian duty to seek peace that it was along with the rest of the treaty null and void as being insupportable and immoral. In other words it violated the basic laws governing relations between states and men and as such had no legal standing.7

Thus right from the start the treaty had grave defects in and of itself.

In terms of less legalistic issues. The treaty faced the problem that the Burgundian faction was at best only lukewarm in support of the treaty. Philip le bel and most of the Burgundian faction quite simply didn’t like Henry V or the English. In fact in Lancastrian France there was little enthusiasm for Henry V as king of France. Even such Burgundian supporters as the Bourgeois of Paris there was precious little liking for Henry V or the English and much animosity and in fact hate. For a time the quite real, almost rabid hatred of the Burgundians for the Armagnacs gave grudging support to the English cause of a dual monarchy. But it was to put it bluntly a very weak reed. Philip le bel, despite his very great hatred of the Armagnacs and the Dauphin for the murder of his father had no love of Henry V or the English and if Dauphin was not swiftly overwhelmed would start moving to reconciliation with him.

Another problem was that before the treaty the Dauphin, Charles VII was firmly in the grasp of one faction, the Armagnacs, afterwards all those Frenchmen who were outraged by his disinheritance and the prospect of an English king becoming king of France became his supporters. Thus making Charles VII more than just the nominal head of one faction but the head of coalition of forces trying to preserve French independence. It also gave Charles VII room to maneuver and lessen his dependence on the Armagnac faction and create an independent power base.

The chances of the treaty working in the long term were to put it bluntly poor. The longer it took to crush Charles VII and his supporters the more likely the whole setup would unravel. The opposition of more than half of France could not be wished away. Further this opposition was allied to the fact that what French support there was of the treaty was grudging and lukewarm, based mostly on hatred of the Armagnac faction than on any positive belief in the treaty.

As for Henry V and English. By the treaty Henry V yoked English policy to an all or nothing outcome, which meant all too likely prolonged if not perpetual war. It precluded negotiation since the English would only treat on Charles VII giving up everything and being left nothing. This was war to the knife / to the death. It also morally tied English policy to an untenable position, i.e., acceptance of an English king as king of France. Basically the English would not settle for anything less than total capitulation by Charles VII and his supporters. Charles VII could not compromise on his claim to be king of France because to do so would put his entire position in danger.

The results were terrible with the price paid by the French people. The war which had restarted in earnest in 1415 was not even momentarily interrupted by the Treaty of Troyes (1420) but continued without a truce until 1444. In that year a temporary truce was finally negotiated. (Truce of Tours). English negotiations were constantly hamstrung by the insistence by many Englishman that they were entitled to all that the Treaty of Troyes gave them, including kingship of France, irregardless of the fact that by 1444 the English would be lucky to keep anything. For the French they could not accept Henry VI’s (Henry V’s son) claim to the throne of France without undermining Charles VII’s claim to the throne.

The war was renewed in 1449 and in 1450 the English were expelled from Normandy, and by 1453 the English were entirely expelled from France. The war ended in complete defeat for England, and in an ironic coda to the Treaty of Troyes Henry VI whose mother Catherine de Valois was married to Henry V at Troyes in the events associated with the Treaty of Troyes inherited from his grandfather, Charles VI his madness. And like in France madness in a king precipitated civil war.

Henry V’s bold diplomatic move at Troyes aiming at having it all ended up with nothing except losing all.8

Henry V meeting Catharine de Valois

1. For the sources for the above narrative see: De Monstrelet, Enguerrand, The Chronicles of Monstrelet, v. 1, William Smith, London, 1840, see pp. 320-438, Seward, Desmond, The Hundred Years War, Atheneum, New York, 1978, pp. 143-188, Allmand, Christopher, The Hundred Years War, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1988, pp. 26-31, Perroy, Edouard, Perroy, The Hundred Years War, Capricorn Books, New York, 1965, pp. 219-244, Barker, Juliet, Conquest, Little, Brown, London, 2009, pp. 3-45, Curry, Anne, The Hundred Years War, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1993, pp. 89-108, Seward, Desmond, Henry V As Warlord, Penguin Books, London, 1987, pp. 130-151, Allmand, Christopher, Lancastrian Normandy 1415-1450, C;arendon Press, Oxford, 1983, pp. 1-49.

2. Seward, 1978, p. 180.

3. De Monstrelet, pp. 439-442. Ogg, F. A., A Source Book of Medieval History, American Book Company, New York, 1907, p. 443.

4. Curry, pp. 12-13.

5. Dickinson, Joycelyne Gledhill, The Congress of Arras, 1435, Clarendon Press, Oxford,1955.

6. IBID, Seward, 1978, p. 230.

7. IBID, Dickinson.

8. See Seward, 1978, pp. 189-265, 1987, pp. 159-169, 214-220, Curry, pp. 103-121, Griffiths, R.A., The Reign of King Henry VI, Sutton Pub, London, 2004, pp. 178-230, 443-550, Allmand, 1988, pp. 26-36, The Bourgeois of Paris, A Parisian Journal 1405-1449, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1968, Perroy, 235-322, Barker, Allmand, 1983, pp. 211-283.

Pierre Cloutier

Napoleonic Fiasco
Why Egypt?

Battle of the Pyramids 1798

Napoleon was, undoubtedly, one of the greatest military geniuses of all time yet he was involved in number of truly disastrous military fiascos.1 The purpose of the following essay is brief look at the preliminaries of the first and probably least costly of these fiascos the Egyptian Expedition.

Although Napoleon only commanded the expedition for the first part of the expedition, (1798-1799), it is obvious that by the time he left the whole thing was headed for disaster and failure unless the French simply cut their losses.

The expedition had in many respects aspects that gave it the appearance of a hair-brained scheme. For example it involved transporting a large French army across the Mediterranean to Egypt in order to conquer and occupy it. That in the face of English naval superiority was more than a bit reckless. Further it involved attacking a possession of a power that was if not an ally of France a power favourably inclined to France; the Ottoman Empire. How annoying the Ottoman Turks made any sense is questionable. In other words the expedition stood a very good chance of being isolated in Egypt under attack by an infuriated formerly friendly power and the British.2

So just why was this hair-brained scheme approved and carried out? Well first of all the scheme although still quite a risk was not quite as hair-brained as appears in retrospect.

It all started in the mid 18th century after the French had established various commercial and governmental agents in Egypt. In the year 1777 the French government sent a diplomat named de Tott to check out the French position in Egypt. After completing his mission de Tott produced a memorandum for the French Minister of the Marine in which he claimed the defences were meagre and the country could be occupied with ease. De Tott mentioned that occupation of Egypt would lead to control of land routes to India, Persia and Arabia to say nothing of the advantages of digging a canal from the Red sea to the Mediterranean. Further the wealth of Egypt itself was quite considerable. Further to this the governing class in Egypt was the Mameluke's, who were both stunningly corrupt and very unpopular.3

The Mameluke's had more or less governed Egypt for more than 5 centuries. They had originally started out as slave soldiers for the Sultans of Egypt in the mid 13th century. They were generally from the peoples who lived in the Caucasus region at the eastern end of the Black sea. By c. 1260 they had achieved control over Egypt. In 1517 C.E., the Ottoman’s conquered Egypt and overthrew the last of the Mameluke Sultans however despite this Egypt remained largely under their control.4

Under their rule, government, administration, taxes etc., became increasingly capricious and arbitrary. So that by 1798 it appeared that Egypt was ripe for the taking. Especially since the Ottoman Turks had little control over Egypt.

Also as a matter of course the Mameluke's although personally capable of great bravery were to put it bluntly quite inept at the art of war. In all it seemed like a good idea.

It did however have some rather severe drawbacks which should have caused the idea to be permanently shelved as a pipe dream.

First was the simple fact that the invaders would be at least nominally Christians would set off a great deal of animosity in an Egypt that was largely Muslim. So however much the average Egyptian may dislike the Mameluke's and their corrupt brutal rule they were not likely to have positive feelings regarding being ruled by Christians.

French Supressing an Uprising in Cairo
Secondly the climate of Egypt was one not very comfortable for European troops and very unhealthy for the inhabitants much less un-acclimatised Europeans. That Europeans would do badly health wise in this climate with its myriad diseases was a given.

Thirdly in the face of English Naval supremacy such an expedition would be likely to be cut off from reinforcements and basically trapped in Egypt.

Fourth despite Ottoman Turk dislike of their nominal vassals the Mameluke's any invasion of Egypt by the French would be regarded as and a declaration of war and would certainly cause a war between the Turks and the French.

Fifth the Turks, English and Russians regarded each other with great suspicion. The Turks for example, with cause, thought the Russians were aiming at the partition of the Ottoman Empire. The Russian’s thought the English were out to deny them commercial advantages in the Middle East and the English regarded both the Turks and Russians as out to screw them over. An Invasion of Egypt was all too likely to bring all these enemies together, at least temporarily, to drive the French out.

Sixth finally the simple fact is the current Ottoman Sultan and his government were very favourably inclined towards the French government and was basically an ally of the French. Under those circumstances it seemed pointless to annoy the Ottoman’s by invading one of their provinces.5

But the course human stupidity cannot be stayed. It appears that aside from the rather overdeveloped tales of the riches to be obtained by occupying Egypt that the real reason was quite simple. The government in France was frustrated at being unable to get a grip at its main enemy England. English Naval supremacy made an invasion of Egypt seemed a cheap and cost effective way at, somehow, striking at England. The fact that the blow struck someone else seemed beside the point.

Further despite English Naval superiority since 1796 the English had evacuated the Mediterranean because of Spain’s alliance with France. So it seemed that perhaps an invasion of Egypt did not have to worry about English Naval superiority.

Napoleon had his own reasons. He apparently underplayed the difficulty of the task and looked at it as a way of adding to his fame and fortune for home political advantage. In 1797 Napoleon had already explored the possibility of overthrowing the government and making himself ruler of France. At the time the idea sunk like a rock and he got virtually no positive feedback for that idea. Meanwhile the Directory that ruled France regarded Napoleon as a danger to it and thought the idea of Napoleon 1000+ miles away a really great idea. In Egypt Napoleon could not intrigue against the government. Napoleon saw it as another way to build up his fame and fortune.6

Well the results were predictable and virtually inevitable. The invasion was the catalyst that led to the formation of the Second coalition against France. The Ottoman Turks declared war on France. Egypt was conquered but proved difficult to hold, even with the manifest military incompetence of the Mameluke's. Nelson destroyed the French fleet in the battle of the Nile and trapped the French in Egypt. In late 1799 Napoleon abandoned his troops in Egypt in order to reap advantage from a political crisis in France. Perhaps at another time I will write about that shameful episode. In late 1799 Napoleon engaged in a coup that brought him to power.

In Egypt disease and attrition steadily reduced the size of the French forces. Finally in 1801 after years of steady attrition and a decaying situation the French left after negotiating a face saving capitulation that allowed them to return to France. Of the c. 50,000 French soldiers and sailors that went to Egypt 23,000 came back the rest were dead. This does not include the large number of Egyptian, dead from massacre, starvation, war, and one must add the English and Turkish dead.7

Aside from the fact that this Expedition marked the beginnings of modern Egyptology from the work of the scientists and specialists Napoleon brought with him the Expedition did little good. Perhaps at another time I will discuss other aspects of the Expedition.

French measuring the Sphinx
1. In Chronological order these fiasco's are The Egyptian Expedition, 1798-1801, The St. Dominique Expedition, 1801-1803, The Peninsular War, 1808-1814, The Russian Campaign 1812.

2. Herold, J. Christopher, Bonaparte in Egypt, Harper and Row Pub., New York, 1962, pp. 4-21, Fregosi, Paul, Dreams of Empire, Cardinal, London, 1989, pp. 146-154, Esdaile, Charles, Napoleon’s Wars, Penguin Books, London, 2007, pp. 61-70, Blanning, T.C.W., The French Revolutionary Wars 1787-1802, Arnold, New York, 1996, pp. 228-230.

3. Herold. p. 8-10, Fregosi, pp. 156-158.

4. IBID.

5. Kinross, Lord, The Ottoman Centuries, Morrow Quill Paperbacks, New York, 1977, pp. 417-418.

6. See Footnote 1 and Blanning, T.C.W., The Origins of the French Revolutionary Wars, Longman, New York, 1986, pp. 173-199.

7. Herold, pp. 1, 388-389.

Pierre Cloutier

A Note on The Peace of Kallias

The Eastern Mediterranean
A rather interminable and endless debate as centred on the historical veracity of the Peace of Kallias, (c. 449-448 B.C.E.), or (c. 465 B.C.E.). The following is a brief review of some of the issues surrounding the Peace of Kallias.

The best description of the Peace comes from Diodorus who writes:

The Athenians and their allies concluded with the Persians a treaty of peace, the principal terms of which run as follows: All the Greek cities of Asia are to live under laws of their own making; the satraps of the Persians are not to come nearer to the sea than a three days’ journey, and no Persian warship is to sail between Phaselis and the Cyanean rocks;1 and if those terms are observed by the King and his generals, the Athenians are not to send troops into the territory over which the King is ruler.2

Other terms appear to have been that the Athenians agreed that the cities in the Delian League on the coast of Asia Minor would not be fortified. Also that the Athenians would not aid rebellion in Cyprus and Egypt , and would leave the eastern Mediterranean to Persia. Persia recognized the Athenian Empire and abandoned their claim to Ionia.3

The attack on the historical veracity of the Peace of Kallias is based on one very damaging fact, the historian Thucydides fails to mention it.4 It seems hard to believe that Thucydides would fail to mention this Peace if it in fact had occurred. However this argument is not conclusive after all Thucydides also seriously downplayed the Megarian decrees5 to give put one example. Although other 5th century sources are also silent about the Peace of Kallias. Arguments from silence do not prove something did not happen, although in the case of Thucydides silence one is left puzzled about why.

The first mention of the Peace of Kallias is in the writings of the Greek writer Isocrates, who briefly records the treaty as limiting the Persian Empire and preventing Persian ships from going west of Phaslis and that no troops will be sent west of the Halys river.6 This differs from the version given above.7 All other references to the treaty post-date this reference.8 So it appears that our earliest reference is about 70 or 85 years after the alleged treaty. No surviving inscription records the treaty or makes a reference to it.9

This combined with the fact that the best and basically only surviving near - contemporary historian, (Thucydides), does not even mention the treaty is certainly enough to raise doubts about the Peace of Kallias being historical.

Further the 4th century historian Theopompus of Chios regarded the Peace of Kallias, or some other treaty with Persia as a forgery based on the fact that the inscription he found in Athens was written in a alphabet, (Ionic), used after 403 B.C.E.10 About 350 B.C.E., references to a whole series of decrees and decisions dating, allegedly, to the period 490-440 B.C.E. start to appear. It appears all too likely that these documents were at worst forgeries and at best imaginative recreations. There is the possibility that the Peace of Kallias was one of those documents,11 if so its’ historical veracity is slight. Further what Isocrates tells us of its terms varies from the version that became generally accepted. The 4th century historian Callisthenes also said that the Peace of Kallias was a fraud.12 The sceptics can hardly be blamed for their doubts about the historical veracity of the Peace of Kallias.13

Regarding Theopompus of Chios, his reliability as an historian is not of the highest so his arguments are not conclusive.14 For example the point about the use of the Ionic alphabet after 403 B.C.E; despite what Theopompus says, several inscriptions in Ionic have been found at Athens dating much earlier than 403 B.C.E.15 As for Callisthenes his reputation as an historian is rather low and he had a reputation for sensationalism and exaggeration.16 Given Plutarch’s confusing date of the peace, (c. 465 B.C.E.)17, in the section in which he refers to Callisthenes it is possible that Plutarch has confused the question of a peace after Eurymedon, (c. 469-466 B.C.E.), with a peace after the Cyprian Expedition of c. 450 B.C.E., resulting in a misunderstanding of what Callisthenes was in fact talking about. Also what Theopompus saw, and Callisthenes referred to, could have been an accurate copy done after 403 B.C.E., of the Peace of Kallias. It also appears Theopompus may not have been referring to the Peace of Kallias but to a later treaty with Darius II of Persia.18 If so the fact he refers to the treaty as forgery when we have the evidence of Andocides for its authenticity does not help Theopompus’ credibility. It is also quite possible that although the terms of the Peace of Kallias, or some other treaty, given in the inscription are “fake”, the Peace of Kallias was in fact real.

The considerations mentioned above also apply to the question of the “faked” documents only some of which we have in their inscriptional form. Perhaps we would be in a better position to settle this question if we had the actual inscription of the Peace of Kallias, but we do not.

Isocrates is also not a good source being basically a political pamphleteer, and rhetorician, who was quite careless all too often.19 His reliability in reporting the Peace of Kallias is not high. Certainly the term forbidding Persian troops west of the Halys river is hard to take seriously.20 Isocrates summary is as follows:

In the time of our supremacy, the barbarians were prevented from marching with an army beyond the Halys river and from sailing with their ships this side Phaselis.21

The idea that the restriction of Persian troops against going west of the Halys is believable if we amend it to mean that Royal troops could not go west of the Halys and had nothing to do with the local armies of the Satraps,22 also has problems. It is not reasonable to think that the Persians would accept such a limitation on their ability to crush rebellion in western Asia Minor and that the Persian King would at the time reduce his ability to rein in his Satraps is problematic and doubtful. No amount of massaging this data makes it any less hard to believe. Finally given what our author says about reading in, (see next two paragraphs), information when something is not clearly stated. This seems to be a prime example. Also Isocrates account of the terms is still at a minimum 70 years after the alleged events and his version still contradicts the other versions.23

And our three other sources from the 4th century Demosthenes, Lycurgus and Aristodemos disagree with Isocrates version of the terms and support Diodorus ' version.24 Demosthenes account, which is the same as Lycurgus, states referring to Kallias:

Who negotiated the celebrated Peace under which the King of Persia was not to approach within a day’s ride of the coast, nor sail a ship of war between the Chelidonian islands and the Blue rocks.25

Asia Minor

Lycurgus adds to the above that it was agreed:

...that the Greeks should be free not only if they lived in Europe but in Asia too...26

The writer Aristodemos, gives the following terms:

The treaty was made on those conditions: the Persians were not to sail in warships beyond the Kyanai, the river Nessos and Phaselis, which is a Pamphylian city, and helidoniai. Nor were they to advance within a three day journey to the sea as overed by a horse at speed.27

There is no reason not to accept Diodorus' version of the treaty given the support it has from those three sources.

Basically it appears that fourth century historians, writers, and orators contrasted the glorious achievement of the Peace of Kallias with the humiliation of the Peace of Antalkidas,28 (also known, more accurately in the Authors’ opinion, as the Kings’ Peace, 387 B.C.E.), which both formally gave the Greeks cities of Asia Minor to Persia and ratified continued Persian interference in Greek affairs. It is surely not a coincidence that the first surviving mention of the Peace of Kallias occurs about 380 B.C.E., in the writings of Isocrates, who quite deliberately and rhetorically contrasts the Peace of Kallias with the "Kings Peace" in the same passage.29

For example Isocrates writes such things as:

We were constantly setting limits on the Empire of the King…

Levying tribute on some of his subjects and banning him from the sea…30

But right now according to Isocrates:

Do we not address him as "The Great King?"

Is it not he who presides over our affairs as though captive of his spear.31

The Athenian Orator Lysias also contrasted the glorious achievements of the 5th century B.C.E., with the early 4th century B.C.E., reality. In the past, according to Lysias, Athens had:

…displayed their own power to such effect that the Great King no more coveted the possessions of others, but yielded some of his own and was in fear for what remained.32

Right now however things had changed for now it is;

…fitting for Greece to come and mourn over this tomb, and lament those who lie here, seeing that her own freedom was interred together with their valour. Unhappy Greece, to be bereft of such men, and happy King of Asia, to be at grips with other leaders! For Greece, deprived of these men, is sunk in slavery…33

The polemical and rhetorical purpose of Isocrates comments about the Peace of Kallias in contrast to the "Kings Peace" are obvious and clear and was part of a rapidly developing tradition. So the reliability of Isocrates’ comments concerning the contents of the Peace terms for both Peaces’ is suspect, so there is no compelling reason to accept Isocrates version of the Peace of Kallias over Diodorus.

The writer Aelius Aristides who lived and wrote in the 2nd century C.E. also provides evidence of the terms of the Peace of Kallias, and the terms he reports agree with Diodorus , Lycurgus and Demosthenes.34 Aristides however follows in the tradition of Isocrates in contrasting the terms of the Kings Peace with those of the Peace of Kallias.35 Bluntly the victorious Peace of Kallias is contrasted with the humiliation of the Kings Peace with, like Isocrates, considerable rhetorical flourish. All of this does not lead to great confidence in the reported terms and reads very much like a cliche. For example Aristides states in his very rhetorical Panathenaic Oration, that Athens:

...crushed the barbarians.,

and,

...it (Athens –Author) made terms of peace with the former and with the later (Persia and Sparta) accordingly, being superior to both, together and separately.36

Aristides whole effort is such a celebration of Athens that its honesty and accuracy are seriously in doubt. Its value has a source for the peace of Kallias is questionable, given its almost hysterically patriotic celebration of Athens and down playing of Athens’s defeats through all sorts of rhetorical tricks.37

The hypothesis that the Peace of Kallias was originally concluded in c. 465 B.C.E., although quite seductive, has several problems.38 In the proposal an attack has to be made on Diodorus ' account because it clearly dates the Peace of Kallias right after the expedition to Cyprus.39 Firstly it does not deal with the evidence that Athens occupied parts of south-eastern Asia Minor, Cyprus and maybe even Palestine.40 Also the historians Ephorus and Callisthenes are used to contradict Diodorus.41 Since these historians only survive in fragments and in summaries, do they really contradict Diodorus? Also Plutarch 's account which refers to Callisthenes could mean that no peace was concluded then. (c. 465 B.C.E.), but was later. It is ironic that a historian who denied the Peace of Kallias is used to date it to c. 465 B.C.E.; because he says no such peace was concluded then!42

Regarding Ephorus since all we have are fragments none of which unambiguously place when the peace was made it doesn't help to set Ephorus against Diodorus when we are not sure they do in fact contradict each other. Further explanations that Herodotus or Thucydides didn't mention the peace because it clashed with the purpose of their works,43 are less than convincing because at the same time the position is advanced that the usual interpretation of the peace has forbidding both sides from going into both areas is rejected on the grounds that no account mentions a limit on Greek ships but only on Persian ships.44 So in two cases something is not mentioned, the Peace of Kallias, and it means nothing about whether or not something really happened. In the other the failure to mention a restriction on Greek ships means none existed.

Regarding Ephorus and Diodorus , a great deal of play as been made by various historians concerning Diodorus' ability to mess up dates.45 As already noted Diodorus, may have messed dates up in crediting an inscription describing Salamis, (c. 450 B.C.E.), as describing Eurymedon, (c. 469-466 B.C.E.).46 So this argument has validity. The problem comes in the following manner. The accepted dates for the Egyptian Expedition are 460-454 B.C.E., and that it lasted c. 6 years.47 Diodorus gives the dates as 463 - 460 B.C.E. which means the expedition lasted about 3 years, and Diodorus further associates the expedition with a rebellion after the death of Xerxes, (465 B.C.E.).48 This leaves very little room for a "Peace of Kallias" after Eurymedon. A Truce would be more likely. The contradictions with Thucydides are pretty blatant.59 So is it just Diodorus who made the error? Since Diodorus is copying Ephorus it is possible Diodorus was copying Ephorus in his dating the events.50 If that is the case then there is a problem. It means that early on, (4th century B.C.E.); there was a fundamental problem with the dates of the Egyptian Expedition including both start and finishing dates and duration. The reason that this is likely is not only was Diodorus copying Ephorus he was compiling a year by year chronology he would have to have made the same error three times and separated out events occurring in the same year has occurring in different years. The other reason is that Ephorus had problems with chronology and was criticized for ignoring it.51

The above being the case there is the possibility that Ephorus' apparent dating of the Peace of Kallias at 465 B.C.E., if such is the case is an error. Ephorus' credibility with dates is not enhanced by his likely incorrect dating of the Egyptian Expedition. Given that Diodorus was copying Ephorus, Diodorus would have had to have made multiple errors in copying in order to produce the chronological mess that resulted. It is submitted that Ephorus is the likely source of this muddle and that part of the muddle is in fact the placing of the Peace of Kallias.

Voyages of Pericles and Ephialtes that were unopposed at this time prove nothing one way or the other.52 the main problem with the idea of a Peace of Kallias at this time c. 465 B.C.E., is that according to the terms we have it would have entailed abandoning Cyprus and other recent conquests and the war does not seem to have stopped anyway. At best we have a truce.53

Finally there is the tantalizing hint in Herodotus who refers to an embassy from Athens lead by Kallias sent to the Persian court.54 Unfortunately Herodotus does not directly or indirectly provide a clear date for this embassy neither does he tell us what the embassy was doing at the Persian court.55 Herodotus' comments that:

Callias, the son of Hipponicus, and a number of other Athenians were in Susa, the city of Memnon, on quite different business, and it so happened that their visit coincided with that of some representatives from Argos, who had been sent to ask Xerxes' son Artaxerxes if the friendly relations, which the Argives had established with his father still held good, or if they were now considered by Persia as enemies. 'they do indeed hold good', Artaxerxes is said to have replied; 'there is no city which I believe to be a better friend to me than Argos'.56

Artaxerxes I

Herodotus does mention that the embassy occurred in the reign of Artaxerxes I, which gives a time period of c. 465-423 B.C.E. for this embassy. Although the implication of the passage would seem to be shortly after the death of Xerxes. At the very least Herodotus at least tells us that Kallias was in fact involved in diplomatic dealing and possible negotiations of some kind with the Persians, at the right time, (approximately), for the Peace of Kallias.57

Herodotus then adds the following which throws the above into confusion:

For my own part I cannot positively state that Xerxes either did, or did not send the messenger to Argos; nor can I guarantee the story of the Argives going to Susa and asking Artaxerxes about their relationship with Persia.58

This quite messes up the dating and the reliability of Herodotus ' account, which Herodotus refers to as "another story current in Greece",59 so he does not claim it as "true". Herodotus merely records and lets the reader decide. Herodotus' account states that Callias' visit coincided with an Argive embassy, at which Artaxerxes made some comment about the good relations between Argos and Persia. Besides the blatant anti-Argive bias of the story. It does not bode well that so soon after the alleged embassy of Kallias that such possible misinformation was circulating about what went on during it. Herodotus is generally thought to have written the Histories, c. 445-430 B.C.E. and died after 430 B.C.E.60 So that within about one generation of the Peace of Kallias, if you accept the early date for the Peace of Kallias, (c. 465 B.C.E.), or within about 14 years if you accept the later date, (c. 449-448 B.C.E.), significant misinformation may already have been circulating concerning the Peace of Kallias. Since in this story Herodotus dates Kallias' embassy by tying it to an alleged Argive embassy after the death of Xerxes, which by implication seems to be shortly after Xerxes death; if said Argive embassy never happened than said embassy no longer helps to date the Kallias' embassy and hence the peace. Certainly it seems all too likely that a lot of "stories" were circulating to muddy the historical waters.

For historians the best evidence for the veracity of the Peace of Kallias is the end of the Persian / Greek war shortly after the end of the expedition to Cyprus in 450 B.C.E., and the following 30 years of peace with Persia before Persian intervention in the Peloponnesian War.61 Thus c. 449-448 B.C.E. is more "logical" for the Peace of Kallias than c. 465 B.C.E. Also there was apparently a mysterious suspension of tribute payments in 449-448 B.C.E., which may be related to the Peace.62 This again is not conclusive, because despite the statements of some historians that “hostilities did cease".63 Hostilities in fact did not cease. Too give but one example Thucydides records that when Samos, (c. 440-439 B.C.E.), revolted against Athens and the League, Persian ships and men tried to help the Samians.64 It appears that the Peace of Kallias did not completely end hostilities.

That the Peace of Kallias is historical is rendered more probable by the oldest written account of a Peace with Persia in the fifth century B.C.E., the account given by the Athenian orator Andocides in his oration On the Peace with Sparta, in which he says:

Thus-- and it is only by calling the past to mind that one can properly policy-- we began by making a truce with the Great King and establishing a permanent accord with him, thanks to the diplomacy of my mothers' brother Epilycus, the son of Teisander.65

This is the so-called Peace of Epilycus usually dated to c. 424 B.C.E.66 Andocides made this speech about 392 B.C.E., when Athens was considering accepting terms to end the Corinthian war. If nothing else this indicates that Athens could have made a number of "Peaces", "Truces" with the Persian Empire in the 5th century B.C.E.

So what is the conclusion of this rather inconclusive ramble through incomplete, bad and quite inadequate source material about the “Peace of Kallias”?

Probably there was a “Peace of Kallias” concluded in about 449 B.C.E. A peace of exhaustion no doubt. Athens had Sparta and its allies to worry about and Persia had its own problems without having to worry about a frontier state like Athens and its’ allies. Whether the “Peace” was a formal peace, a truce, an agreement, or an informal suspension of hostilities cannot now be known.67 Regarding the terms of the “Peace” we can say very little. The terms recorded in the 4th century, by Ephorus and others are very dubious and probably at least partially false. It appears likely that both sides agreed to a suspension of hostilities and set up no go areas for each other's fleets and armies. It is unlikely that Athens imposed terms on Persia and in fact Athens was probably mainly confined to the Aegean by the “Peace”. If there were no go areas agreed too this did not last long in that when favourable opportunities arose the Persians at least would intervene with ships and men. Despite this it is also clear that neither side was willing to make an open breach and resume full-scale war. So a sort of “peace” endured for about 30 years.68

Addendum

The Peace of Kallias was referred to by various Greek historians and writers of the 4th century B.C.E. Below are the various terms as reported by these sources. Diodorus used the 4th century B.C.E.; historian Ephorus as his source and so apparently did Plutarch . Isocrates mentioned the peace several times in his political writings in detail, along with more general references elsewhere. The Athenian politician Demosthenes mentioned the peace in fair detail in one of his speeches. Also another Athenian politician Lycurgus also mentioned the peace. In the 2nd century C.E., the Orator Aristides also mentions the Peace of Kallias in fair detail. The quote from Diodorus is taken from, C. H. Oldfather, Diodorus Siculus, Harvard University Press, London, 1989. The quote from Plutarch is taken from, Ian Scott-Kilvert, The Rise and Fall of Athens, Nine Greek Lives of Plutarch, Penguin Books, London, 1960. The quotes from Isocrates are from, George Norlin, Isocrates, v. 1 & 2, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1980. The quote from Demosthenes is from, Vince, J.H., Ed., Demosthenes, with an English Translation, v. 2, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinman Ltd., London, 1935. The quote from Lycurgus is from, Burtt, J. O., Minor Attic Orators, v. 2, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinman Ltd., London, 1954. The quote from Aristodemos is from, Fornara, Charles W., Archaic Times to the End of the Peloponnesian War, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1977. The quotes from Aristides are from Aristides, v.1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinmann Ltd, London, 1973.

Consequently Artabazus and Megabyzus sent ambassadors to Athens to discuss a settlement. The Athenians were favourable and dispatched ambassadors plenipotentiary, the leader of whom was Callias the son of Hipponicus; and so the Athenians and their allies concluded with the Persians a treaty of peace, the principal terms of which run as follows: All the Greek cities of Asia are to live under laws of their own making; the satraps of the Persians are not to come nearer to the sea than a three days' journey and no Persian warship is to sail inside Phaselis or the Cyanean Rocks; and if these terms are observed by the king and his generals, the Athenians are not to send troops into the territory over which the king is ruler. After the treaty had been solemnly concluded. The Athenians withdrew their armaments from Cyprus, having won a brilliant victory and concluded most noteworthy terms of peace. And it so happened that Cimon died of illness during his stay in Cyprus.
(Diodorus, Book 12, 4.)

This blow so dashed the king's hopes that he accepted the terms of that notorious peace, whereby he agreed to stay away the distance of a whole day's ride from the Greek sea board of Asia Minor and not to let a single warship or armoured vessel sail west of the Cyanean and the Chelidonian islands.
(Plutarch, Life of Kimon 13)

Well then, the Hellenes felt such confidence in those who governed the city in those times that most of them of their own accord placed themselves under the power of Athens, while the barbarians were so far from meddling in the affairs of Hellenes that they neither sailed their ships-of-war this side of Phaselis nor march their armies beyond the Halys, refraining, on the contrary, from all aggression. Today, however, circumstances are so completely reversed that the Hellenes regard Athens with hatred and the barbarians hold us in contempt. As to the hatred of us among the Hellenes, you have heard the report of our generals themselves and what the king thinks of us, he has made plain in the letters which have been dispatched by him.
(Isocrates, Areopagiticus, 80-81.)

In the time of our supremacy, the barbarians were prevented from marching with an army beyond the Halys river and from sailing with their ships of war this side of Phaselis, but under the hegemony of the Lacedaemonians not only did they gain the freedom to march and sail wherever they pleased, but they even became masters over many Hellenic states.
(Isocrates, Panathenaicus, 59.)

In fact, after the disaster which befell us in the Hellespont, when our rivals took our place as leaders, the barbarians won a naval victory, became rulers of the sea, occupied most of the islands made a landing in Laconia, took Cythera by storm, and sailed around the whole Peloponnesus, inflicting damage as they went. One may best comprehend how great is the reversal in our circumstances if he will read side by side the treaties which were made during our leadership and those which have been published recently; for he will find that in those days we were constantly setting limits to the empire of the king, levying tribute on some of his subjects, and barring him from the sea; now, however, it is he who controls the destinies of the Hellenes, who dictates what they must each do, and who all but sets up his viceroys in their cities. For with this one exception, what else is lacking? Was it not he who decided the issue of the war, was it not he who directed the terms of peace, and is it not he who now presides over our affairs? Do we not sail off to him as to a master, when we have complaints against each other? Do we not address him as "The Great King" as though we were captives of his spear? Do we not in our wars against each other rest our hopes of salvation on him, who would gladly destroy both Athens and Lacedaemons?
(Isocrates, Panegyricus, 119-121)

I am sure you have heard the story of their treatment of Callias, son of Hipponicus, who negotiated the celebrated peace under which the King of Persia was not to approach within a day's ride of the coast, nor sail with a ship of war between the Chelidonian islands and the Blue Rocks. (Cyanean Rocks- Author).
(Demosthenes, De Falsa Legatione, 273.)

And to crown their victory: not content with erecting the trophy in Salamis, they fid for the Persian the boundaries necessary for Greek freedom and prevented his overstepping them, making an agreement that he should not sail his warships between Cyaneae, (Cyanean Rocks- Author) and Phaselis and that the Greeks should be free not only if they lived in Europe but in Asia too.
(Lycurgus, Against Leocrates, 73.)

They elected as general Kallias – the one nicknamed Lakkopoutos (“pit-wealth”) – because he became wealthy by discovering a treasury at Marathon and appropriating it. This Kallias made atreaty with Artaxerxes and the rest of the Persians. The treaty was made on those conditions: the Persians were not to sail in warships beyond the Kyanai, the river Nessos and Phaselis, which is a Pamphylian city, and Chelidoniai. Nor were they to advance within a three day journey to the sea as covered by a horse at speed.
(Aristodemos, 104. 13.)

He (The Persian King) valued his safety more, and he retreated before their city (Athens –Author) on land and sea not the distance, as the saying goes, of a ship's backwater, nor of a step backwards, but he gave up all his land down by the sea, tens of thousands of stades in Asia, in all no less than the area of a great empire…
(Aristides, Panathenaic Oration, 208.)

But after the struggles and expeditions of the city, he sank so low that he agreed that he would no longer sail within two boundaries, the Chelidonean Isles to the south, and the Cyanean to the north, and that he would everywhere keep five hundred stades away from the sea, so that this very circle was like a crown upon the head of the Greeks, and the king was under surveillance from his very territory.
(Aristides, Panathenaic Oration, 209.)

But in the matter of the peace what a great difference there is! For the city’s peace gave orders to the king and said he must do what he was commanded. For it did not allow him to sail within the Chelidanian and Cyanean islands, and if you are proud of your cavalry, no longer will you ride up to the sea but it says you will stay away from the sea the distance of a day’s ride of that cavalry, and you will here much about the Greeks who live in Greece as about the Greeks who live in your own land.
(Aristides, Panathenaic Oration, 274.)

Greek Helemet

1. For locations see Maps. Note the Cyanean rocks are the Cheledonian Islands on the Map.

2. Diodorus , Book 12, 4. Diodorus is quoting the 4th century B.C.E., historian Ephorus. For a review of the terms and related issues see de Ste Croix, pp. 310-314, McGregor, pp. 67.

3. de Ste Croix, pp. 310-314, McGregor, pp. 67.

4. Thucydides , Book 1, 113-120, Powell, 1988, pp. 49-50, Sealey, p. 278.

5. See Grant, 1995, p. 77, Powell, 1988, p. 114-117.

6. Isocrates, v. 2, Panathenaicus, (12), 59, Areopagiticus, (7), 120. See Sealey, p. 279.

7. Powell, 1988, p. 114.

8. For example Demosthenes mentions it in 351 and 343 B.C.E., in v. 2, De Falsa Legatione, (19), 273., and so does Lycurgus in 328 B.C.E, in v. 2, Against Leocrates, (1), 73. See also Addendum on p. 80, for complete text of Demosthenes and Lycurgus. See also Meiggs, 1972, p. 129. See also Powell, 1988, p. 114-115.

9. Powell, 1988, p. 114-123, Davies, 1993, p. 80-82.

10. Davies, 1993, p. 81. Fornara, p. 96 quotes Harpocration, Attic Letters, '…Theopompus in book 15 of the Philippika says that the treaty with the Barbarian was a fabrication, and that it was not inscribed on the stelae with Attic letters but with the letters of the Ionians'.

11. Davies, 1993, p. 81.

12. See Plutarch, Life of Kimon, 13., for Callisthenes. See also Sealey, p. 279. See Addendum for complete text of Plutarch concerning the Peace terms.

13. The best attack on the historical veracity of the Peace of Kallias is Sealey, pp. 278-282.

14. Grant, 1995, p. 109.

15. Powell, 1988, p. 51.

16. Grant, 1995, p. 110.

17. Plutarch , Life of Kimon, 13. This position of the Peace of Kallias has many modern defenders. See Miller, pp. 13-14, 16-17, Badian, pp. 20-23.

18. Theon, in his Progymnasmata II, 67. 22, quotes Theopmpus as saying the 'Hellenic oath is a fabrication, which the Athenian say the Hellenes swore before the battle of Plataea against the barbarians, and so is the Athenian treaty with King Dareios in regards to the Greeks.' The above isquoted in Fornara, p. 96. The, so called Peace of Epilycus. See Andocides, v. 1, On the Peace with Sparta, (3) 29, from Burtt, Minor Attic Orators, v. 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heineman Ltd., London, 1962, and Sealey p. 281.

19. Davies, 1993, p. 170-171.

20. See Sealey, p. 279-280, Powell, 1988, 49-54. See also Badian who does take this provision seriously, pp. 49-50.

21. Isocrates, v. 2, Panathenaicus, (12), 59. For a repeat of these terms see his, v. 2, Areopagiticus, (7), 80.

22. Badian 51-52.

23. See above.

24. See Demosthenes, v. 2, De Falsa Legatione, (19), 273, Lycurgus, v. 2, Against Leocrates, (1), 73 and Aristodemos, 104. 13.

25. Demosthenes, v. 2, De Falsa Legatione, (19), 273.

26. Lycurgus, v. 2, Against Leocrates, (1), 73.

27. Aristodemos, 104. 13, quoted in Fornara, pp. 97-98.

28. Powell, 1988, p. 50. See for example Lysias, Funeral Oration, (55)-(61).

29. See Isocrates, v. 1, Panegyricus, (4), 120, v. 2, Areopagiticus, (7), 80, v. 2, Panathenaicus, (12), 59-61. Sealey, p. 279.

30. Isocrates, v. 2, Areopagiticus, (7), 120..

31. Isocrates, v. 2, Areopagiticus, (7), 121.

32. Lysias, Funeral Oration, (56).

33. Lysias, Funeral Oration, (60).

34. See Aristides, Panathenaic Oration, 209, 274, and Addendum to this Note for quotes.

35. See Aristides, Panathenaic Oration, 271-279.

36. See Aristides, Panathenaic Oration, 227, 226.

37. No better evidence of this exists than to read Aristide’s Panathenaic Oration. Read the Aristides quotes in the Addendum to this Note. In this respect it is interesting that Aristides mentions Athenian forces going to Egypt but 'inadvertently' neglects to mention the disasterous outcome. Aristides is also an excellent example of the takeover of History by rhetoric in antiquity.

38. See Badian, pp. 20-60, and Miller, pp. 15-16, 22-23

39. Diodorus , Book 12, 4.

40. See also Meiggs, 1972, p. 102.

41. Badian, pp. 20-26.

42. Plutarch, Life of Kimon, 13. Badian's comment, 'The fact that Ephialtes and Pericles, on separate occasions, refrained from attacking the King's territory can be explained only on the hypothesis that there was already a peace in existence, which they would not break:', p. 15. This comment is amazing. Badian seems to be assuming that these Athenian naval incursions if they did not raid or fight other ships must have been in a time of peace. This is unacceptable. War fleets historically have often neither fought nor raided merely patrolled or looked for enemies. Finally it is hard to accept Badian's contention that the treaty would have allowed Athenian war fleets to go anywhere while restricting the Persians. Such terms being accepted by the Persians unless they were utterly crushed, is simply not believable.

43. Badian, p. 27.

44. Badian pp. 14-15, 50-52, Badian’s linkage of the debate over the terms of the Peace of Kallias with the treaty with Carthage at the end of the First Punic war, which attacks historians who argue that the Ebro river limit on Carthage imposed a limit on Rome south of the river, on the grounds that ancient historians do not mention it does not help his argument. It is hard to believe that Carthage would have agreed to a document that would have allowed Roman interference in their domain in Spain. Such acquiescence to Roman messing in an area of Carthaginian interest is simply not believable.

45. See Grant, 1995, pp. 101-102, 108.

46. See Diodorus , Book 11, 62.

47. See above.

48. See Diodorus Book 11, 71-77.

49. See Thucydides , Book 1, 104. 109. 110.

50. Grant, 1995, p. 109. Grant gives Ephorus' dates has c.405-330 B.C.E.

51. See Grant, 1995, pp. 108-109.

52. Badian thinks otherwise pp. 26-30. Plutarch , Life of Kimon, 13, refers to Callisthenes has saying 'the Persians never agreed to observe any such terms. He says that this is merely how they behaved in practice, because of the fear in which the victory of Eurymedon had implanted in them; and, indeed, they kept so far away from Greece that Pericles with a squadron of fifty and Ephialtes with no more than thirty sailed far beyond the Chelidonian Islands without meeting anything resembling a barbarian fleet' I merely note that the implication of this passage, contra Badian, is that Callisthenes assumes some sort of reciprocity in terms of limits about where fleets and armies could go.

53. Meiggs, 1972, pp. 101-103.

54. Herodotus , Book 7, 151.

55. Herodotus , Book 7, 151.

56. Herodotus , Book 7, 151. See the de Sélincourt-Burn, translation of Herodotus.

57. See Powell, 1988, pp. 51-53.

58. Herodotus , Book 7, 152. See the de Sélincourt-Burn, translation of Herodotus.

59. Herodotus , Book 7, 149. See the de Sélincourt-Burn, translation of Herodotus.

60. See Burn, Introduction, p. 14, in the de Sélincourt-Burn, translation of Herodotus.

61. See Lewis, The Thirty Years' Peace, The Cambridge Ancient History, v. 4, 2nd Edition, Ed., D.M. Lewis et al, Cambridge University Press, 1992, p, 121, p. 123.

62. Powell, 1988, p. 49-54, Davies, 1993, p. 81, Meiggs, 1972, p. 129.

63. Davies, 1993, p. 81.

64. Thucydides , Book 1, 114-115. Badian, pp. 37-39. Miller p. 22-23, discusses the treaty has minimizing conflict not eliminating it, and refers to a 'Cold war', between Athens and Persia and also discusses the Samian revolt and Persia's possible aid to in detail.

65. Andocides, v. 1, On the Peace with Sparta, (3) 29.

66. See Burtt.

67. Bengtson, p. 128, is of the opinion no formal peace was made.

68. See Powell, 1988, pp. 49-54 for a fuller discussion. See also Miller pp. 22-23.

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Pierre Cloutier