The Dark Side

Augustus

The Roman Empire is too this day greatly admired, but a lot of that admiration is based on the fact that it occurred so long ago so that the bruises of everyday knowledge of Roman power are softened by the nostalgia of distance in time. It is also helped by the fact that Greco-Roman culture was and is so widely admired as the foundation of Western Civilization.

The result is a tendency to whitewash the regime of the Emperors and to represent it as a benign institution except of course when “bad” Emperor’s ruled. Of course it is a common shibboleth in classic scholarship that a “bad” Emperor was one disliked by the Senate. The bottom line is that if the institution of Emperorship was so open to be so easily being “misused” then of course the problem wasn’t just with the individual but the institution as well.

The Ides of March

Some Thoughts

Caesar getting the "point"
on March 15, 44 B.C.E.

Ides simply means middle in Latin but today what is interesting is that the only ides that people remember are the Ides of March and just why is that?

The Fall of the Roman Republic a Note

The Roman Empire 60 B.C.E.

The fall of the Roman Republic and its replacement by the Roman Imperial Empire was one of the most epoch shaking events in history for failure would have meant the end of the Roman state and empire.

As I said in an earlier posting the obvious if not only solution to the serious problems with the Roman Republic governing an empire with a governmental structure geared to running a city state was autocratic one man rule. The problem was the ethos and political sense of the Roman ruling classes basically forbade accepting the rule of one man and hence elevating one man has superior to them all. The very idea of “King” was anathema to the Roman ruling class and utterly unacceptable. The problem was the cooperation of this ruling class was absolutely essential in order for the state to function, but they would also likely bring down or kill anyone who aspired to dictatorial or one man rule.1

In fact it was not just the fact that the Roman ruling class was so opposed to one man rule; it was also in many respects hopelessly corrupt and out of control. In many respects the greed and brutality of the Roman Ruling class was so vicious and so widespread has to endanger the very survival of the state. A classic example was the violence and corruption by which the Roman ruling class opposed the extension of Roman Citizenship to Italians in the period 100-90 B.C.E., including murdering the politician who championed it. The result was the near destruction of the empire at its core. The details of this war are poorly given in our sources but the war seems to have been bloody and very brutal.

What happened was that despairing of getting Roman Citizenship many of the Italian states allied with Rome succeeded from Rome and set up their own state, with their own Senate and capital. When Rome tried to crush the revolt, called the Social War, proved impossible to crush. Which was hardly a surprise given that the Italian allies, who had fought in Rome’s wars also were just as good at war making as full fledged Romans. After c. 1 year of indecisive warfare with all of Etruria about to go over to the rebels, and thus sealing the collapse of Rome as a major power, the Roman Senate finally did the right thing. Citizenship was offered to allies who remained loyal, then to those who quite the rebel cause. The rebellion instead of being crushed simply petered out. However it had been an incredibly close call. This event is amazingly enough not given the status it deserves in the historical records as one of the most important events of ancient times. Because failure to solve this issue would have but an end to the Roman Empire by fatally dividing Italy.2

After that close call, which indicated that the Roman ruling class, as personified by the doings of the Roman Senate was losing its grasp of doing the sensible and expedient and instead acting in crass, narrow minded self interest with potentially fatal consequences, Rome plunged into a series of destructive civil conflicts, pointless intrigues, purges and much gratuitous, pointless violence. During all this the empire continued to expand and so did the venality and corruption of the Roman officials sent to govern the empire. So at the same time the empire expanded it was creaking at the seams ready to fall apart.3

The long history of the various intrigues, machinations etc, which occurred in the period after the Social War, are not germane to the topic of this post except to note that they indicate the steady loss of command of the situation by the traditional governing institutions of the state, most especially the Senate, and those institutions steady loss of political sense. In effect the idea emerged that the state existed so that members of the Roman Ruling class through their command of the state could personally profit from such control over the state. Not surprisingly this attitude was deeply resented by other members of the state who had citizenship rights and felt they also had a right to benefit from the Roman state. Of course all sorts of other groups also through their champions tried to influence the state. The fact that the Roman State, although Oligarchic, had democratic features through its popular assemblies insured that those who felt they were being exploited would have both a voice and champions. The Senate and other supporters of the ruling class position, called Optimates, through its systems of clientele and patronage could deflect and eliminate much of this popular opposition but could never quite defuse it; especially since various members of the ruling class for reasons of self advancement and in the interest of jockeying for power felt it expedient to support the popular cause against the ruling class.

The resulting conflict of the orders was frequently bloody and quite ruthless, with purges, massacres, terror and all round mayhem. All of which further weakened the state. The Republic was dying a long slow and quite contorted death. But in the end the chief characteristic of the decline of the Roman Republic was the almost incredible, but the undeniable loss of political sense in the Roman ruling class and it's seeming hell bent suicidal drive to self destruction.4

The event that more than anything signifies the terminal stupidity and lack of sense of the Roman Ruling class as shown by the Roman Senate is a series of events in 61-59 B.C.E. Basically the Roman Ruling class through its instrument the Senate managed to quite effectively cut its own throat.

Before going into these events I should give an overview of a man who in many ways is an outstanding example of why and how the Roman ruling class self destructed and literally had to be saved against its will. I am of course referring to Cicero, (106-43 B.C.E.).

Cicero also called old chick pea, has a wonderfully inflated reputation as a great mind. Well he certainly had a great, literary, oratorical, philosophical mind, but has a politician he was utterly hopeless. In many respects a legend in his own mind. Cicero was in many respects a totally clueless reactionary intellectual who had little real understanding of what the developments of his own time meant.

Bust of Cicero

What Cicero wanted was a “concord of the Orders”, basically an agreement among the various members of the Roman ruling classes to band together to fight off both popular revolts and measures and one man rule. Part of this ethos was an un-wavering belief in the right of the Senatorial class in alliance with what Cicero called the “New M en” to use the state for their own benefit. This along with Cicero’s almost fanatical belief in private property rights makes him nothing more than a backward looking reactionary.5

…Cicero, in despair and longing, wrote of an ideal commonwealth that had once existed, the Rome of the Scipiones, with the balanced and ordered constitution that excited the admiration of Polybius:…6

Cicero’s view of private property rights was such that he viewed any attempt to deal with the truly horrible problem of indebtedness, that was helping to choke the Roman Republic with significant economic and political problems, that did not uphold the property rights of lenders to the maximum dictated by the law as nothing less than a unwarranted attack on the most fundamental rights of property. The simple fact is that a very large percentage of the debtors could not pay the full amounts owing or that the steadily rising interest amounts were making these debts more impossible to pay. That all this created disastrous class conflict and further tied up enormous amounts of money in unproductive enterprises. Also an enormous amount of the wealth of the lenders was in loans that could not ever be paid to them. Some sort of debt relief was the only possible solution but this Cicero adamantly opposed as an attack on property. The fact that at this rate the lenders would get very little was ignored or that the enraged debtors facing perpetual, never ending debts frequently stopped paying anything at all or contemplated murdering the lenders was simply brushed aside.7

Cicero foolishly also fancied himself a brilliant politician and painted a hugely inflated picture of himself as a gifted politician and sneered, which given his oratorical abilities was quite wounding, at other much more gifted politicians. Cicero, thinking himself gifted at the art of political intrigue, engaged in dubious political intrigues and was with monotonous regularity out manoeuvred by other politicians like Caesar / Crassus or Pompey.8

But then the Roman politician Brutus is supposed to have described Cicero as follows:

…as long as Cicero can get people to give him what he wants, to flatter and praise him, he will put up with servitude.9

In the end Cicero fancying himself a hero in rhetorical speech tried to use Caesar’s heir Octavian (Called later Augustus) against Mark Anthony. Cicero hoped to use Octavian and then discard him. Unfortunately Cicero did not seem to realize that all the speeches he uttered against Mark Anthony meant little in terms of real power. Octavian and Mark Anthony got together and made an agreement and Cicero, considered, rightly, a duplicitous double dealer was proscribed and killed. Right to the end Cicero never understood what was going on or that has a politician he was at best mediocre and likely totally incompetent. What he also was; was totally unaware about how to solve Rome’s serious political and economic problems.10

If the Roman ruling class included among its members, people has intelligent as the very gifted Cicero who unfortunately was an inept politician one can easily guess how blinkered the average member of the governing classes was. The classic example, or perhaps the moment when the Roman ruling class finally lost it and demonstrated to the world its supreme almost sublime idiocy occurred in the years 60-59 B.C.E. it involved the handling of the three most powerful politicians in Rome at the time and how the Roman ruling class through its instrument the Senate completely dropped the ball.

It occurred in the following manner. By the year 60 B.C.E., the three most important Roman politicians were Pompey, Caesar and Crassus. They were each pissed off, one after the other, by an arrogant and frankly brain dead Senate, which seemed to have had a death wish.

Head of Pompey

Pompey, (106-48 B.C.E.) was at the time the most powerful of the three. He had just returned from a spectacularly successful, military and political mission in the east. During which Pompey had quelled various threats to Rome and added much new territory and more importantly added massive new revenues to the Roman state. He had also consolidated Roman authority in the eastern Mediterranean. Pompey had also come back very wealthy. Pompey had also in fact came back with a huge army prompting fears that he intended to establish one man rule. Certainly he could have done so. Instead he disbanded his army upon entering Italy and indicated that he was perfectly willing to work with the Senate. He did however have two requests. The first was that all the decisions he made regarding reorganizing the east be ratified by the Senate. The second was that land be given to his veterans.11 As one of our sources says:

At this time Pompey entered Italy and had Lucius Afranius and Metellus Celer appointed consuls, vainly hoping that through them he could effect whatever he desired. He wished in particular to have some land given to his soldiers and to have all his acts approved; but he failed of these objects at that time. For, in the first place, the optimates, who even before this had not been pleased with him, prevented the questions from being brought to vote.12

Two politicians Lucullus, (who had preceded Pompey in the east) and Cato the Younger helped organize Senate opposition to Pompey:

When Pompey got back, the Senate, wishing to curtail his great reputation, were all the more urgent in encouraging Lucullus to take an active part in politics. By this time Lucullus had abandoned himself to the pleasures of an easy life and to enjoyment of his wealth; most things made little impression on him and he seemed to have lost all zest for action. However, in the case of Pompey he plunged straight into the fray. He made a vigorous and indeed overwhelming attack on him in connection with those administrative arrangements of his own which Pompey had cancelled, and, with the support of Cato, gained a majority for his own views.13

There was also a whole string of lesser slights that added to Pompey’s quite understandable annoyance.

If annoying Pompey to this degree indicates a lack of political sense then the Senate compounded the problem by annoying Caesar.

Head of Caesar

Caesar, (100-44 B.C.E.) by this time was an important politician in Rome were he was the leader of a powerful faction. Caesar had recently completed a tour as Governor of Baetica, (part of Spain), were he had engaged in military operations. Caesar had been awarded Triumph. Now Caesar was also interested in becoming Consul for the following year, however he would lose his Triumph if he entered Rome before hand. So Caesar asked permission to stand for election as Consul by proxy. The Senate led by Cato refused.14

Many of the Senators were willing to consent to it, [Caesar standing for election by proxy] but Cato opposed it, and perceiving them inclined to favour Caesar, spent the whole day in speaking, and so prevented the Senate from coming to any conclusion.15

Then realizing that Caesar would almost certainly become Consul in 59 B.C.E. if not in 60 B.C.E, the Senate decided to slap him in the face. Now generally Consuls after their terms were done were given provinces to govern and what provinces would be given were selected by the Senatee several years in advance. It was decided to give the Consuls for that year the woodlands and cattle drifts of Italy. This was a deliberate insult aimed against Caesar.16

Having thoroughly pissed off Pompey and Caesar, the Senate had to complete the triangle by pissing off Crassus.

Head of Crassus

Crassus, (c. 112-53 B.C.E.) was one of the wealthiest men in Rome, if not the wealthiest, he was also a successful general and after Pompey’s return from the east was filled with envy and dislike of Pompey. Crassus controlled an important political faction which was also antagonistic to Caesar as well.17

Crassus considered himself an advocate of those with business interests and he had taken under his wing a group of tax farmers who had purchased a contract to collect tax revenue in Asia, (tax farming). Those revenues proved to be much less lucrative than expected, in fact they proved to be a net loss. Crassus campaigning on their behalf requested some sort of relief from the purchase price. The Senate again led by Cato rejected the claim. Crassus was now upset.18

Thus the Senate managed to alienate the three most powerful men in Rome. If doing just one of those things was dumb; doing all three at the same time was simply insane. Pompey, Caesar and Crassus disliked and distrusted each other giving the Senate room to manoeuvre, and play them against each other, instead the Senate managed to offend all three. The Senatorial aristocracy had apparently lost all political sense. The result was inevitable.19

It appears that Caesar took the initiative:

He [Caesar] entered the city and immediately adopted a policy which deceived everyone except Cato. This was to effect a reconciliation between Pompey and Crassus, the two most powerful people in Rome. Caesar brought these men together, making them friends instead of enemies, and used their united power for the strengthening of himself. So before anyone was aware of it, he had, by an action which could be called a simple piece of kindness, succeeded in producing what was in effect a revolution. For the cause of the civil wars was not, as most people think, the quarrel between Caesar and Pompey; it was rather their friendship, since in the first place they worked together to destroy the power of the aristocracy and only when this had been accomplished quarrelled amongst themselves.20

And in another source:

Thus the three for these reasons formed their friendship and ratified it with oaths, and then managed public affairs among themselves. Next they gave to each other and received in turn one from another, whatever they set their hearts on and whatever it suited them to do in view of the circumstances.21

Thus was created the First Triumvirate, which was very quickly to turn the Roman state into their tool for increasing their power and the Senate was totally incapable of thwarting Them. This event announced the death throes of the Roman Republic.22

Subsequently Crassus got killed in a hair-brained invasion of the Parthian Empire and Caesar and Pompey fell out afterwards over who would be dominant in the Roman state. A civil war resulted, during which Caesar defeated Pompey and Pompey was murdered to please Caesar. Caesar shortly after was assassinated by an aristocratic plot because so many of his fellow Roman aristocrats could not bear Caesar’s autocratic ways.23

The rest of story need not detail us except to note that Octavian / Augustus eventually came on top and the Roman Republic was suceeded by the Roman Empire which finally put an end to the anachronistic Republic and established an Empire that would last for hundreds of years.24

1. Grant, Michael, History of Rome, Faber and Faber, London, 1978, p. 198.

2. Appian, The Civil Wars, Penguin Books, London, 1996, Book 1, s. 34-54, Grant, pp. 156-158, Florus, Epitome of Roman History, Book 2, s. 6, Lacus Curtius Here.

3. Grant, pp. 127-142, Cowell, F.R., Cicero and the Roman Republic, Penguin Books, London, 1948, pp. 270-279, 356-382, de Ste. Croix, G.E.M., The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World, Cornell University Press, Ithaca NY, 1981, pp. 350-372.

4. IBID, de Ste. Croix, Grant, pp. 150-152, Cowell, pp. 280-309, Syme, The Roman Revolution, Oxford University Press, 1939, pp. 10-27.

5. IBID, Cowell, & 219-235, de Ste. Croix, 352-357, 286, Syme, pp. 15, 37, 146, 88, 319-320, Grant, pp. 168-172.

6. Syme, p. 319.

7. de Ste. Croix, Footnote 5, Grant, pp. 193-194, Cowell, pp. 195-196, 293-295.

8. Grant, pp. 168-172, Syme, p. 138, 320-321.

9. Syme quoting Brutus, p. 138.

10. Syme, pp. 140-146, 192, Grant, p. 199.

11. Grant, pp. 172-174, Syme, pp. 28-46, Plutarch, Fall of the Roman Republic, Penguin Books, London, 1958, Pompey, s. 43-44, 48-49.

12. Dio, Cassius, Roman History, Book 37 s. 49, Lactus Curtius, Here.

13. Plutarch, Pompey, s. 46.

14. IBID, Footnote 11, Plutarch, Fall of the Roman Republic, Caesar, s. 13, Suetonius, The Twelve Caesars, Penguin Books, 1957, Julius Caesar, s. 18-19, Syme, pp. 28-46.

15. Plutarch, Lives of the Noble Grecians and Romans, The Modern Library, New York, 1955, Cato the Younger, p. 935.

16. Grant, p. 173-174, Suetonius, Julius Caesar, s. 19.

17. Grant, pp. 164-165, 173, Syme, pp. 27-46, Plutarch, The Fall of the Roman Republic, Crassus, s. 1-14, which gives a good outline of Crassus’ career before this crisis and his considerable wealth.

18. Grant, p. 173, Syme, p. 35, Appian, Book 2, s. 13, Dio, Book 38, s. 7.

19. Suetonius, Julius Caesar, s. 18-20, Plutarch, The Fall of the Roman Republic, Pompey, s. 46-47, Caesar, s. 13-14, Crassus, s. 14-15, Dio Book 37, s.55-57.

20. Plutarch, Fall of the Roman Republic, Caesar, s. 13.

21. Dio, Book 37, s. 57.

22. See Grant, pp. 168-174, Syme, pp. 27-46.

23, Grant, pp. 196-198, Syme, pp. 47-58, see also Plutarch’s lives of Crassus, Pompey and Caesar, See also Suetonius’ life of Julius Caesar, and Appian, Book 2, s. 14-119.

24. For a summary of Augustus’ achievement see Grant, pp. 198-221.

Pierre Cloutier

Augustus’ Problem

Augustus
The emperor Augustus who grew up with the name Octavian was undoubtedly one of the most important men who ever lived. A man whose influence on our present day world is massive.

Now Octavian, who was born in 63 B.C.E. and died in 14 C.E.1 did not do it all by himself he had lots of help and a great deal of good luck. To make it very simple he had the extraordinary good fortune to be born in the Julii family and to be the nephew of Julius Caesar. Even more extraordinary Julius managed to have, by Roman standards, no legitimate children alive by the time he was assassinated.2

Shortly before Caesar was murdered, 44 B.C.E., he changed his will making Octavian, at the time of the assassination 18 years old, his heir.3

Now Caesar is in many respects a truly extraordinary individual, a brilliant general and a great writer and an in all respects a dazzling personage. He is also in my opinion overrated has a politician. Although certainly capable he owed his success to the trump card of his military ability and his ability to hold onto the loyalty of his men. As a politician he had numerous deficiencies, despite all his skills and brilliance he lacked any real ability to solve Rome’s severe century old crisis.4

Julius Caesar
For over a century before Caesar’s murder Rome had been racked by a series of steadily escalating crises that sapped the foundations of the Roman state. Basically what happened was that Rome’s Republican city Government, admirably suited to conquest and expansion and promoting a certain degree of internal stability was breaking down under the impact of empire and conquest. Rome’s government was a city state government that was best suited for a city state and not for an empire.5

The fact that this government was very unusual in terms of usual sort of city state government in the ancient world in its ability to absorb and integrate conquered territories including the steady expansion of its citizen base. This was combined with a remarkably effective military machine that by 150 B.C.E., made Rome the greatest power in the Mediterranean. Frankly the other great powers of the day simply could not cope with Roman military power. These other powers were steadily disposed or conquered so that by the lifetime of Julius Caesar Rome had no other power to fear.6

Rome did however have to fear its own internal divisions.

The tensions produced by the dichotomy between the centralization of authority in Rome and the essentially provincial nature of government resulted in a steady increase in tension. The vast wealth pouring into Rome had massively increased the wealth of the Roman Aristocracy at the same time tensions in the countryside between the aristocracy and the ordinary Roman citizen had increased massively. Further the massive wealth that Rome now had had spurred output of all sorts and given rise to the creation of a large new moneyed class whose wealth was formed on their ability to lend money. This also created a very large class of debtors who could not pay their debts.7

The simple fact was that Rome was tearing it self apart in civil discord. It was likely that the empire would fly apart into several pieces. In fact in the late 90’s early 80’s B.C.E., the empire had in fact come close to terminal collapse when the Italian allies of Rome succeeded from the empire and thus ignited the Social War. The war was terminated by giving the remaining Italian allies what they had long wanted Roman citizenship. But it had been a close call.8

Further the Republic was riddled with corruption and ruthless exploitation, notably by the governors and their lackeys sent to govern the conquered provinces. This corruption was also sapping the political strength of the state.9

The decline of the old Roman Aristocracy and the rise of soldier politicians like Sulla and Marius also were precursors to the death of the Republic. Another ominous development was the practice of violent purges and proscriptions. Starting with the Gracchi c. 130-115 B.C.E., the scale of these proscriptions escalated until during the rule of Sulla thousands were killed in a reign of terror.10

The solution to this problem was clear the imposition of one man rule and the supporting bureaucracy to support that rule. Here was the crunch. This solution was in effect no solution at all. The very beliefs and political practices that had made Rome strong and powerful enough to create an empire without precedent in the Mediterranean world also made this an apparent non-solution. The Roman Aristocracy was deeply, almost pathologically anti-monarchical. Any rule by one man offended their deepest political instincts and was considered almost completely unacceptable. Further the only system that promised long term stability was a type of hereditary monarchy, which by Roman tradition was considered totally unacceptable. The term for King in Latin “Rex” was considered a curse and insult. Given this any man who attempted to impose one man rule or a monarchy risked virtually certain assassination attempts and was not likely to live long.11

Caesar attempted to get around this by making himself Dictator for life. Dictator was a well established Roman practice for emergencies, however traditionally it was only for periods of 6 months. Caesar’s perpetual Dictatorship was offensive and considered clearly extra-legal. Further rather than stay behind and continue the long difficult process of restoring and reforming the empire Caesar was about to embark on an eastern campaign leaving his staff to govern most of empire. This was too much for the pride of the Roman aristocracy. It was bad enough to be governed by one man, even one as capable as Caesar, but to be governed by his secretaries and thus left out of the main sources of power was too much. Not surprisingly Caesar was assassinated.12 Caesar failed and why he failed is not surprising:

For all his immeasurable abilities as a general and administrator, he had failed, and would have continued to fail, to rescue Rome from its major dilemma. It was this. The Republic, obviously, had become impotent, and, that being so, there was no practical alternative to one-man rule. Yet one-man rule was just what the nobles, although incapable of ruling any more, categorically refused to accept; and so they put him to death. It seemed an insoluble problem. Yet there now came another sort of man altogether, who preformed the seemingly impossible task of finding a solution after all: he was the 19-year-old Octavian, grand nephew of Julius Caesar who had adopted him in his will as his son.13

That was Augustus’ problem; later in another posting I will discuss Augustus’ solution.

1. Wells, Colin, The Roman Empire, 2nd Edition, Fontana Books, London, 1992, p. 286.

2. IBID. pp. 11-14, Julius Caesar had a daughter Julia who died young and by Cleopatra, Queen of Egypt a son nicknamed Caesarian, actual name Ptolemy. Under Roman rules Caesar could not name Caesarian his heir. See Suetonius, The Twelve Caesars, 2nd Edition, Penguin Books, London, 1979, Julius Caesar, s, 1, Dio, Cassius, The Roman History: The Reign of Augustus, Penguin Books, London, 1987, Book 50, s. 1.

3. Suetonius, Augustus, s. 4.

4. Grant Michael, History of Rome, Faber and Faber, London, 1979, pp. 192-198, Crawford, Michael, The Roman Republic, 2nd Edition, Fontana books, London, 1978, pp. 182-186.

5. Dudley, Donald, Roman Society, Penguin Books, London, 1970, p. 115.

6. Crawford, pp. 94-106.

7. Grant, pp. 168-169.

8. The actual succession was an act of desperation and the war which is very poorly documented was apparently extremely ferocious and bloody. It was also inconclusive and only ended by Rome conceding citizenship. See Crawford, pp. 138-144, Grant, pp. 156-158, Dudley, pp. 99-100.

9. Grant, pp. 161-174.

10. Syme, Ronald, The Roman Revolution, Oxford University Press, London, 1939, pp. 16-17, Crawford, pp. 150-151, Grant, pp. 161-162.

11. Grant, pp. 196-198, Dudley, pp. 115-116, Crawford, pp. 184-186.

12. IBID, Grant, Dudley, pp. 113-116, Crawford, pp. 182-186.

13. Grant, p. 198.

Pierre Cloutier

The Battle of Teutoburg Wald

Roman Military mask found at Kalkriese

This year is the 2000th anniversary of the destruction of three legions of the army of the Emperor Augustus, lead by Quintus Varus, occurring in September of that year apparently; in the area called by the Historian Tacitus the Teutoburg Wald.1 This battle marked the end of the Roman attempt to conquer Germania and incorporate it into the Roman Empire. It is also of interest as one of the few ancient battle fields of which field archaeology has told us a great deal about.2

For years the battlefield was only guessed at, with much dispute over the location of the battlefield.3 In the late 19th century some historians like the great Classicalist Mommsen identified the area of the battle as in the Kalkriese. It was not confirmed as the battlefield until the late 1980s.4 Previous writers have located the battlefield all over the place in north western Germany, although the most common opinion was to locate the battle in the area of Detmold which is about 70 miles south east of Kalkriese. With the idea that much of the fighting occurred near or in the Doren pass.5 The archaeological discoveries at Kalkriese have effectively removed that option.

Location of Kalkriese
Before I get into the Archaeology of the site and what this tells us of the battle let us go through the various historical sources for the battle.

The main sources of the battle are Velleius Paterculus’, Roman History, written during the reign of Augustus’ successor Tiberius, (c. 20’s C.E.), and the earliest surviving source. The next is Lucius Annaeus Florus in his Epitome of Roman History, written during the reign of Antonius Pius, (c. 150’s C.E.). Neither of these sources provides much detail; however, the last source Cassius Dio, provides in his Roman History, a fairly detailed account of the battle. It was written in the reign of the Emperor Alexander Severus. (c. 220’s C.E.). It seems to have been based largely on much earlier source material that is now lost.6

Florus’ book is basically a summary of parts of the work of the Roman historian Livy, however he does describe events that occurred after the end of Livy’s history, further he gives information from the lost books of Livy. His history seems to be basically reliable but not terribly impressive as history. Florus seems to have been basically a summarizer, and a not an historian.7

Paterculus is quite different he knew Varus and was a friend of the Emperor Tiberius. His Roman History which like Florus’ is a summary history of Rome has some of the most revolting suck up flattery of the Emperor Tiberius, for example:

What public buildings did he construct in his own name or that of his family! With what pious munificence, exceeding human belief, does he now rear the temple to his father! With what a magnificent control of personal feeling did he restore the works of Gnaeus Pompey when destroyed by fire! For a feeling of kinship leads him to protect every famous monument. With what generosity at the time of the recent fire on the Caelian Hill, as well as on other occasions, did he use his private fortune to make good the losses of people of all ranks in life!8

Head of Tiberius

This rather stomach turning claptrap detracts from the value of his book although it appears that his book, when not sucking up to the imperial family, is basically reliable.9

Cassius Dio is another matter, he was a Greek who wrote his Roman History in Greek and although not a great writer was overall a more competent and reliable historian than Livy or Tacitus. He wrote during the early stages of Rome’s decline in which even then the reign of Marcus Aurelius, (161-180 C.E.) and the period of the 5 “good Emperors”, (96-180 C.E. were considered a golden age).10 Dio was a friend of the Emperor Alexander Severus and an Roman Senator. His Roman History is unlike the two previous works, which are quite brief, a massive work divided into 80 books. Although it is an invaluable source much of it is fragmentary and some of it only survives in the form of summaries written up in the Middle Ages. Dio provides the only detailed account of the battle of Teutoburg Wald and for that event is indispensable. He also provides the only detailed complete account of the reign of the Emperor Augustus.11

The above three are the chief primary historical sources on the battle itself; however there is one other source that while it provides little data about the battle itself provides much additional information, including a description of the battlefield that is the account by the historian Publius Cornelius Tacitus, The Annals of Imperial Rome. The section which describes a visit by a Roman army lead by the Emperor Tiberius’ nephew Germanicus to the battlefield, where they buried the strewn remains of the dead (c. 15 C.E.), also is the only account which gives the name of where the battlefield occurred, the Teutoburg Wald. Tacitus is considered among the very greatest of Roman historians, although his reliability and fairness are in many respects questionable, his literary style is among the very best of classical Latin literature. Examples of Tacitus’ lack of reliability is his rather off putting boosting of Germanicus’ questionable military achievements and his studied character assassination of the Emperor Tiberius. Unfortunately Tacitus’ book is in fragmentary pieces and is missing large sections, notably the end of the work and the section describing the reign of Caligula and the first half of the reign of Claudius. Tacitus who was a Roman Senator and who wrote during the reign of the Emperor Trajan was nostalgic for the days of the Republic although he realized that they were gone for good. Despite his biases he is considered basically reliable in matters in which he doesn’t have a political or social bias to advance.12

The accounts themselves describe the conflict as arising from the effects of Roman efforts to formalize their conquest of Germania and turn Germania into a formal Roman province.

Beginning c. 15 B.C.E., the Romans began a long series of campaigns to pacify and occupy Germania; it was part of a general and massive extension of the empire that occurred during the reign of the Emperor Augustus. Although Augustus drastically reduced the number of legions, (to 28) he did not reduce the number of men nearly as much. Further this was not much of a reduction of capacity or desire of the Roman elite to expand the empire as might be thought given that the great expansion of the size of the Roman army before Augustus was the result largely of the fact that Roman armies fought each other in bloody civil wars that were only ended by Augustus’ defeat of Anthony and Cleopatra at Actium in 31 B.C.E. Not just Germania was invaded by Augustus’ troops but north western Spain, Dalmatia, Illyricum, the Cottian Alps etc. Augustus’ reign was an age of massive imperial expansion.13

Head of Augustus

The description of these various wars would be interminable, aside from the fact except for the attempted conquest of Germania we lack much detail, and even in this case the account is pretty sparse.

The conquest of Germania was a long drawn out affair apparently related to the fact that unlike the peoples of Gaul the Germans lacked fortified settlements or towns in which they could be pinned down and crushed, further the terrain seems to have been rougher and less open and cultivated, with fewer good roads or trails for Roman armies to march over. Although it appears that the Germans were a settled agricultural population they were at a less complex stage of culture than their Gaulish neighbours.14

Roman bases in Eastern Germany

The division of Germania into many different tribal groups who were fiercely independent of each other also didn’t help Roman efforts to conquer the Germans. So the conquest was long drawn out. In 9 B.C.E., Tiberius’ brother Drusus died while on campaign of an infected wound while near the Rhine river.15 Other Roman generals including Tiberius continued with the war and by 4 C.E., it appears that Germania was conquered and all that was left to do was to round off the conquest by taking neighbouring areas. However in 6 C.E., due to mal-administration and oppression the recently subjugated provinces of Dalmatia and Pannonia rose in rebellion and these efforts had to be called off. The rebellion turned out to be difficult to suppress and was very costly too. The main Roman general involved in suppressing the revolt was the Tiberius, who succeeded in crushing the rebellion in 9 C.E.16

Shortly after this rebellion was crushed came the disaster of the battle of Teutoburg Wald. What happened was as follows. It appears that Romans jumped the gun in terms of guessing how fast they could begin the process of romanizing the areas of Germania that they had conquered.

As a side issue there used to be a debate about whether or not the Romans were actually trying to conquer Germany or merely trying to prevent the formation of any threats to Roman possessions west of the Rhine, (i.e., Gaul), and that they therefore had no intention of conquering Germania and adding new provinces to the Roman Empire, thus despite the disaster of Teutoburg Wald the Roman policy was successful after Tiberius resumed it after the disaster and it was carried out by his nephew Germanicus.17

Aside from the fact that this idea relies on sheer speculation to a large extent, ignores clear statements from the ancient sources regarding what the Romans were doing which indicates conquest was intended, it ignores the Archaeological evidence which clearly indicates the founding of Roman cities in Germania. It appears that yes indeed the Romans were intending to establish a Roman province of Germania. For example the Romans had established large bases at Haltern and Oberaden, which were military fortresses that were intended to be the basis for Roman cities. Further a full fledged civic centre, probably a future provincial capital had been established at Waldgirmes. Those three along with many other incipient fortresses and possible towns were abandoned / destroyed after the disaster at Teutoburg Wald.18

To illustrate the point that conquest was intended Dio says:

The Romans had a hold on parts of it,--not the whole region, but just places that happened to have been subdued, so that the fact has not received historical notice,--and soldiers of theirs were used to wintering there and cities were being founded. The barbarians were adapting themselves to Roman ways, were taking up the custom of markets, and were holding peaceful meetings.19

Paterculus says:

But, after accomplishing to a great extent the subjection of Germany, in which much blood of that people was shed on various battle-fields, an unkind fate carried him [Drusus] off during his consulship, in his thirtieth year. The burden of responsibility for this war was then transferred to Nero. He carried it on with his customary valour and good fortune, and after traversing every part of Germany in a victorious campaign, without any loss of the army entrusted to him — for he made this one of his chief concerns — he so subdued the country as to reduce it almost to the status of a tributary province. He then received a second triumph, and a second consulship.20

…

Nothing remained to be conquered in Germany except the people of the Marcomanni, which, leaving its settlements at the summons of its leader Marobodus, had retired into the interior and now dwelt in the plains surrounded by the Hercynian forest.21

Florus states as follows concerning Roman aims in the war with Germania:

It could be wished that Caesar had not set such store on conquering Germany also. Its loss was a disgrace which far outweighed the glory of its acquisition. But since he was well aware that his father, Gaius Caesar, had twice crossed the Rhine by bridging it and sought hostilities against Germania, he had conceived the desire of making it into a province to do him honour. His object would have been achieved if the barbarians could have tolerated our vices as well as they tolerated our rule.22

It appears that the weight of evidence indicates that the Roman plan was indeed to conquer Germania not merely to render it an impotent threat by military action.

The main German leader was a nobleman of the Cherusci tribe who was called by the Romans Arminius, whose German name is unknown. It is known that he had served in the Roman Army as an auxiliary soldier in the early years of Dalmatian revolt, before returning to Germania. It is also known that in exchange for his services to Rome he had been made a Roman Citizen and given Equestrian status. Before he turned against Rome Arminius had a very antagonistic relationship with a relative of his named Segestes, which became very bad when sometime after the battle of Teutoburg Wald he eloped with Segestes daughter Thusnelda. Arminius’ brother, called by the Roman’s Flavus, stayed loyal to the Romans to the end.23

About the Roman leader Quintilius Varus what we know is strongly coloured by a very negative historical tradition concerning him that blames him for the disaster. Varus was basically a civilian appointee and his appointment indicates that the Roman government led by Augustus was thinking that the process of turning Germania into a Roman province governed by civilians could now begin. Varus was related by marriage to the Imperial family and he had a fairly distinguished record as a public official including a stint as Governor of Syria. While Governor of Syria Varus was involved in handling military disturbances which he dealt with effectively.24 Unfortunately for Varus Augustus and his advisors were very wrong in their appraisal of the readiness of Germania to become a full fledged Roman province.

Coin of Varus

It appears that what brought on the revolt was the attempt to impose the apparatus of Roman fiscal and administrative domination over the various subdued tribes of Germania.

Dio says:

Finally, Quintilius Varus received the command of Germany and in the discharge of his office strove, in administering the affairs of the people, to introduce more widespread changes among them. He treated them in general as if they were already slaves, levying money upon them as he had upon subject nations. This they were not inclined to endure, for the prominent men longed for their former ascendancy and the masses preferred their accustomed constitution to foreign domination.25

Paterculus states:

The cause of this defeat and the personality of the general require of me a brief digression. Varus Quintilius, descended from a famous rather than a high-born family, was a man of mild character and of a quiet disposition, somewhat slow in mind as he was in body, and more accustomed to the leisure of the camp than to actual service in war. That he was no despiser of money is demonstrated by his governorship of Syria: he entered the rich province a poor man, but left it a rich man and the province poor. When placed in charge of the army in Germany, he entertained the notion that the Germans were a people who were men only in limbs and voice, and that they, who could not be subdued by the sword, could be soothed by the law. With this purpose in mind he entered the heart of Germany as though he were going among a people enjoying the blessings of peace, and sitting on his tribunal he wasted the time of a summer campaign in holding court and observing the proper details of legal procedure.26

Florus says:

But it is more difficult to retain provinces than to acquire them. They are obtained by force, but secured by justice. Our exultation was accordingly but short. The Germans been defeated rather than subdued. Under the rule of Drusus they respected our manners rather than our arms. But when Drusus was dead, they began to detest the licentiousness and pride, no less than the cruelty, of Quintilius Varus. He ventured to call an assembly, and administered justice in his camp as if he could restrain the violence of barbarians by the rods of a lictor and voice of a crier. But the Germans who had long regretted that their swords were covered with rust, and their horses idle, proceeded, as soon as they saw the toga and felt laws more cruel than arms, to go to war under the conduct, of Arminius,…27

If read carefully, despite the rather obvious scapegoating of Varus; the above indicates that the imposition of Roman rule, with its officials and taxes and probably the activities of various Romans seeking to take advantage of the conquest for gain that inflamed the situation creating a situation ripe for revolt. It seems to be that Varus was doing nothing more than carrying out a policy agreed to in Rome and as such is less to blame for the coming disaster than his political masters in Rome, i.e., Augustus and the Imperial family.

The role of Imperial officials especially those in the legal field in cheating the Germans is brought out in Florus’ account of what happened during and after the battle to Romans involved in such practices:

Never was slaughter more bloody than, that which was made of the Romans among: the marshes and woods; never were insults more intolerable than those of the barbarians, especially such as they inflicted on the pleaders of causes. Of some they tore out the eyes, of others they cut off the hands. Of one the mouth was sewed up, after his tongue had been cut out which one of the savages holding in his hand cried, "At last, viper, cease to hiss."28

What seems to have happened is that Arminius, probably disillusioned with the Romans due to their crass behaviour and exploitation of his fellow tribesmen, engaged in a widespread conspiracy to revolt. According to various roman historians word leaked out about the conspiracy but that Varus disregarded the warnings. The Historian Tacitus says:

There had, in fact, sprung up a hope of the enemy being divided between Arminius and Segestes, famous, respectively, for treachery and loyalty towards us. Arminius was the disturber of Germany. Segestes often revealed the fact that a rebellion was being organized, more especially at that last banquet after which they rushed to arms, and he urged Varus to arrest himself and Arminius and all the other chiefs, assuring him that the people would attempt nothing if the leading men were removed, and that he would then have an opportunity of sifting accusations and distinguishing the innocent.29

It appears that since Varus was well aware of the antipathy between Arminius and Segestes so that he dismissed these warnings, as personally motivated slanders.

The Roman accounts go into much detail about the treachery of the Germans and Arminius.

For example Dio says:

They did not openly revolt, since they saw there were many Roman soldiers near the Rhine and many in their own territory; but they received Varus, pretending they would execute all his commands, and took him far away from the Rhine into heruscis near the Visurgis. There by behaving in a most peaceful and friendly manner they led him to believe that they could be trusted to live submissively without soldiers.30

Paterculus says:

This young man [Arminius] made use of the negligence of the general as an opportunity for treachery, sagaciously seeing that no one could be more quickly overpowered than the man who feared nothing, and that the most common beginning of disaster was a sense of security.31

A lot of this reads like sour grapes.

What seems to have happened is that Varus who was near the Weser river was preparing to march back to Haltern, the main Roman Army base east of the Rhine to establish his army in a secure camp for the winter, when Arminus put his plan into action. First his various associates put out calls to have Roman troops scattered among them to deal with, bandits, disorder and possible rebels, purely for the purpose of being destroyed when the rebellion started in earnest. Next a revolt was stated near the line of march of the Roman army to its winter quarters and not surprisingly Varus was encouraged to, if he did not decide on his own, to crush the revolt on his way back to winter quarters.32

Arminius and the other leaders excused themselves on the grounds that they were going to raise other auxiliary forces for the Romans and instead they and the troops under their command joined the rebels. Dio then describes the initial engagement:

The mountains had an uneven surface broken by ravines, and the trees, standing close together, were extremely tall. Hence the Romans even before the enemy assaulted them were having hard work in felling, road making, and bridging places that required it. They had with them many wagons and many beasts of burden as in a time of peace. Not a few children and women and a large body of servants were following them,--another reason for their advancing in scattered groups. Meanwhile a great rain and wind came up that separated them still farther, while the ground, being slippery where there were roots and logs, made walking very difficult for them, and the top branches of trees, which kept breaking off and falling down, caused confusion. While the Romans were in such perplexity as this the barbarians suddenly encompassed them from all sides at once, coming through the thickest part of the underbrush, since they were acquainted with the paths. At first they hurled from a distance; then as no one defended himself but many were wounded, they approached closer to them. The Romans were in no order but going along helter-skelter among the wagons and the unarmed, and so, not being able to form readily in a body, and being fewer at every point than their assailants, they suffered greatly and offered no resistance at all.33

What is interesting is that this seems to describe an ambush in thick forested terrain. This is very much like the terrain of the Kalkriese area with a steep hill on one side and a fairly narrow passage / trail at the base of the hill, with only a few hundred feet to the north an extensive bog. What is not mentioned in the account is the wall that existed along a part of the hill. It would appear that this is were Arminius sprung his ambush and certainly it appears the Romans were surprised and sustained very heavy casualties.34

Kalkriese Battlefield

The wall is a bit of a mystery. It has been theorized that the wall was erected before the battle as part of the plan to lure the Roman Army into an ambush in that area. Given that the wall seems to be quite substantial, and would have taken quite sometime, perhaps months to build, and that rarely does such long term planning pay off in war. It is hard to believe that Varus’ intelligence services would have been unaware of such a recent construction along a road he was using so I rather doubt the idea of the wall being part of a long range plan to ambush a Roman army there. It is frankly hard to believe that the Romans would not have heard of such a construction.35

Remains of the wall at Kalkriese

The Romans left on the battlefield many remains and much debris that was still there too be found 2000 years later. Such things as weights, bits of armour, coins, spear points, buckles, boot nails, hooks, and arrows etc. The debris is scattered over quite a large area and from the direction of the debris it appears that the army may in fact have divided in two, perhaps temporaily.36

Map of artefacts found a Kalkriese

Artefacts found at Kalkriese

After this serious reverse Dio writes:

Accordingly, they encamped on the spot, after securing a suitable place so far as that was possible on a wooded mountain, and afterward they either burned or abandoned the majority of their wagons and everything else that was not absolutely necessary for them. The next day they advanced in better order, with the aim of reaching open country; but they did not gain it without loss. From there they went forward and plunged into the woods again, defending themselves against the attacks, but endured no inconsiderable reverses in this very operation. For whereas they were marshalled in a narrow place in order that cavalry and heavy-armed men in a mass might run down their foes, they had many collisions with one another and with the trees.37

It appears that the Romans were badly cut up by the ambush at Kalkriese and left much booty and apparently considerable number of dead and prisoners there. It appears that they camped near by and continued marching the next day. An indication of the extent of the losses is Tacitus’ description of the battlefield:

Varus's first camp with its wide circumference and the measurements of its central space clearly indicated the handiwork of three legions. Further on, the partially fallen rampart and the shallow fosse suggested the inference that it was a shattered remnant of the army which had there taken up a position.38

Possible locations of First and Second camps
( The X marks the site of Kalkriese)

It appears that Arminius continued the guerrilla style attacks against them and using the terrain to inhibit the Roman’s ability to engage in full open battle for which the Romans were vastly superior to the Germans.

The following day was the dénouement. News of Arminius’ success was attracting many reinforcements to his ranks and the Roman forces were being steadily depleted. The end came as follows:

Dawn of the fourth day broke as they were advancing and again a violent downpour and mighty wind attacked them, which would not allow them to go forward or even to stand securely, and actually deprived them of the use of their weapons. They could not manage successfully their arrows or their javelins or, indeed, their shields (which were soaked through). The enemy, however, being for the most part lightly equipped and with power to approach and retire freely, suffered less from the effects of the storm. Their numbers, moreover, increased, as numbers of those who had at first wavered joined them particularly for the sake of plunder, and so they could more easily encircle and strike down the Romans, who were already few, many having perished in the previous battles. Varus, therefore, and the most eminent of the other leaders, fearing that they might either be taken alive or be killed by their bitterest foes,--for they had been wounded,--dared do a deed which was frightful but not to be avoided: they killed themselves.

22), When this news was spread, none of the rest, even if he had strength still left, defended himself longer. Some imitated their leader; others, throwing aside their arms, allowed who pleased to slay them. To flee was impossible, however one might wish it. Every man and horse, therefore, was cut down without resistance, and the…[there is a gap in Dio’s account here]39

This probably occurred on the road from Kalkriese to Haltern.40 As it was it was a complete disaster. The Roman army was annihilated. The other accounts do not add much; Paterculus for example says:

An army unexcelled in bravery, the first of Roman armies in discipline, in energy, and in experience in the field, through the negligence of its general, the perfidy of the enemy, and the unkindness of fortune was surrounded, nor was as much opportunity as they had wished given to the soldiers either of fighting or of extricating themselves, except against heavy odds; nay, some were even heavily chastised for using the arms and showing the spirit of Romans. Hemmed in by forests and marshes and ambuscades, it was exterminated almost to a man by the very enemy whom it had always slaughtered like cattle, whose life or death had depended solely upon the wrath or the pity of the Romans. The general had more courage to die than to fight, for, following the example of his father and grandfather, he ran himself through with his sword. Of the two prefects of the camp, Lucius Eggius furnished a precedent as noble as that of Ceionius was base, who, after the greater part of the army had perished, proposed its surrender, preferring to die by torture at the hands of the enemy than in battle. Vala Numonius, lieutenant of Varus, who, in the rest of his life, had been an inoffensive and an honourable man, also set a fearful example in that he left the infantry unprotected by the cavalry and in flight tried to reach the Rhine with his squadrons of horse. But fortune avenged his act, for he did not survive those whom he had abandoned, but died in the act of deserting them.41

Aside from indicating that towards the end the Roman army seems to have disintegrated and collapsed, including details that Dio omits about Romans fleeing and surrendering, this account provides little information to the account of Dio. Although it does give a pretty good indication of the sense of shock that the disaster engendered among the Romans.

Florus writes that:

Having therefore, risen upon Him [Varus] unawares, and fearing nothing of the kind, while he with a strange want of precaution, was actually summoning, them to his tribunal, they assailed him on every side, seized his camp, and, cut off three legions. Varus met his overthrow with the same fortune, and spirit with which Paulus met. the day of Cannae. Never was slaughter more bloody.42

Roman losses were apparently very large, as the army consisted of 3 legions, (the 17th, 18th and 19th) with 3 cavalry squadrons and 6 additional cohorts. In all it was probably at least 20,000 men and probably more like 22-24 thousand along with a large number of non-combatants.43

This large Roman army was almost completely annihilated with very few escaping death or capture, which was also likely the fate of virtually all the non-combatants. It appears that most of the captured military men, with exception of those worth ransoms were killed. Along with the dead and captured, and the vast booty captured by the Germans, also lost was an enormous amount of prestige, symbolized in the case of this battle by the loss of the Eagles, or standards, of the three legions. These were an especially important symbol in they symbolized in a concrete symbolic form the military power of Rome. Supposedly of the three Eagles lost one was kept out of the hands of the Germans by a Legionnaire drowning himself along with the Eagle in a Marsh.44

Tacitus describes the scene of the battlefield:

In the centre of the field were the whitening bones of men, as they had fled, or stood their ground, strewn everywhere or piled in heaps. Near, lay fragments of weapons and limbs of horses, and also human heads, prominently nailed to trunks of trees. In the adjacent groves were the barbarous altars, on which they had immolated tribunes and first-rank centurions. Some survivors of the disaster who had escaped from the battle or from captivity, described how this was the spot where the officers fell, how yonder the eagles were captured, where Varus was pierced by his first wound, where too by the stroke of his own ill-starred hand he found for himself death. They pointed out too the raised ground from which Arminius had harangued his army, the number of gibbets for the captives, the pits for the living, and how in his exultation he insulted the standards and eagles.45

Arminus can be forgiven his exaltation he had done something few enemies of Rome had done before. He had destroyed a Roman army utterly.

Also lost was the Roman bases and posts east of the Rhine that one by one were sacked and burned or abandoned shortly after the disaster. The devastation was widespread as Haltern, Oberaden and Waldgirmes among many others were destroyed.46

Augustus was so upset that according to Suetonius among others he:

… was so greatly affected that for several months in succession he cut neither his beard nor his hair, and sometimes he would dash his head against a door, crying: "Quintilius Varus, give me back my legions!" And he observed the day of the disaster each year as one of sorrow and mourning.47

The disaster quite unintentionally marked the end of Roman attempts to conquer Germany and it the non-conquest of Germany by Rome became over time permanent.

The Romans were quite taken aback over the disaster, what with their continued complaining of “Barbarian treachery” and their attempts to avenge the disaster. The Roman poet Ovid, then in exile in a city on the Black sea wrote concerning Arminius:

He was the leader in battle, that one next in command.
This one who fixes his eyes now on the earth in his miserable sorrow.
Did not look at all like this when he carried his weapons of war.
That fierce one whose eyes even now are blazing with hostile emotions.
Was once the man who planned battles and urged on his men to the fight.
This treacherous fellow designed an ambush that trapped our battalions.
The one who conceals his distorted features behind his long Hair.
That one who conceals his distorted features behind his long hair.
That one who follows, they tell us, as a priest often sacrificed humansWho were captured in war to a god who often refused to accept.
This lake, these mountains, these many forts, these many forts, these rivers that pass by.
As floats were full of fierce slaughter, were filled with the blood of men.48

A 19th century portrait of Arminius

Thus did Ovid predict that the Romans would avenge their defeat and Germany would be conquered. This provided not to be the case at all.

Augustus sent Tiberius to the Rhine to secure the border from German attack and apart from raiding areas close to the Rhine Tiberius and other Roman generals did not invade Germania deeply. In 14 C.E., Augustus died and was replaced by Tiberius. Shortly afterwards it was decided to avenge the disaster at Teutoberg Wald and probably to try to, again, conquer Germany. Tiberius sent his nephew Germanicus to command the invasion ( in 14-16 C.E.).49

The interminable campaign that resulted got the Romans two of their Eagles back, although another was not found until the reign of Claudius.50 Other than that there was a good deal of skirmishing, lots of devastation and a few pitched battles, all apparently getting the Romans nowhere despite the repeated statements by the Roman historians especially Tacitus of great victories. It appears that Arminius, who was commander of the united German forces, engaged in a largely successful resistance. Germanicus was able to capture Arminius’ wife Thusnelda, who was pregnant at the time. Due to the fact that her father Segestes, who hated Arminus went over to the Romans and took her with him. Thusnelda spent the rest of her life in captivity along with the son she bore soon after being captured. Despite the triumph that Germanicus celebrated in Rome for his, so-called, great victories it appears that his campaigns were basically costly and futile and were for good reason called off. Tacitus despite his glorification of Germanicus does not conceal that Germanicus failed, even has he blames Tiberius for failing to support Germanicus in another campaign and retiring permanently to the Rhine border.51

After Germanicus’ withdrawal Arminius, despite his enormous prestige, did not live long; a few years later he was killed by neighbouring tribesmen and his own relatives who feared his ambitions.52

The historian Tacitus gives this eulogy for Arminius:

Assuredly he was the deliverer of Germany, one too who had defied Rome, not in her early rise, as other kings and generals, but in the height of her empire's glory, had fought, indeed, indecisive battles, yet in war remained unconquered. He completed thirty-seven years of life, twelve years of power, and he is still a theme of song among barbarous nations, though to Greek historians, who admire only their own achievements, he is unknown, and to Romans not as famous as he should be, while we extol the past and are indifferent to our own times.53

Aside from being a rather favourable tribute from a true-blue Roman it is also a definite indication that Germanicus’ “victories” were anything but crushing.

As for the long term effects of this battle if the Romans had won it is likely that Germania would have been Romanized, that England would very likely never have become England, that the Franco-German conflict would never have arisen and that I would not be speaking and writing English, in fact English as a language would not exist and probably not German. All of history after 9 C.E., would be different, very different!!54 Without this battle:

There would have been no Charlemagne, no Louis XIV, no Napoleon, no Kaiser William II, and no Hitler.55

The Cenotaph of Marcus Caelius, killed in the Battle of Teutoberg Wald (The Inscription is as follows:

To Marcus Caelius, son of Titus, of the Lemonian district, from Bologna, first centurion of the eighteenth legion. 53½ years old. He fell in the Varian War. His bones may be interred here. Publius Caelius, son of Titus, of the Lemonian district, erected (this monument).)56

1. Wells, Peter S., The Battle That Stopped Rome, W. W. Norton & Co., New York, 2003, p. 227.

2. Wells, Peter, pp. 49-55, Schulter, Wolfgang, The Battle of the Teutoburg Forest, in Creighton, J. D., & Wilson, R. J. A., Roman Germany Studies in Cultural Integration, Journal of Roman Archaeology, Supp. Series, No. 32, 1999, pp. 125-159, and the Varusschlacht / Kalkriese Museum, website Here. See also The Battle in the Teutoburg Forest, at Livius Here.

3. See Wells, Peter, p. 45-49,

4. IBID, Schluter, p. 125, and Dornberg, John, Battle of the Teutoburg Forest, in Archaeology, vol. 45, No. 5, September / October, 1992, pp. 26-32.

5. Fuller, J. F. C., A Military History of the Western World, vol. 1, Da Capo Press, New York, 1954, pp. 248-249, Delbruck, Hans, History of the Art of War, Vol. II: The Germans, Greenwood Press, New York, 1980, p. 70-71, 76-78.

6. Wells, Peter, pp. 38-42.

7. Notes on Florus and his Epitome of Roman History, can be found at LacusCurtius, Here, see also Note 6.

8. Paterculus, Roman History, Book 2, s. 130, at LacusCurtius, Here. See also Note 6.

9. Notes on Paterculus and his Roman History, can be found at LacusCurtius, Here, see also Note 6.

10. The 5 “good Emperors” are Nerva, 96-98 C.E., Trajan, 98-117 C.E., Hadrian, 117-138 C.E., Antoninus Pius, 138-161 C.E., Marcus Aurelius, 161-180 C.E.

11. Notes on Dio and his Roman History, can be found at LacusCurtius, Here, see also Note 6. For more information on Dio and for Dio’s writings in his Roman History concerning the reign of Augustus see Dio, Cassius, The Roman History: The Reign of Augustus, Penguin Books, London, 1987, see the Introduction, by Carter, John, pp. 1-29.

12. Notes on Tacitus and his The Annals of Imperial Rome, can be found at LacusCurtius, Here, See Wells, Peter, pp. 42-43, and Tacitus, The Annals of Imperial Rome, Penguin Books, Revd Ed., 1971, see Introduction, by Grant, Michael, pp. 7-28.

13. See Florus, Book 2, s. 22-29, 31-33, and Fuller, pp. 234-238.

14. Wells, Peter, pp. 111-124, Jones, Terry, Ereira, Alan, Barbarians, BBC Books, London, 2006, pp. 87--95.

15. Dio, Book 55, s. 1-2.

16, Dio, Book, 55, s. 29-34, Book, 56, s. 11-17.

17, See Oldfather, W. A., & Canter, Howard Vernon, The Defeat of Varus and the German Frontier Policy of Augustus, University of Illinois Studies in the Social Science, Vol. 4, No. 2, June 1915, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, ILL., 1915.

18, Wells, Peter, pp. 208-209, Wells, Colin Michael, The German Policy of Augustus: an Examination of the Archaeological Evidence, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1972, pp. 239-250, Jones, pp. 97, 102.

19. Dio, Book 56, s. 18.

20. Paterculus, Book 2, s. 97.

21. IBID, Book 2, s. 108.

22. Florus, Book 2, s. 30.

23. See Wells, Peter, pp. 105-111, Jones, pp. 95-96, Tacitus, Book 1, s. 57, Book 2, s. 9-10, Strabo, Geographia, Loeb classical Library, William Heinemann Pub. London, 1924, Book 7, Ch. 1, s. 4. Tacitus records in Book 2, s. 9-10, the following exchange between Arminius and Flavus which occurred during the campaigns of Germanicus (14-16 C.E.):

The waters of the Visurgis flowed between the Romans and the Cherusci. On its banks stood Arminius with the other chiefs. He asked whether Caesar had arrived, and on the reply that he was present, he begged leave to have an interview with his brother. That brother, surnamed Flavus, was with our army, a man famous for his loyalty, and for having lost an eye by a wound, a few years ago, when Tiberius was in command. The permission was then given, and he stepped forth and was saluted by Arminius, who had removed his guards to a distance and required that the bowmen ranged on our bank should retire. When they had gone away, Arminius asked his brother whence came the scar which disfigured his face, and on being told the particular place and battle, he inquired what reward he had received. Flavus spoke of increased pay, of a neck chain, a crown, and other military gifts, while Arminius jeered at such a paltry recompense for slavery.

10), Then began a controversy. The one spoke of the greatness of Rome, the resources of Caesar, the dreadful punishment in store for the vanquished, the ready mercy for him who surrenders, and the fact that neither Arminius's wife nor his son were treated as enemies; the other, of the claims of fatherland, of ancestral freedom, of the gods of the homes of Germany, of the mother who shared his prayers, that Flavus might not choose to be the deserter and betrayer rather than the ruler of his kinsfolk and relatives, and indeed of his own people. By degrees they fell to bitter words, and even the river between them would not have hindered them from joining combat, had not Stertinius hurried up and put his hand on Flavus, who in the full tide of his fury was demanding his weapons and his charger. Arminius was seen facing him, full of menaces and challenging him to conflict. Much of what he said was in Roman speech, for he had served in our camp as leader of his fellow-countrymen.

Frankly I think Flavus deserved this treatment.

24. Fuller, pp. 246-247, Jones, pp. 99-110, Dio, Book 56, 18-19, Paterculus, Book 2, s. 117, Florus, Book 2, s. 30, Tacitus, Book 1, s. 58, Wells, Peter, pp. 80-83.

25. Dio, Book 56, s. 18.

26. Paterculus, Book 2, 117.

27. Florus Book 2, s. 30. Roman methods of waging war were also likely to create resentment / resistance. Here is a quote from Tacitus, (Book 1, s. 51), describing war making by Tacitus’ hero and all round glorious Roman Germanicus:

Caesar, to spread devastation widely, divided his eager legions into four columns, and ravaged a space of fifty miles with fire and sword. Neither sex nor age moved his compassion. Everything, sacred or profane, the temple too of Tamfana, as they called it, the special resort of all those tribes, was levelled to the ground. There was not a wound among our soldiers, who cut down a half-asleep, an unarmed, or a straggling foe.

Although like far too many “civilized” peoples they complained when “barbarians” engaged in similar atrocities. But then the Roman attitude seems to have been it is alright when we do it because we’re civilized and so are allowed to do these things. “Barbarians” do not have the same freedom.

28, IBID.

29. Tacitus, Book 1, s. 55. See also Florus, Book 2, s. 30, Dio, Book 56, s.118, s. 19, Paterculus, Book 2, s. 118.

30. Dio, Book 56, s. 18.

31. Paterculus, Book 2, s. 118.

32, Dio, Book 56, s. 18-19, Wells, Peter, pp. 161-163, Fuller, pp. 246-248, Jones, 100-102.

33, Dio Book 56, s. 20.

34. Walls, Peter, pp. 45-55, Schluter, pp. 127-130, Benario, Hebert W., Teutoberg, in Classical World, Vol. 96, No. 3, Spring 2003, pp. 397-406, at pp. 403-405, Dornberg, pp. 28-29. See also Livius, Note 2.

35. See Wells, Peter, pp. 161-166, Schuler, pp. 130-131.

36. See Wells, Peter, pp. 49-55, 161-176, Schuler, pp. 136-149, also Livius, & Dornberg.

37. Dio, Book 56, s. 21.

38. Tacitus, Book 1, s. 61.

39. Dio, Book 56, s. 21-22.

40. See Livius.

41. Paterculus, Book 2, s. 119.

42. Florus, Book 2, s. 30.

43. Wells, Peter, p. 15, Dornberg, p. 26, Gruen, Erich S., The Expansion of the Empire under Augustus, The Cambridge Ancient History, Vol. 10, The Augustan Empire, Ed. Bownan, Alan K., Champlin, Edward, Lintott, Andrew, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996, pp. 527, Schluter, p. 125, Mommsen, Theodor, The Provinces of the Roman Empire, Vol. 1, MacMillian and Co. Ltd., 1909, p. 45-46.

44. Florus, Book 2, s. 30.

45, Tacitus, Book 1, s. 61.

46. Wells, Colin, 165, 179, 201, 213, 237-245, Jones, 102.

47. Suetonius, The Twelve Caesars, Penguin Books, Revd. Edition, 1979, London, Augustus, s. 23, see also LacusCurtius, Here. See also Dio, Book 56, s. 23.

48. Ovid, Tristia, University of Georgia Press, Athens, Georgia, 1975, Book 4, No. 2.

49. Paterculus, Book 2, s. 120-121, Tacitus, Book 1, s. 3, 50-51, 55-56.

50. Tacitus, Book 1, s. 60, Book 2, s. 25, Dio Book 60, s. 8.

51. Tacitus’ descriptions of Germanicus campaigns can be found in Book 1, s. 50-51, 55-72, Book 2, s. 5-26. for modern assessments of Germanicus’ campaigns see Delbruck, pp. 111-121, Wells, 204-207, Grant, Michael, pp. 18-19, Wells, Colin, pp. 241-243, Mommsen, pp. 51-62, Guen, pp. 185-187, Jones, 103-109.

52. Tacitus, Book 2, s. 88. See also Jones, pp. 107-108.

53. Tacitus Book 2, s. 88.

54. Fuller, p. 252-253.

55, Fuller, p. 253.

56. Livius, Here.

Pierre Cloutier