The Degree of Themistocles and Military Probability

Degree of Themistocles
One of the most significant events in history was the successful Greek defence against Persia in 480-479 B. C.E. The decisive event was the naval battle of Salamis just off the coast of Attica near Athens, where the Greeks defeated the Persian navy.

The most important Greek naval contingent was that of Athens and the most influential Greek Naval leader was the Athenian statesman Themistocles, who engineered the Greek victory at Salamis.

The Greeks had tried to stop the Persians at the pass of Thermopylae, with naval forces stationed at nearby Artemisium. The plan failed when the Persians broke through by outflanking the pass. The Persians advanced and ravaged Athens and Attica. The Chief account of this is that of Herodotus who describes panic and what amounts to hysteria in Athens. The Athenians evacuate their women and children to the island of Salamis and parts of the Peloponnesus and man their fleet with the men. The Greek fleet assembles at Salamis to cover the evacuation. The Persian fleet bottles up the Greek Fleet at Salamis and in the panic some of the Greek leaders contemplate withdrawal. By a judicious combination of diplomacy and blackmail Themistocles keeps the fleet together and eggs on the Persians to attack. The result is the battle of Salamis. Afterwards the Persians withdraw part of their forces and fleet withdraws also to Asia Minor. The next year the Greeks defeat the Persians at Plataea ending the Persian threat.1

Map of Greece
Such is the story as usually told.

In 1959 at Troezen in the part of Greece called the Peloponnesus was found an inscription that was supposed to be a 3rd century B.C.E., copy of a 5th century B.C.E., degree of the Athenian Assembly dated 480 B.C.E.2 It dealt with plans for the defence of Greece from the Persian Invasion and goes has follows:

(1) [Gods]. It was resol[ved] by the boule and the people: Themis[tokl]es son of Neokles of Phrearrhioi proposed the motion: [to en]tr[u]st th[e] ci[ty] to Athena [who protlects, Athens (5) a[nd to all the other gods to guard an[d] ke[ep off the ba]rbar[i]an in defence of the country; and that [a]l[l] Athenian[s and the foreig]ners living in Athens should place [their chil]dre[n and wives i[n] Troizen [ .... ? in the protection of Theseus] the founder of the land; and that they should pla[ce] (10) t[he old people and the] moveable possessions on Salamis[; and that the treasurers and the priestesses should remain on the acropolis guarding the belongings of th]e gods; and that all the other Athenians and the foreigners who have reached adulthood should embark o[n the prepared 200 ships and (15) resi[st] t[he barbarian on behalf of freedom, both their own [and that of the other Greeks], along with the Spartans and Corin[thians and Aeginetans] and the others who wish] to sh[are in the danger; and that the gene[r]al[s] should appoint [200] trierar[chs, one for] each ship, (20) [beginning tomorrow, from those who o[w]n both la[nd a]nd [hom]e in Ath[e]ns and who have legit[imate] childr[en and are not more th]an fifty years of age, an[d] should [a]ss[ign t]he ships t[o t]hem by lot; vv they should also choose [t]en ma[r]ines [for each ship from those between twenty [and (25) thirty years of age and four archers; they should [a]lso ap[point by lot] the officers for the ships when they al[so] appoint [the trierar]chs by lot; the generals should als[o] list [the others ship] by ship on notice4boards, the Athenians according to the deme (lexiarchic) registers (30) and the] foreigners from those registered wi[t]h the [pole]m[archj they should list them, assigning them [t]o 200 divisions of [u]p to 100 men each and inscribe for each [divis]ion the name of the trireme and the trierarch and the offi[ce]rs so that they may know on which trireme (35) e[a]ch [d]ivision should e[m]bark; and when al[1] the divisions have been assigned and allocated to the triremes, the boule and t[h]e general[s] are to man a[l]l the 200 ships after [sa]crificing to propitiate Zeus the Almighty (Pankrates) and Athena and Victory (Nike) and Poseidon (40) the Preser[v]er (Asphaleios); and when the ships are manned, with 100 of th[e]m they are to assist Artemis[i]on in Euboea, and with the other 100 around Salamis and the rest of Attica they are to lie in wait and guard the country. So that all Athenians may be united (45) in resisting the barbarian, those who have changed their residence for [ten] years are to go to Salamis and stay there until the people should decide about them; and those [deprived of civic rights ....]3

Not surprisingly the document has been controversial. It for example clearly contradicts Herodotus’ account on a number of points. The most important being as follows:

1. That the Athenian assembly voted to evacuate non-combatants before the battles of Thermopylae and Artemisium and in fact the evacuation began then.

2. The Athenians held back part of their fleet at Salamis. Sending only 100 to Artemisium and keeping 100 at Salamis.

3. The Athenians in fact only intended Artemisium and Thermopylae has temporary holding actions and were preparing for a decisive action at Salamis.

Now one of the problems is that in the 4th and 3rd century B.C.E., there were a number of faked Athenian degrees allegedly from earlier times. Further the language and form of the lettering is in some respects early 3rd century B.C.E. Given that at the very least this degree if its based on an authentic degree of 480 B.C.E., the document has been modified / edited.4

As mentioned above this scenario contradicts Herodotus’ account which is over all quite believable if problematic on details. It is hard to believe that Herodotus could have missed this if it was true. Of course this is not decisive it is simply a problem.5

However the chief problems with the degree are simple military ones. If this was the Athenian plan, or more precisely Themistocles’, then it was an unbelievably stupid plan. And on top of it is very hard to believe that the Athenian assembly would have agreed to such a plan to say nothing of Athens’s allies.

Some of Athens’s allies lived in the area just south of the pass of Thermopylae, just what would they have thought about Athenian commitment to defence against Persia knowing that Athens was already planning to evacuate its non-combatants and abandon Attica and Athens to Persia and keeping ships behind at Salamis. One wonders just what the Spartans would have thought of such plan. Almost certainly it would have infuriated them.

Regarding the Athenian Assembly. Is it remotely serious as even a flight of fancy that even before Artemisium and Thermopylae had been breached that the Assembly would have agreed to open up their city, farms etc., to be looted and devastated by Persian troops has part of some hair-brained scheme of defence? It would be clear that acting out of simple self interest that the Assembly would want the Persians halted as far away from Athens as reasonably possible.

From a psychological point of view it is hard to think up a strategy more effective in demoralizing a population before hand and infuriating your allies.

It is generally recognized that the Greek land and naval forces at Artemisium and Thermopylae were intended to halt the Persian forces permanently. Certainly Herodotus’ account would seem to indicate this.6 Attempt to find a trace of a version of events similar to the degree in Herodotus center on the second oracle of Delphi prophecy given to Athenian emissaries before the battle of Salamis. Part of it goes has follows:

Yet Zeus the all-seeing grants to Athene’s prayer
That the wooden wall only shall not fail, but help you and your children
But await not the host of horse and foot coming from Asia,
Nor be still, but turn your back and withdraw from the foe.
Truly come when you will meet him face to face.
Divine Salamis, you will bring death to women’s sons
When the corn is scattered, or the harvest gathered in.7

Aside from the question of whether or not this prophecy was ever uttered for real or if it is a post-hoc creation; it is a rather slender reed to build on and it still faces the problem that the plan for defence as outlined in the degree is military idiocy.

To illustrate some of the problems with this document look at this photo of the island of Salamis.

Arial Photo of Salamis and surrounding area

The fact is the bay of Salamis is a trap. You can see in the left center the narrow strait between the island of Salamis and the mainland. In antiquity it was even narrower and shallower. It is unlikely that the Greek fleet could have escaped through it or even navigate it!8 All the Persians had to do was block the main strait and blockade the Greek fleet in its trap and sooner or latter the Greeks would have been forced to capitulate or come out and fight in far more open waters were the greater numbers and speed of the Persian fleet would have given the Persians the advantage.

Any plan to set up Salamis has an ultimate defensive position is simply moronic. In fact it appears that the plan was simply for the Greek fleet to cover the evacuation of the population of Athens and Attica to the island of Salamis and the Peloponnesus. I have little doubt that the Persian Admirals were simply ecstatic to find the Greek fleet at Salamis, where it could be blockaded and the transports of the fleet had used to transport part of the army directly to the Peloponnesus out flanking the wall, manned by the Spartans and others across the Isthmus of Corinth.

Now an argument can be made that ignoring the Greek fleet at Salamis was not an option, possible flank attacks, and that the lateness of the campaign season would have forced the Persians to retire to winter quarters.9

I rather doubt that all the Persian fleet would have been required to keep the Greeks bottled up. Only a portion of the fleet was necessary and of course with the Greek fleet at Salamis it would have been easy for Persian transports carrying troops to invade the island of Aegina , (second greatest Greek sea power) and the Peloponnesus. Further the Athenians had abandoned Attica just before harvest. Some food would have been available for Persian troops. Also the Persians had the alliance of Thebes which gave them a substantial Greek ally in central Greece. It is debatable whether or not the Persians were under any real military pressure to attack.

Finally the Greek alliance was fragile, with each city state extremely suspicious of each other and ready at virtually any moment to accuse each other of betrayal. In fact Herodotus’ account of the events in the Greek camp before Salamis indicate an alliance on the point of collapse, with massive mutual recrimination. Herodotus’ account describes in fair detail how the Greeks were ready to flee to their respective homes with their ships and how Themistocles through a combination of trickery and blackmail managed to thwart their efforts.10 It is hard to believe that the Persians were not aware of this from their spies. If anything it was the Greeks who needed a battle soon to save their crumbling alliance.

Herodotus gives to Artemisia, ruler of Halicarnassus, the following words:

Let me tell you how I think things will now go with the enemy; if only you are not in too great a hurry to fight at sea – if you keep the fleet on the coast where it now is – then, whether you stay here or advance into the Peloponnese, you will easily accomplish your purpose. The Greeks will not be able to hold out against you for long; you will soon cause their forces to disperse – they will soon break up and go home. I hear they have no supplies in the island where they now are; and the Peloponnesian contingents, at least are not likely to be very easy in their minds if you march with the army towards their country – they will hardly care to fight in defence of Athens.11

Now it is virtually certain that Artemisia never uttered those words but in my opinion they represent an accurate overview of the situation before the battle of Salamis.

It is interesting that Herodotus says that Themistocles sent a secret message to the Persians telling them that the Greeks were completely disunited and would offer little resistance and that the Persians would have a easy victory if they attacked.12

Strait of Salamis where the battle occurred
The end result of all of this was the Greek victory at Salamis. Even if one doubts certain aspects of the story like Themistocles message to the Persians; the picture it gives of an alliance hanging together by a thread rings true. It also indicates desperation for a battle as soon has possible before the alliance collapses into mutual recriminations.

Themistocles was one of the most astute politicians of his time and it appears he pulled of the equivalent of a military / political miracle. It is rather ironic that he ended up as governor of Magnesia in Asia Minor for the Persian King Artxerxes son of King Xerxes who he had defeated at Salamis!13

It is a common place that in war things hardly ever go according to plan and it is very hard to believe that the apparent plan indicated in the degree would have worked out so well; given its glaring defects and lack of common sense. Further any such degree passed before Artemisium and Thermopylae would have told the Persians well ahead of time Greek, or at least Athenian strategy.

It is virtually certain that at the very least the degree we have is not an exact / accurate copy of the Athenian degree passed at the time and that its more controversial sections that contradict Herodotus should simply not be taken seriously.

1. Sealey, Raphael, A History of the Greek City States: 700 – 338 B.C.E., University of California Press, Los Angles, 1976, pp. 208-228, Buckley, Terry, Aspects of Greek History: 750 – 323 B.C., Routledge, London, 1996, pp. 170-188, Ehrenberg, Victor, From Solon to Socrates, 2nd Edition, Routledge, London, 1973, pp. 152-174, For Herodotus see Herodotus, The Histories, Revd Edition, Penguin Books, London, 2003. For the panic in Athens see Book 8, s. 40-48, See also The Rise and Fall of Athens, Plutarch, Penguin Books, London, 1960, Themistocles, s. 9-10, Fuller, J.F.C., A Military History of the Western World, v. 1, Da Capo Press, New York, 1954, pp. 26-52, Burn, A.R., The Pelican History of Greece, Penguin Books, London, 1965, pp. 177-192.

2. Buckley, p. 174.

3. Dillon, Matthew, & Garland, Lynda, Ancient Greece: Social and Historical Documents from Archaic times to the Death of Socrates, 2nd Edition, Routledge, London, 2000, p. 203. Other translations include, Lewis, Naphtali, Greek Historical Documents, The Fifth Century B.C., A.M. Hakkert Ltd., Toronto, 1971, pp. 4-5, Meiggs, R., & Lewis, D., A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions to the End of the Fifth Century B.C., University of Oxford Press, Oxford, 1969, No. 23, Fornara, Charles W., Translated Documents of Greece and Rome 1: Archaic times to the end of the Peloponnesian War, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2nd Edition, 1983, No. 55, pp. 54-55.

4. Buckley, p. 174, Lewis, p. 4, Ehrenburg, pp. 156, 426 n. 59, Sealey, pp. 214-216.

5. See Buckley, pp. 170-175, Sealey, pp. 208-221.

6. IBID. Buckley, and Herodotus, Book 7, s. 196-239.

7. Herodotus, Book 7, s. 141.

8. Sealey, p. 220.

9. Buckley, p. 178.

10. Herodotus, Book 8, s. 50-65.

11. IBID. Book 8, s. 68.

12. IBID. Book 8. s. 75-77.

13. Plutarch, Themistocles, s. 27-32.

Pierre Cloutier

A Note on The Peace of Kallias

The Eastern Mediterranean
A rather interminable and endless debate as centred on the historical veracity of the Peace of Kallias, (c. 449-448 B.C.E.), or (c. 465 B.C.E.). The following is a brief review of some of the issues surrounding the Peace of Kallias.

The best description of the Peace comes from Diodorus who writes:

The Athenians and their allies concluded with the Persians a treaty of peace, the principal terms of which run as follows: All the Greek cities of Asia are to live under laws of their own making; the satraps of the Persians are not to come nearer to the sea than a three days’ journey, and no Persian warship is to sail between Phaselis and the Cyanean rocks;1 and if those terms are observed by the King and his generals, the Athenians are not to send troops into the territory over which the King is ruler.2

Other terms appear to have been that the Athenians agreed that the cities in the Delian League on the coast of Asia Minor would not be fortified. Also that the Athenians would not aid rebellion in Cyprus and Egypt , and would leave the eastern Mediterranean to Persia. Persia recognized the Athenian Empire and abandoned their claim to Ionia.3

The attack on the historical veracity of the Peace of Kallias is based on one very damaging fact, the historian Thucydides fails to mention it.4 It seems hard to believe that Thucydides would fail to mention this Peace if it in fact had occurred. However this argument is not conclusive after all Thucydides also seriously downplayed the Megarian decrees5 to give put one example. Although other 5th century sources are also silent about the Peace of Kallias. Arguments from silence do not prove something did not happen, although in the case of Thucydides silence one is left puzzled about why.

The first mention of the Peace of Kallias is in the writings of the Greek writer Isocrates, who briefly records the treaty as limiting the Persian Empire and preventing Persian ships from going west of Phaslis and that no troops will be sent west of the Halys river.6 This differs from the version given above.7 All other references to the treaty post-date this reference.8 So it appears that our earliest reference is about 70 or 85 years after the alleged treaty. No surviving inscription records the treaty or makes a reference to it.9

This combined with the fact that the best and basically only surviving near - contemporary historian, (Thucydides), does not even mention the treaty is certainly enough to raise doubts about the Peace of Kallias being historical.

Further the 4th century historian Theopompus of Chios regarded the Peace of Kallias, or some other treaty with Persia as a forgery based on the fact that the inscription he found in Athens was written in a alphabet, (Ionic), used after 403 B.C.E.10 About 350 B.C.E., references to a whole series of decrees and decisions dating, allegedly, to the period 490-440 B.C.E. start to appear. It appears all too likely that these documents were at worst forgeries and at best imaginative recreations. There is the possibility that the Peace of Kallias was one of those documents,11 if so its’ historical veracity is slight. Further what Isocrates tells us of its terms varies from the version that became generally accepted. The 4th century historian Callisthenes also said that the Peace of Kallias was a fraud.12 The sceptics can hardly be blamed for their doubts about the historical veracity of the Peace of Kallias.13

Regarding Theopompus of Chios, his reliability as an historian is not of the highest so his arguments are not conclusive.14 For example the point about the use of the Ionic alphabet after 403 B.C.E; despite what Theopompus says, several inscriptions in Ionic have been found at Athens dating much earlier than 403 B.C.E.15 As for Callisthenes his reputation as an historian is rather low and he had a reputation for sensationalism and exaggeration.16 Given Plutarch’s confusing date of the peace, (c. 465 B.C.E.)17, in the section in which he refers to Callisthenes it is possible that Plutarch has confused the question of a peace after Eurymedon, (c. 469-466 B.C.E.), with a peace after the Cyprian Expedition of c. 450 B.C.E., resulting in a misunderstanding of what Callisthenes was in fact talking about. Also what Theopompus saw, and Callisthenes referred to, could have been an accurate copy done after 403 B.C.E., of the Peace of Kallias. It also appears Theopompus may not have been referring to the Peace of Kallias but to a later treaty with Darius II of Persia.18 If so the fact he refers to the treaty as forgery when we have the evidence of Andocides for its authenticity does not help Theopompus’ credibility. It is also quite possible that although the terms of the Peace of Kallias, or some other treaty, given in the inscription are “fake”, the Peace of Kallias was in fact real.

The considerations mentioned above also apply to the question of the “faked” documents only some of which we have in their inscriptional form. Perhaps we would be in a better position to settle this question if we had the actual inscription of the Peace of Kallias, but we do not.

Isocrates is also not a good source being basically a political pamphleteer, and rhetorician, who was quite careless all too often.19 His reliability in reporting the Peace of Kallias is not high. Certainly the term forbidding Persian troops west of the Halys river is hard to take seriously.20 Isocrates summary is as follows:

In the time of our supremacy, the barbarians were prevented from marching with an army beyond the Halys river and from sailing with their ships this side Phaselis.21

The idea that the restriction of Persian troops against going west of the Halys is believable if we amend it to mean that Royal troops could not go west of the Halys and had nothing to do with the local armies of the Satraps,22 also has problems. It is not reasonable to think that the Persians would accept such a limitation on their ability to crush rebellion in western Asia Minor and that the Persian King would at the time reduce his ability to rein in his Satraps is problematic and doubtful. No amount of massaging this data makes it any less hard to believe. Finally given what our author says about reading in, (see next two paragraphs), information when something is not clearly stated. This seems to be a prime example. Also Isocrates account of the terms is still at a minimum 70 years after the alleged events and his version still contradicts the other versions.23

And our three other sources from the 4th century Demosthenes, Lycurgus and Aristodemos disagree with Isocrates version of the terms and support Diodorus ' version.24 Demosthenes account, which is the same as Lycurgus, states referring to Kallias:

Who negotiated the celebrated Peace under which the King of Persia was not to approach within a day’s ride of the coast, nor sail a ship of war between the Chelidonian islands and the Blue rocks.25

Asia Minor

Lycurgus adds to the above that it was agreed:

...that the Greeks should be free not only if they lived in Europe but in Asia too...26

The writer Aristodemos, gives the following terms:

The treaty was made on those conditions: the Persians were not to sail in warships beyond the Kyanai, the river Nessos and Phaselis, which is a Pamphylian city, and helidoniai. Nor were they to advance within a three day journey to the sea as overed by a horse at speed.27

There is no reason not to accept Diodorus' version of the treaty given the support it has from those three sources.

Basically it appears that fourth century historians, writers, and orators contrasted the glorious achievement of the Peace of Kallias with the humiliation of the Peace of Antalkidas,28 (also known, more accurately in the Authors’ opinion, as the Kings’ Peace, 387 B.C.E.), which both formally gave the Greeks cities of Asia Minor to Persia and ratified continued Persian interference in Greek affairs. It is surely not a coincidence that the first surviving mention of the Peace of Kallias occurs about 380 B.C.E., in the writings of Isocrates, who quite deliberately and rhetorically contrasts the Peace of Kallias with the "Kings Peace" in the same passage.29

For example Isocrates writes such things as:

We were constantly setting limits on the Empire of the King…

Levying tribute on some of his subjects and banning him from the sea…30

But right now according to Isocrates:

Do we not address him as "The Great King?"

Is it not he who presides over our affairs as though captive of his spear.31

The Athenian Orator Lysias also contrasted the glorious achievements of the 5th century B.C.E., with the early 4th century B.C.E., reality. In the past, according to Lysias, Athens had:

…displayed their own power to such effect that the Great King no more coveted the possessions of others, but yielded some of his own and was in fear for what remained.32

Right now however things had changed for now it is;

…fitting for Greece to come and mourn over this tomb, and lament those who lie here, seeing that her own freedom was interred together with their valour. Unhappy Greece, to be bereft of such men, and happy King of Asia, to be at grips with other leaders! For Greece, deprived of these men, is sunk in slavery…33

The polemical and rhetorical purpose of Isocrates comments about the Peace of Kallias in contrast to the "Kings Peace" are obvious and clear and was part of a rapidly developing tradition. So the reliability of Isocrates’ comments concerning the contents of the Peace terms for both Peaces’ is suspect, so there is no compelling reason to accept Isocrates version of the Peace of Kallias over Diodorus.

The writer Aelius Aristides who lived and wrote in the 2nd century C.E. also provides evidence of the terms of the Peace of Kallias, and the terms he reports agree with Diodorus , Lycurgus and Demosthenes.34 Aristides however follows in the tradition of Isocrates in contrasting the terms of the Kings Peace with those of the Peace of Kallias.35 Bluntly the victorious Peace of Kallias is contrasted with the humiliation of the Kings Peace with, like Isocrates, considerable rhetorical flourish. All of this does not lead to great confidence in the reported terms and reads very much like a cliche. For example Aristides states in his very rhetorical Panathenaic Oration, that Athens:

...crushed the barbarians.,

and,

...it (Athens –Author) made terms of peace with the former and with the later (Persia and Sparta) accordingly, being superior to both, together and separately.36

Aristides whole effort is such a celebration of Athens that its honesty and accuracy are seriously in doubt. Its value has a source for the peace of Kallias is questionable, given its almost hysterically patriotic celebration of Athens and down playing of Athens’s defeats through all sorts of rhetorical tricks.37

The hypothesis that the Peace of Kallias was originally concluded in c. 465 B.C.E., although quite seductive, has several problems.38 In the proposal an attack has to be made on Diodorus ' account because it clearly dates the Peace of Kallias right after the expedition to Cyprus.39 Firstly it does not deal with the evidence that Athens occupied parts of south-eastern Asia Minor, Cyprus and maybe even Palestine.40 Also the historians Ephorus and Callisthenes are used to contradict Diodorus.41 Since these historians only survive in fragments and in summaries, do they really contradict Diodorus? Also Plutarch 's account which refers to Callisthenes could mean that no peace was concluded then. (c. 465 B.C.E.), but was later. It is ironic that a historian who denied the Peace of Kallias is used to date it to c. 465 B.C.E.; because he says no such peace was concluded then!42

Regarding Ephorus since all we have are fragments none of which unambiguously place when the peace was made it doesn't help to set Ephorus against Diodorus when we are not sure they do in fact contradict each other. Further explanations that Herodotus or Thucydides didn't mention the peace because it clashed with the purpose of their works,43 are less than convincing because at the same time the position is advanced that the usual interpretation of the peace has forbidding both sides from going into both areas is rejected on the grounds that no account mentions a limit on Greek ships but only on Persian ships.44 So in two cases something is not mentioned, the Peace of Kallias, and it means nothing about whether or not something really happened. In the other the failure to mention a restriction on Greek ships means none existed.

Regarding Ephorus and Diodorus , a great deal of play as been made by various historians concerning Diodorus' ability to mess up dates.45 As already noted Diodorus, may have messed dates up in crediting an inscription describing Salamis, (c. 450 B.C.E.), as describing Eurymedon, (c. 469-466 B.C.E.).46 So this argument has validity. The problem comes in the following manner. The accepted dates for the Egyptian Expedition are 460-454 B.C.E., and that it lasted c. 6 years.47 Diodorus gives the dates as 463 - 460 B.C.E. which means the expedition lasted about 3 years, and Diodorus further associates the expedition with a rebellion after the death of Xerxes, (465 B.C.E.).48 This leaves very little room for a "Peace of Kallias" after Eurymedon. A Truce would be more likely. The contradictions with Thucydides are pretty blatant.59 So is it just Diodorus who made the error? Since Diodorus is copying Ephorus it is possible Diodorus was copying Ephorus in his dating the events.50 If that is the case then there is a problem. It means that early on, (4th century B.C.E.); there was a fundamental problem with the dates of the Egyptian Expedition including both start and finishing dates and duration. The reason that this is likely is not only was Diodorus copying Ephorus he was compiling a year by year chronology he would have to have made the same error three times and separated out events occurring in the same year has occurring in different years. The other reason is that Ephorus had problems with chronology and was criticized for ignoring it.51

The above being the case there is the possibility that Ephorus' apparent dating of the Peace of Kallias at 465 B.C.E., if such is the case is an error. Ephorus' credibility with dates is not enhanced by his likely incorrect dating of the Egyptian Expedition. Given that Diodorus was copying Ephorus, Diodorus would have had to have made multiple errors in copying in order to produce the chronological mess that resulted. It is submitted that Ephorus is the likely source of this muddle and that part of the muddle is in fact the placing of the Peace of Kallias.

Voyages of Pericles and Ephialtes that were unopposed at this time prove nothing one way or the other.52 the main problem with the idea of a Peace of Kallias at this time c. 465 B.C.E., is that according to the terms we have it would have entailed abandoning Cyprus and other recent conquests and the war does not seem to have stopped anyway. At best we have a truce.53

Finally there is the tantalizing hint in Herodotus who refers to an embassy from Athens lead by Kallias sent to the Persian court.54 Unfortunately Herodotus does not directly or indirectly provide a clear date for this embassy neither does he tell us what the embassy was doing at the Persian court.55 Herodotus' comments that:

Callias, the son of Hipponicus, and a number of other Athenians were in Susa, the city of Memnon, on quite different business, and it so happened that their visit coincided with that of some representatives from Argos, who had been sent to ask Xerxes' son Artaxerxes if the friendly relations, which the Argives had established with his father still held good, or if they were now considered by Persia as enemies. 'they do indeed hold good', Artaxerxes is said to have replied; 'there is no city which I believe to be a better friend to me than Argos'.56

Artaxerxes I

Herodotus does mention that the embassy occurred in the reign of Artaxerxes I, which gives a time period of c. 465-423 B.C.E. for this embassy. Although the implication of the passage would seem to be shortly after the death of Xerxes. At the very least Herodotus at least tells us that Kallias was in fact involved in diplomatic dealing and possible negotiations of some kind with the Persians, at the right time, (approximately), for the Peace of Kallias.57

Herodotus then adds the following which throws the above into confusion:

For my own part I cannot positively state that Xerxes either did, or did not send the messenger to Argos; nor can I guarantee the story of the Argives going to Susa and asking Artaxerxes about their relationship with Persia.58

This quite messes up the dating and the reliability of Herodotus ' account, which Herodotus refers to as "another story current in Greece",59 so he does not claim it as "true". Herodotus merely records and lets the reader decide. Herodotus' account states that Callias' visit coincided with an Argive embassy, at which Artaxerxes made some comment about the good relations between Argos and Persia. Besides the blatant anti-Argive bias of the story. It does not bode well that so soon after the alleged embassy of Kallias that such possible misinformation was circulating about what went on during it. Herodotus is generally thought to have written the Histories, c. 445-430 B.C.E. and died after 430 B.C.E.60 So that within about one generation of the Peace of Kallias, if you accept the early date for the Peace of Kallias, (c. 465 B.C.E.), or within about 14 years if you accept the later date, (c. 449-448 B.C.E.), significant misinformation may already have been circulating concerning the Peace of Kallias. Since in this story Herodotus dates Kallias' embassy by tying it to an alleged Argive embassy after the death of Xerxes, which by implication seems to be shortly after Xerxes death; if said Argive embassy never happened than said embassy no longer helps to date the Kallias' embassy and hence the peace. Certainly it seems all too likely that a lot of "stories" were circulating to muddy the historical waters.

For historians the best evidence for the veracity of the Peace of Kallias is the end of the Persian / Greek war shortly after the end of the expedition to Cyprus in 450 B.C.E., and the following 30 years of peace with Persia before Persian intervention in the Peloponnesian War.61 Thus c. 449-448 B.C.E. is more "logical" for the Peace of Kallias than c. 465 B.C.E. Also there was apparently a mysterious suspension of tribute payments in 449-448 B.C.E., which may be related to the Peace.62 This again is not conclusive, because despite the statements of some historians that “hostilities did cease".63 Hostilities in fact did not cease. Too give but one example Thucydides records that when Samos, (c. 440-439 B.C.E.), revolted against Athens and the League, Persian ships and men tried to help the Samians.64 It appears that the Peace of Kallias did not completely end hostilities.

That the Peace of Kallias is historical is rendered more probable by the oldest written account of a Peace with Persia in the fifth century B.C.E., the account given by the Athenian orator Andocides in his oration On the Peace with Sparta, in which he says:

Thus-- and it is only by calling the past to mind that one can properly policy-- we began by making a truce with the Great King and establishing a permanent accord with him, thanks to the diplomacy of my mothers' brother Epilycus, the son of Teisander.65

This is the so-called Peace of Epilycus usually dated to c. 424 B.C.E.66 Andocides made this speech about 392 B.C.E., when Athens was considering accepting terms to end the Corinthian war. If nothing else this indicates that Athens could have made a number of "Peaces", "Truces" with the Persian Empire in the 5th century B.C.E.

So what is the conclusion of this rather inconclusive ramble through incomplete, bad and quite inadequate source material about the “Peace of Kallias”?

Probably there was a “Peace of Kallias” concluded in about 449 B.C.E. A peace of exhaustion no doubt. Athens had Sparta and its allies to worry about and Persia had its own problems without having to worry about a frontier state like Athens and its’ allies. Whether the “Peace” was a formal peace, a truce, an agreement, or an informal suspension of hostilities cannot now be known.67 Regarding the terms of the “Peace” we can say very little. The terms recorded in the 4th century, by Ephorus and others are very dubious and probably at least partially false. It appears likely that both sides agreed to a suspension of hostilities and set up no go areas for each other's fleets and armies. It is unlikely that Athens imposed terms on Persia and in fact Athens was probably mainly confined to the Aegean by the “Peace”. If there were no go areas agreed too this did not last long in that when favourable opportunities arose the Persians at least would intervene with ships and men. Despite this it is also clear that neither side was willing to make an open breach and resume full-scale war. So a sort of “peace” endured for about 30 years.68

Addendum

The Peace of Kallias was referred to by various Greek historians and writers of the 4th century B.C.E. Below are the various terms as reported by these sources. Diodorus used the 4th century B.C.E.; historian Ephorus as his source and so apparently did Plutarch . Isocrates mentioned the peace several times in his political writings in detail, along with more general references elsewhere. The Athenian politician Demosthenes mentioned the peace in fair detail in one of his speeches. Also another Athenian politician Lycurgus also mentioned the peace. In the 2nd century C.E., the Orator Aristides also mentions the Peace of Kallias in fair detail. The quote from Diodorus is taken from, C. H. Oldfather, Diodorus Siculus, Harvard University Press, London, 1989. The quote from Plutarch is taken from, Ian Scott-Kilvert, The Rise and Fall of Athens, Nine Greek Lives of Plutarch, Penguin Books, London, 1960. The quotes from Isocrates are from, George Norlin, Isocrates, v. 1 & 2, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1980. The quote from Demosthenes is from, Vince, J.H., Ed., Demosthenes, with an English Translation, v. 2, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinman Ltd., London, 1935. The quote from Lycurgus is from, Burtt, J. O., Minor Attic Orators, v. 2, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinman Ltd., London, 1954. The quote from Aristodemos is from, Fornara, Charles W., Archaic Times to the End of the Peloponnesian War, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1977. The quotes from Aristides are from Aristides, v.1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinmann Ltd, London, 1973.

Consequently Artabazus and Megabyzus sent ambassadors to Athens to discuss a settlement. The Athenians were favourable and dispatched ambassadors plenipotentiary, the leader of whom was Callias the son of Hipponicus; and so the Athenians and their allies concluded with the Persians a treaty of peace, the principal terms of which run as follows: All the Greek cities of Asia are to live under laws of their own making; the satraps of the Persians are not to come nearer to the sea than a three days' journey and no Persian warship is to sail inside Phaselis or the Cyanean Rocks; and if these terms are observed by the king and his generals, the Athenians are not to send troops into the territory over which the king is ruler. After the treaty had been solemnly concluded. The Athenians withdrew their armaments from Cyprus, having won a brilliant victory and concluded most noteworthy terms of peace. And it so happened that Cimon died of illness during his stay in Cyprus.
(Diodorus, Book 12, 4.)

This blow so dashed the king's hopes that he accepted the terms of that notorious peace, whereby he agreed to stay away the distance of a whole day's ride from the Greek sea board of Asia Minor and not to let a single warship or armoured vessel sail west of the Cyanean and the Chelidonian islands.
(Plutarch, Life of Kimon 13)

Well then, the Hellenes felt such confidence in those who governed the city in those times that most of them of their own accord placed themselves under the power of Athens, while the barbarians were so far from meddling in the affairs of Hellenes that they neither sailed their ships-of-war this side of Phaselis nor march their armies beyond the Halys, refraining, on the contrary, from all aggression. Today, however, circumstances are so completely reversed that the Hellenes regard Athens with hatred and the barbarians hold us in contempt. As to the hatred of us among the Hellenes, you have heard the report of our generals themselves and what the king thinks of us, he has made plain in the letters which have been dispatched by him.
(Isocrates, Areopagiticus, 80-81.)

In the time of our supremacy, the barbarians were prevented from marching with an army beyond the Halys river and from sailing with their ships of war this side of Phaselis, but under the hegemony of the Lacedaemonians not only did they gain the freedom to march and sail wherever they pleased, but they even became masters over many Hellenic states.
(Isocrates, Panathenaicus, 59.)

In fact, after the disaster which befell us in the Hellespont, when our rivals took our place as leaders, the barbarians won a naval victory, became rulers of the sea, occupied most of the islands made a landing in Laconia, took Cythera by storm, and sailed around the whole Peloponnesus, inflicting damage as they went. One may best comprehend how great is the reversal in our circumstances if he will read side by side the treaties which were made during our leadership and those which have been published recently; for he will find that in those days we were constantly setting limits to the empire of the king, levying tribute on some of his subjects, and barring him from the sea; now, however, it is he who controls the destinies of the Hellenes, who dictates what they must each do, and who all but sets up his viceroys in their cities. For with this one exception, what else is lacking? Was it not he who decided the issue of the war, was it not he who directed the terms of peace, and is it not he who now presides over our affairs? Do we not sail off to him as to a master, when we have complaints against each other? Do we not address him as "The Great King" as though we were captives of his spear? Do we not in our wars against each other rest our hopes of salvation on him, who would gladly destroy both Athens and Lacedaemons?
(Isocrates, Panegyricus, 119-121)

I am sure you have heard the story of their treatment of Callias, son of Hipponicus, who negotiated the celebrated peace under which the King of Persia was not to approach within a day's ride of the coast, nor sail with a ship of war between the Chelidonian islands and the Blue Rocks. (Cyanean Rocks- Author).
(Demosthenes, De Falsa Legatione, 273.)

And to crown their victory: not content with erecting the trophy in Salamis, they fid for the Persian the boundaries necessary for Greek freedom and prevented his overstepping them, making an agreement that he should not sail his warships between Cyaneae, (Cyanean Rocks- Author) and Phaselis and that the Greeks should be free not only if they lived in Europe but in Asia too.
(Lycurgus, Against Leocrates, 73.)

They elected as general Kallias – the one nicknamed Lakkopoutos (“pit-wealth”) – because he became wealthy by discovering a treasury at Marathon and appropriating it. This Kallias made atreaty with Artaxerxes and the rest of the Persians. The treaty was made on those conditions: the Persians were not to sail in warships beyond the Kyanai, the river Nessos and Phaselis, which is a Pamphylian city, and Chelidoniai. Nor were they to advance within a three day journey to the sea as covered by a horse at speed.
(Aristodemos, 104. 13.)

He (The Persian King) valued his safety more, and he retreated before their city (Athens –Author) on land and sea not the distance, as the saying goes, of a ship's backwater, nor of a step backwards, but he gave up all his land down by the sea, tens of thousands of stades in Asia, in all no less than the area of a great empire…
(Aristides, Panathenaic Oration, 208.)

But after the struggles and expeditions of the city, he sank so low that he agreed that he would no longer sail within two boundaries, the Chelidonean Isles to the south, and the Cyanean to the north, and that he would everywhere keep five hundred stades away from the sea, so that this very circle was like a crown upon the head of the Greeks, and the king was under surveillance from his very territory.
(Aristides, Panathenaic Oration, 209.)

But in the matter of the peace what a great difference there is! For the city’s peace gave orders to the king and said he must do what he was commanded. For it did not allow him to sail within the Chelidanian and Cyanean islands, and if you are proud of your cavalry, no longer will you ride up to the sea but it says you will stay away from the sea the distance of a day’s ride of that cavalry, and you will here much about the Greeks who live in Greece as about the Greeks who live in your own land.
(Aristides, Panathenaic Oration, 274.)

Greek Helemet

1. For locations see Maps. Note the Cyanean rocks are the Cheledonian Islands on the Map.

2. Diodorus , Book 12, 4. Diodorus is quoting the 4th century B.C.E., historian Ephorus. For a review of the terms and related issues see de Ste Croix, pp. 310-314, McGregor, pp. 67.

3. de Ste Croix, pp. 310-314, McGregor, pp. 67.

4. Thucydides , Book 1, 113-120, Powell, 1988, pp. 49-50, Sealey, p. 278.

5. See Grant, 1995, p. 77, Powell, 1988, p. 114-117.

6. Isocrates, v. 2, Panathenaicus, (12), 59, Areopagiticus, (7), 120. See Sealey, p. 279.

7. Powell, 1988, p. 114.

8. For example Demosthenes mentions it in 351 and 343 B.C.E., in v. 2, De Falsa Legatione, (19), 273., and so does Lycurgus in 328 B.C.E, in v. 2, Against Leocrates, (1), 73. See also Addendum on p. 80, for complete text of Demosthenes and Lycurgus. See also Meiggs, 1972, p. 129. See also Powell, 1988, p. 114-115.

9. Powell, 1988, p. 114-123, Davies, 1993, p. 80-82.

10. Davies, 1993, p. 81. Fornara, p. 96 quotes Harpocration, Attic Letters, '…Theopompus in book 15 of the Philippika says that the treaty with the Barbarian was a fabrication, and that it was not inscribed on the stelae with Attic letters but with the letters of the Ionians'.

11. Davies, 1993, p. 81.

12. See Plutarch, Life of Kimon, 13., for Callisthenes. See also Sealey, p. 279. See Addendum for complete text of Plutarch concerning the Peace terms.

13. The best attack on the historical veracity of the Peace of Kallias is Sealey, pp. 278-282.

14. Grant, 1995, p. 109.

15. Powell, 1988, p. 51.

16. Grant, 1995, p. 110.

17. Plutarch , Life of Kimon, 13. This position of the Peace of Kallias has many modern defenders. See Miller, pp. 13-14, 16-17, Badian, pp. 20-23.

18. Theon, in his Progymnasmata II, 67. 22, quotes Theopmpus as saying the 'Hellenic oath is a fabrication, which the Athenian say the Hellenes swore before the battle of Plataea against the barbarians, and so is the Athenian treaty with King Dareios in regards to the Greeks.' The above isquoted in Fornara, p. 96. The, so called Peace of Epilycus. See Andocides, v. 1, On the Peace with Sparta, (3) 29, from Burtt, Minor Attic Orators, v. 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heineman Ltd., London, 1962, and Sealey p. 281.

19. Davies, 1993, p. 170-171.

20. See Sealey, p. 279-280, Powell, 1988, 49-54. See also Badian who does take this provision seriously, pp. 49-50.

21. Isocrates, v. 2, Panathenaicus, (12), 59. For a repeat of these terms see his, v. 2, Areopagiticus, (7), 80.

22. Badian 51-52.

23. See above.

24. See Demosthenes, v. 2, De Falsa Legatione, (19), 273, Lycurgus, v. 2, Against Leocrates, (1), 73 and Aristodemos, 104. 13.

25. Demosthenes, v. 2, De Falsa Legatione, (19), 273.

26. Lycurgus, v. 2, Against Leocrates, (1), 73.

27. Aristodemos, 104. 13, quoted in Fornara, pp. 97-98.

28. Powell, 1988, p. 50. See for example Lysias, Funeral Oration, (55)-(61).

29. See Isocrates, v. 1, Panegyricus, (4), 120, v. 2, Areopagiticus, (7), 80, v. 2, Panathenaicus, (12), 59-61. Sealey, p. 279.

30. Isocrates, v. 2, Areopagiticus, (7), 120..

31. Isocrates, v. 2, Areopagiticus, (7), 121.

32. Lysias, Funeral Oration, (56).

33. Lysias, Funeral Oration, (60).

34. See Aristides, Panathenaic Oration, 209, 274, and Addendum to this Note for quotes.

35. See Aristides, Panathenaic Oration, 271-279.

36. See Aristides, Panathenaic Oration, 227, 226.

37. No better evidence of this exists than to read Aristide’s Panathenaic Oration. Read the Aristides quotes in the Addendum to this Note. In this respect it is interesting that Aristides mentions Athenian forces going to Egypt but 'inadvertently' neglects to mention the disasterous outcome. Aristides is also an excellent example of the takeover of History by rhetoric in antiquity.

38. See Badian, pp. 20-60, and Miller, pp. 15-16, 22-23

39. Diodorus , Book 12, 4.

40. See also Meiggs, 1972, p. 102.

41. Badian, pp. 20-26.

42. Plutarch, Life of Kimon, 13. Badian's comment, 'The fact that Ephialtes and Pericles, on separate occasions, refrained from attacking the King's territory can be explained only on the hypothesis that there was already a peace in existence, which they would not break:', p. 15. This comment is amazing. Badian seems to be assuming that these Athenian naval incursions if they did not raid or fight other ships must have been in a time of peace. This is unacceptable. War fleets historically have often neither fought nor raided merely patrolled or looked for enemies. Finally it is hard to accept Badian's contention that the treaty would have allowed Athenian war fleets to go anywhere while restricting the Persians. Such terms being accepted by the Persians unless they were utterly crushed, is simply not believable.

43. Badian, p. 27.

44. Badian pp. 14-15, 50-52, Badian’s linkage of the debate over the terms of the Peace of Kallias with the treaty with Carthage at the end of the First Punic war, which attacks historians who argue that the Ebro river limit on Carthage imposed a limit on Rome south of the river, on the grounds that ancient historians do not mention it does not help his argument. It is hard to believe that Carthage would have agreed to a document that would have allowed Roman interference in their domain in Spain. Such acquiescence to Roman messing in an area of Carthaginian interest is simply not believable.

45. See Grant, 1995, pp. 101-102, 108.

46. See Diodorus , Book 11, 62.

47. See above.

48. See Diodorus Book 11, 71-77.

49. See Thucydides , Book 1, 104. 109. 110.

50. Grant, 1995, p. 109. Grant gives Ephorus' dates has c.405-330 B.C.E.

51. See Grant, 1995, pp. 108-109.

52. Badian thinks otherwise pp. 26-30. Plutarch , Life of Kimon, 13, refers to Callisthenes has saying 'the Persians never agreed to observe any such terms. He says that this is merely how they behaved in practice, because of the fear in which the victory of Eurymedon had implanted in them; and, indeed, they kept so far away from Greece that Pericles with a squadron of fifty and Ephialtes with no more than thirty sailed far beyond the Chelidonian Islands without meeting anything resembling a barbarian fleet' I merely note that the implication of this passage, contra Badian, is that Callisthenes assumes some sort of reciprocity in terms of limits about where fleets and armies could go.

53. Meiggs, 1972, pp. 101-103.

54. Herodotus , Book 7, 151.

55. Herodotus , Book 7, 151.

56. Herodotus , Book 7, 151. See the de Sélincourt-Burn, translation of Herodotus.

57. See Powell, 1988, pp. 51-53.

58. Herodotus , Book 7, 152. See the de Sélincourt-Burn, translation of Herodotus.

59. Herodotus , Book 7, 149. See the de Sélincourt-Burn, translation of Herodotus.

60. See Burn, Introduction, p. 14, in the de Sélincourt-Burn, translation of Herodotus.

61. See Lewis, The Thirty Years' Peace, The Cambridge Ancient History, v. 4, 2nd Edition, Ed., D.M. Lewis et al, Cambridge University Press, 1992, p, 121, p. 123.

62. Powell, 1988, p. 49-54, Davies, 1993, p. 81, Meiggs, 1972, p. 129.

63. Davies, 1993, p. 81.

64. Thucydides , Book 1, 114-115. Badian, pp. 37-39. Miller p. 22-23, discusses the treaty has minimizing conflict not eliminating it, and refers to a 'Cold war', between Athens and Persia and also discusses the Samian revolt and Persia's possible aid to in detail.

65. Andocides, v. 1, On the Peace with Sparta, (3) 29.

66. See Burtt.

67. Bengtson, p. 128, is of the opinion no formal peace was made.

68. See Powell, 1988, pp. 49-54 for a fuller discussion. See also Miller pp. 22-23.

Bibliography

Badian, E., From Plataea to Potidaea, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1993.

Aristides, Aristides, v. 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann Ltd., London, 1973.

Bengtson, Hermann, The History of Greece, 4th Ed., University of Ottawa Press, Ottawa, 1988.

Burtt, J. O., Minor Attic Orators, v. 2, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinman Ltd., London, 1954.

Davies, J. K., Democracy and Classical Greece, 2nd Ed., Fontana Press, London, 1993.

Herodotus, Herodotus , the Histories, Penguin Books, London, 1954.

de Ste Croix, G. E. M., Origins of the Peloponnesian War, Duckworth, London, 1972.

Grant, Michael, Greek & Roman Historians, Routledge, London, 1995.

Fornara, Charles W., Archaic Times to the End of the Peloponnesian War, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1977.

Diodorus, Diodorus Siculus, v. 1, 4, 5, & 8, Loeb Classic Library, William Heinemann Ltd., London, 1989.

McGregor, Malcolm F., The Athenians and their Empire, University of British Columbia Press, Vancouver, 1987.

Powell, Anton, Athens and Sparta, Routledge, London, 1988, Athens and Sparta, 2nd Ed., Routledge, London, 2001.

Isocrates, Isocrates, v. 1 & 2, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1980.

Demosthenes, Demosthenes, with an English Translation, v. 2, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinman Ltd., London, 1935.

Plutarch, Plutarch , The Lives of the Noble Grecians and Romans, The Modern Library, New York, 1954, The Age of Alexander, Nine Greek Lives of Plutarch , Penguin Books, London, 1973. The Rise and Fall of Athens, Nine Greek Lives of Plutarch , Penguin Books, London,1960.

Sealey, Raphael, A History of the Greek City States, ca. 700 B.C. – 338 B.C., University of California Press, Berkeley, 1978.

Andocides, In Burtt.

Lycurgus, In Burtt

Aristodemos, In Fornara

Lysias, Lysias, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinman Ltd., London, 1930.

Miller, Margaret, C., Athens and Persia in the Fifth Century B.C., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997.

Lateiner, Donald, The Historical Method of Herodotus, University of Toronto, Press, Toronto, 1989.

Meiggs, Russell, The Athenian Empire, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1972.

Lewis, D. M., Chronological Notes, The Cambridge Ancient History, v. 5, 2nd Ed., Editor, D. M. Lewis et al, Cambridge University Press, 1992, p, 499.

Pierre Cloutier

A Note on Numbers and Military Probabilities

in Ancient Sources.

A common problem with trying to sort out the history of the Greco-Roman era is trying to make sense of the numbers given in the different accounts of, for example, the size of armies.

In this essay reference as already has been made to the problem of wildly exaggerated numbers given by the Greek historians. This is a very wide ranging topic so the author will stick to Ktesias , Herodotus and Diodorus .

Regarding Herodotus the main question is where to begin. So a start will be his numbers for the invasion of Greece. We get the following:

1,207 Triremes, with 241,000 men & 36,210 Marines
3,000 other ships with 240,000 men
1,700,000 infantry & 80,000 cavalry
A camel and chariot corps for another 20,000
Total 2,317,610 men
Add 120 ships, with 24,000 men
300,000 more men
Total 2,641,610
men + Servants equal to above total
Grand total 5,283,320 men; Total ships 1,327 Triremes

This does not include camp women, wives, cooks, etc., of course.1

Island of Salamis, Greece

The numbers from Ktesias for the invasion of Greece are as follows:

800,000 men excluding servants
1,000 Triremes2

For the Egyptian Expedition the numbers are:

400,000 men in one army
80 Triremes in one fleet
500,000 men in another army
300 Triremes in another fleet3

The numbers from Diodorus for the invasion of Greece are as follows:

1210 "Warships", probably Triremes
1,000,000 men.4

Battle of Salamis

For the Egyptian Expedition the numbers are:

300,000 men in one army
300,000 in another army
300 Triremes5

Egyptian Delta

The above are the figures given for Persian forces in both the invasion of Greece and the Egyptian Expedition by several sources. The figures for men are simply absurd not to be taken seriously. They give the feel about being plucked out of thin air.

Herodotus for example in his careful listing of his figures for men, and in how he calculates them gives the appearance of being both exact and careful. The problem is it makes his figures look if anything even more absurd. For example Herodotus says:

Meanwhile Xerxes at Doriscus was occupied in numbering his troops. As nobody has left a record, I cannot state the precise number of men provided by each separate nation, but the grand total, excluding the naval contingent, turned out to be 1,700.000. The counting was done by first packing ten thousand men as close together as they could stand and drawing a circle round them on the ground; they were then dismissed, and a fence, about navel-high, was constructed round the circle; finally other troops were marched into the area thus enclosed and dismissed in their turn, until the whole army had been counted.6

This truly weak attempt by Herodotus to make his figures look plausible only succeeds in enmeshing Herodotus further in the absurdity of his figures. It appears Herodotus realized that at least some people hearing or reading his numbers would not believe them so this explanation was put in. It is hardly surprising that later writers criticized Herodotus for either gullibility or out-right lying. However it seems that:

He (Herodotus–Author) does seem to have believed in the traditional figures, if his arithmetical labours are any indication. That these numbers are a sheer physical impossibility does not seem to have occurred to him.7

Although it should be pointed out ancient writers, to the best of our knowledge, did not criticize Herodotus for including absurdly high figures for Persian armies and fleets.

No attempt to sort out, analyze etc., such figures can save them, certainly not Herodotus ' absurd explanations. For example dividing by 10, or a hundred. Herodotus’ figures for the number of men cannot be saved by such procedures. The bottom line is that they are pure invention is more likely than that they are not. In fact this is just one more example of Herodotus’ lack of understanding of military affairs.8

Regarding the number of ships here the figures are not quite as absurd. The 80 and three hundred ships recorded for the Egyptian Expedition certainly are plausible. But here we run into problems. The three hundred figure reads like a stereotype, not a real figure and the 80 could be nothing but a doubling of the Athenian 40.9

As for Herodotus' figure of 1,327 triremes this implies a total force of 301,610 men. Accepting Herodotus' figure of 200 men per ship.10 This figure is implausible, especially if we add in the supporting vessels.

Herodotus' figures for ships are not implausible if we accept that the figure he gives for triremes is for total ships. This is so because it was easier to supply and move men by ship than over land and on the sea the very expensive, both financially and logistically, cavalry was not a factor. Further food supplies could be moved much cheaper by sea than overland. Still there were limits so Herodotus' total figures are still implausible for the full fleet. Although it is probable that there were more men in the fleet than in the land army. As for the navy feeding the army it would have had enough problems feeding its self with trying to feed the army as well.11

If Herodotus' figures are, despite his efforts to justify and explain them, impossible, then neither the figures of Diodorus or Ktesias are in the least reliable. Both Diodorus and Ktesias seemed to have selected impressive large figures, quite literally, out of thin air and made no attempt or justify or explain them.

The best way to approach this is in terms of logistics, not crunching numbers taken from dubious sources. Since if the literary sources cannot be taken seriously than what we have left is probability.

Before we leave the "Oriental" hordes behind a good check on these numbers is the forces lead by Napoleon in his invasion of Russia, which totalled, along with reinforcements, about 612,000 men.12 Despite considerable logistic support and trying to live off the land, Napoleon's army was mainly destroyed by logistical and supply problems. Spread out over a vastly larger area than Ancient Greece and one that was more productive, Napoleon's army could not properly feed itself and was destroyed.13 If Napoleon could not feed and supply his army in Russia in 1812, with vastly superior logistic and supply resources it is hard to believe that the huge hordes of Persians mentioned by the Greek historians could have been supplied successfully.14

Logistically the problem, until very recently, has been that the size of an army depended not just on the resources of the nation, empire creating the army but on the local resources of the area where the army would be operating. It is clear that:

In the ancient world, where logistics placed severe constraints on the size and mobility of armies, even a small force, when disciplined and determined, could pose a threat.15

What this means, for example, is that despite the huge size of the Persian empire in relation to Greece, the main limit on the size of the Persian Army invading Greece was not the size of the empire but the size of the resources in Greece that could support an army. Since the army would have to be supplied locally it was Greece's ability to support the army that counted not the size of the Persian Empire. The relative strength of states counted in these circumstances not in terms of being able to mobilize vast armies on a battlefield, because logistics set limits on that, but the ability of states to finance and sustain and replace losses in war. Thus if the Persian Empire could only send an army of 50,000 men against a enemy because that was all the area could supply, it could still do so again and again, both financially and in manpower. Whereas its enemy may not be able to sustain such an effort or replace its losses to the same extent.

In one of Thucydides speeches, he puts in the mouth Hermocrates, a politician, during the debate at Syracuse about whether to resist the Athenians, the following:

There have certainly not been many great expeditions, either Hellenic or foreign, which have been successful when sent far from home. They cannot come in greater numbers than the inhabitants of the country and their neighbours, all of whom will unite through fear.16

It appears, given the likely-hood, that this represented Thucydides’ views that this also represents his general opinion about Persian numbers against Greek numbers. Further this shows that the general principal of a limit on the size of invasion / expeditionary forces was recognized by some thinkers in antiquity.

How large were the armies that invaded Greece and Egypt ?17 Two conclusions can be drawn. First the numbers given by the Greek Historians cannot be taken seriously has figures for the size of the Persian armies, except has evidence of what the Greeks believed. Second Thucydides decision not to give figures at all of the size of the Persian armies is probably the best course, because we do not know and baring some "find" can not know, the actual size of the Persian armies.

Greeks Fighting Persians
1. Herodotus, Herodotus: The Histories, Penguin Books, London, 1954, Book 7, s. 184-186.

2. Ktesias in Photius, The Library of Photius, Vol. 1, SPCK, London, 1920, Book 72, s. 27.

3. IBID. Book 72, s. 36-37.

4. Diodorus, Diodorus Siculus, v. 4, William Heinemann, London, 1989, Book 11, s. 3-5.

5. IBID. Book 11, s. 74-75.

6. Herodotus , Book 7, s. 60.

7. Waters, K. H., Herodotus the Historian, Croom Helm, London, 1985. p. 152.

8. Buckley, Terry, Aspects of Greek History, 750-323 B.C., Routledge, London, 1996, pp. 15-16. For a Critical discussion of Herodotus' accouint of the Persian Wars see Buckley, pp. 161-188.

9. Bigwood, J. M., Ctesias' Account of the Revolt of Inarus, Phoenix, v. 32, 1976, pp. 11.

10. Herodotus, Book 7, s. 184.

11. See Lazenby, J. F., The Defence of Greece, Aris and Phillips, Warminister, England, 1993, pp. 88-92.

12. Riehn, Richard K., 1812, Napoleon's Russian Campaign, John Wiley & Sons Ltd., Toronto, 1991, p. 395.

13. IBID. pp. 138-155.

14. It is a common, but incorrect belief that Napoleon's army was destroyed by the Russian winter. This is only partly true. By far the worst losses were in the advance to Moscow, from disease, starvation etc. See Riehn, pp. 199-201, 404-407.

15. Daniel, Elton L., The History of Iran, Greenwood Press, London, 2001, p. 48.

16. Thucydides, Thucydides: History of the Peloponesian War, Penguin Books, London, 1954, Book 6, s. 33.

17. For a thoroughly unconvincing attempt to partially justify Herodotus' figures for the land army see Cook, J. M., The Persian Empire, Schocken Books, New York, 1983, pp. 114-116. Cook does not deal with the considerable logistic problems of such a large force or the added burden of such a large armies’ camp followers.

Pierre Cloutier