The Pacification

Scales of Justice
One of the most disturbing features of our age is an unreflective nostalgia for the past. Usually it for a past that never existed and those that bemoan the passing away of that past are those that would not ever be caught dead actually living in that past.

One of the most prevalent features of this mindless nostalgia for what never was is the notion that in the past crime was less and we were safer.

This is a myth. Of course if you are talking about say the 1950’s then you would be right the rate of violent crime as in fact gone up considerably since then. However if you go back considerably further you find out something completely different. What you find is interpersonal violence on a truly massive scale.

Thus in Europe c. 1000 C.E. most European societies were characterized by blood feuds and codes of personal vengeance. This was combined with a code of personal honour which made it permissible to punish with violence all sorts of real and alleged violations of personal “honour”.1

Not surprisingly society was characterized by a vast amount of insecurity, instability and interpersonal violence. The lack of over arching institutions tended to create a fragmented society in which groups of individuals were pitted against other groups.

It was in England that we have the clearest picture of the emergence of a powerful set of behavioural and intellectual mores that began to inhibit the use of violence to settle issues of “honour” and real dispute.

A factor in the emergence of these norms was the emergence in pre-Norman times of the idea of the King or Royal government as the fount of the law. In this scenario the idea was that the King was the arbiter of disputes and attempts by private parties to settle disputes outside of this norm were violations of the King’s prerogatives, in effect a form of treason. Of course the spread of the idea of the “King’s Justice” via the system of Shires, local courts, Sheriffs etc., was not because of benevolence but because this provided a potent avenue for the extension of Royal power and just as importantly the extension of the Royal powers of taxation and expropriation. In other words it was good for the Royal treasury. In England the Kings profited by trying homicide cases through fines and confiscation of property.2

Even the rates of violence were by contemporary standards quite astounding. For example in 14th century London the rate was between 36-52 murders per hundred thousand per year. Oxford with its tradition of feuding, brawling and drunken students had a rate of over 100 murders per hundred thousand per year.3

Thus in quarrels with neighbours or drunken brawls some especially if they were male had a good chance of ending up dead, especially in a environment in which all sorts of slights were thought to excuse if not justify violence in response.

What happened was that the gradual process by which the “King’s Justice” was used to curtail violence among the elite, because of its threat to the Kings power and ability to collect revenue gradually percolated through all layers of society. Basically uncontrolled violence was viewed as a threat to both personal safety and the sanctity of property.

It is of interest that in contrast to England this process started much later in most of Europe.4

Now this process could only happen in England because of the emergence of courts and enormous pressure from the Royal administration and bureaucracy to use the courts to settle disputes rather than take personal vengeance or some other violent solution. This was so despite a violent culture that exalted violence as a solution to problems. Despite these problems by 1200 C.E., the government had managed to take one step forward by virtually ending the institutional blood feud. Royal courts were already instituting the practice of legally binding people to keep the peace. Also Royal courts had acquired by then virtually sole jurisdiction to try and punish violent offences or those having violent / severe punishment. Although the nobility might engage in a posture of violence and murderous talk there was already a tendency to use the courts instead and engage in rhetorical violence instead.5

By the 15th century violence was ratcheted to a new lower level. Frankly by then in virtually all of society there was a tendency for friends and neighbours to try to lower the level of violence and to prevent disputes from escalating into a violent resolution. Not simply because violence was considered immoral but because once blood was shed you would get the costly, time consuming intervention of the Royal courts which would hamstring peoples lives for what could seem like an interminable amount of time. The result was the flourishing of an entire culture of postured violence, of rhetoric and bluff all designed to SEEM threatening and violent but really just play acting. This was further redoubled by the ever greater use of the courts to settle disputes. The only acceptable violence was on behalf of God and the authorities all other violence was deemed illegitimate and in effect immoral if not evil.6

By the 17th century in contrast to countries like France were the institutional apparatuses of the State barely penetrated locally, England had a fairly well developed system of governmental authority to impose local order.

In France as indicated above the authorities were not much interested in imposing order unless it interfered with collection of taxes or seemed like incipient rebellion. Flying off the handle and the easy resort to violence to settle disputes were common so was widespread antipathy between different classes. Battles between poachers or gamekeepers occurred. So did extralegal violence to settle disputes. Life was riddled with assaults and homicides.7

In England by then the pacification had proceeded, culture and life was permeated with the idea that while threatening violence was in some cases permissible actually doing it was quite another matter. Instead there were the courts where people were encouraged and frequently coerced to go in order to settle disputes. In fact England by this time had acquired the reputation of being a very litigious society. And even if people did not go to court there was a powerful tendency for people to try to settle matters by informal arbitration before things got out of hand. Cash payments to settle issues was commonplace.

Even more remarkable English criminals had a strong tendency, compared to the continent to NOT accompany their criminal acts with excessive violence. For example beating or killing people you robbed was generally not done and was decidedly less frequent than elsewhere. In effect self policing had become common and people were restraining themselves as part of the effort to impose order.8

In the 18th century the decline continued so that by 1800 C.E., the murder rate was apparently below 2 per hundred thousand.9 The rather horrible list of capital crimes was tempered by procedural rules and juries who were increasingly reluctant to inflict violent punishment. England had for example no routine torture of alleged criminals as part of the process of investigation unlike much of the continent. Despite the truly Draconian penalties in law remarkably few people actually suffered the full legal penalties. According to the best available figures between 1749-1771 only 81 people were convicted of murder in London / Middlesex. Whereas in Rome, ¼ the size of London, in ½ that time period had 4000 murders.10

What the century saw was the emergence of a “Middle Class” ideology that emphasized politeness and civility and frowned upon any sort of violent assertiveness, especially violence. A key part of this was the campaign against duelling which was considered a reversion to barbaric and uncivilized manners and as such to be both opposed and suppressed as murder plain and simple. At the same time English criminals continued their trend of avoiding gratuitous physical violence and were commented on by continental visitors for being “humane” in comparison to continental criminals.11

This was accompanied by the decline and in fact “death” of the concept of personal honour that required the cultivation of status and the punishment of alleged and real slights to ones honour by means of personal action.

In the 19th centuries this developments reached a climax in that the growth of philanthropy, and a culture that frowned quite vigorously on the idea of spur of the moment violence as a solution to problems. Basically more and more people absorbed basic inhibitions to violence that even inhibited spur of the moment behaviour. The idea was that giving into those spur of the moment impulses indicated a failure to control oneself. To commit violence even in the face of provocation was considered a moral failure by the individual who was considered bound to use other non-violent ways of registering his anger or disgust and not just act out. Even criminals had by then absorbed the ethos that violent acting out was unacceptable. The ethos that emerged found displays of violence for entertainment profoundly disturbing and began to ban them even if they involved animals. There was also a climate of respectability and the idea of proper appearance that fostered a lower crime rate.12

The result was by 1900 the English homicide rate was below 1 per hundred thousand.13

Of course all this came at a price in conformity and exploitation but as indicated by reforms of the Victorian period, the continued decline in the homicide rate was not incompatible with significant political and social reforms which however much they diffused economic and political power away from the landed elite did not cause an upsurge in violence.

In most of western Europe they had to wait until the 19th century for the great pacification. In much of eastern Europe until the 20th century. As for 20th century developments there was in England and the in western Europe a rise in the crime rates in the 1960’s and 70’s although contrary to hysteria it was not a rise to unprecedented levels.

The fact is the great pacification worked and is still working at least in England and Europe.

1. Leyton, Elliott, Men of Blood, McClelland & Stewart Inc., Toronto, 1995, pp. 99-101.

2. IBID, pp. 99-103, Moore, R. I., The Formation of a Persecuting Society, 2nd Edition, Blackwell Pub., London, 2007, pp. 102-104, 123-128.

3. Leyton, p. 102. Leyton gives the homicide rate of 13th century England as 10 to 20 times the current rate, p. 103. This works out to 10-20 murders per hundred thousand.

4. IBID, p. 103.

5. IBID, pp. 103-105.

6. IBID, pp. 105-107.

7. IBID, pp. 107-108.

7. IBID, pp. 107-109.

9. IBID, p. 109.

10. IBID, p. 109.

11. IBID, pp. 107-112.

12. IBID, pp. 112-114.

13. IBID, p. 115.

Pierre Cloutier

Blinkered History

Book Cover

Sowell, Thomas, Conquest and Cultures: An International History.1

I’m writing this review of the above book in response to reviews of this book I have read on Amazon.com,2 not because I was really impressed by this book but because of some of the comments written earlier.

This book fills the need to have a "conservatively correct" history of the world. Certainly the complaints about "political correctness" and Sowell allegedly demonstrating that minorities are totally responsible for their various plights is something a great many people want to hear so they won't feel any responsibility, and that is the real reason for the appeal of Sowell’s books. They help those who have “made it” avoid feeling of responsibility for those who have not “made it”.

Sowell in this book uses a great many facts and much statistical information. Unfortunately Sowell has far too much faith in the dubious and weak figures for the past (say before 1800 A.D.) and is too complacent about both their accuracy and his interpretations of the data.

Also Sowell judges cultures according to ethical criteria and argues that success somehow proves moral superiority. Sowell also more than just implies that failure to develop along the "proper" lines indicates some sort of serious moral failing and is therefore deserved.

For all of Sowell’s discussion concerning the environmental and geographical constraints on the development of different cultures his view is basically moralistic. Sowell is basically repeating with considerably less skill and scholarship and a repellent moralistic bias the work of Jared Diamond.3

In the end his view is an apologia for the triumph of western culture and states by arguing that they "deserved" their success.

The result is we get a lot of detail about non-western atrocities and less about western atrocities. For example Aztec Human sacrifice is described with shall I say a less than critical look at the problems with Spanish descriptions of it. While at the same time downplaying Spanish atrocities in the Conquest of the Americas.

What we have here, dressed up in modern garb, is an old fashioned late nineteenth century world history in which the west is the summit of human achievement and that western dominance is praiseworthy and "deserved".4

What Sowell seems to have a hard time grasping is that some times people have “cheated” in the market place of success by using terror violence and coercion to rob, oppress and otherwise take unfair advantage of others and have reaped massive rewards while doing so. It appears that Sowell seems to think that “better” (I.e., more intensive) exploitation of an environment justifies or at least excuses stealing it from those not using it “correctly”; say Hunter-gatherers. If those victims of mans progress suffer and die as a result well it is their choice not to adapt.5

Sowell doesn't seem to get it that the failure to develop civilization and accumulate "cultural capital" is not an ethical failure but a rational response to a situation. Why should people develop civilization is a question Sowell can't seem to understand. It is typical of his mind set that Sowell commodifies culture as “capital”. Just how does he know that Europeans c. 1500 C.E., had more “cultural capital” than Australian Aborigines? Of course he des not what he means is that Europeans of that time period had more technological goods of various kinds, which by calling them “cultural capital” Sowell can dress up in moralistic terms. Of course there is no reason to believe that Europeans in c. 1500 C.E., had more “culture” than Australian Aborigines; it was simply different. Also Sowell seems to be saying that “cultural capital” can be accumulated. No doubt once “cultural capital” is accumulated it can be spent in conquest, slavery and genocide.6

This results in a "Stalinist" view of history in which economic development justifies or excuses all manner of acts. Thus the conquest of the New World lead to development so it was "justified" because the natives were "stagnant", one of Sowell's many ethical excuses and one that in this case is not true. But then Sowell as long been a purveyor of the idea that so long as atrocities are done by the operation of the "market" rather than the state that that is at least more "correct".7

So the huge corpus of facts in Sowell's book make it a useful read but just remember that his interpretation is in the service of an ideology and a rather blinkered one at that.

1. Basic Books, New York, 1999.

2 At Amazon Here.

3. See Diamond, Jared, Guns, Germs, and Steel, W.W. Norton and Company, New York, 1998.

4. For an analysis that amply describes Sowell’s pretty obvious biases that go back to the 19th century see Blaut, J.M., Eight Eurocentric Historians, The Guilford Press, New York, 2000, pp. 1-12. Note Blaut does not discuss Sowell explicitly but the biases he describes fit Sowell perfectly. For an overview of the 19th century European biases about progress and “backward” peoples that Sowell recapitulates to very large extent see Kiernan, V.G., The Lords of Human Kind, Penguin Books, London, 1972.

5. Foe an account of some of the losers, (including the Aztecs), see Cocker, Mark, Rivers of Blood, Rivers of Gold, Jonathan Cape, London, 1998.

6. For a look explaining that the Australian Aborigines where not either mentally or morally deficient in not developing civilization, agriculture see Blaut, pp. 160-161.

7. For a look at the “Fellow Travellers” who celebrated the “progressive” (economic “progress”) successes of Stalinism see Caute, David, The Fellow Travellers, 2nd Edition, Yale University Press, 1988.

Pierre Cloutier

“Development”?

One of the problems of the historiography of modern Europe is the “westernization” and “modernization” of Russia and why this process which started with Peter the Great seems to have had at best only a partial success? Why as Russia in so many ways proved to be resistant to the process of “westernization” and “modernization”?

Maybe the question should be phrased differently; perhaps the reason why Russia failed to “westernize”, “modernize” more than particially is precisely the effects of the process of “westernization” and “modernization”.

Yet if the Russian experience warns against any single, linear theory of modernisation, the concept nevertheless helps to bring into focus crucial interrelationships between government, economy, and society. Russia’s kinship-dominated peasant communities were not the casual detritus of government-led modernisation: they were its direct consequence. As the state counted the cost of its new standing army, its extensive multi-national territories, its administrative institutions, and its glittering cosmopolitan capital, the people paid the price. Risk-averse peasants relapsed into intensified collective responsibility as the only safe way to meet the government’s increasing fiscal demands. The more Russia’s rulers tried to modernize their state, the more backward their empire became.1

This opens up a whole new area of thought. Usually the “modernizers” of Russian History like Peter the Great, Catherine the Great, are celebrated has great visionaries and bearers of progress and enlightenment. The above quote asks us to think again about the real legacy of such reform from above.

Aside from the issue of exaggerating Russia’s isolation from the “west” and Russia’s “backwardness”, and locating “all” “good” in adopting the attributes of the “west”, this approach systematically ignores certain features of Russian development. Of course such an approach flatters the chauvinistic assumptions of “westerners” and also plays into the assumption that some how Russia really isn’t part of the “west”.

For example Peter the Great’s reformation of Russian society, economy and culture was accomplished through a vast strengthening of the forces of coercion and violence. It was a top down operation. Even today we have little idea of the sheer scale of violence and bloodshed required to effect these changes. Peter the Great used a vast Secret Police network and mass terror. I could give a long list of Peter’s myriad atrocities. I will simply mention that the building of St. Petersburg on a delta of the Neva river cost the lives of who knows how many forced labourers.2

Peterof palace near St. Petersburg

In fact due to violent oppression, massive fiscal demands etc., it appears that the population of Russia actually fell during Peter’s reign.3 In many respects Peter was similar to Stalin in that much of the modernization accomplished was through violent, coercive means in a process that was frequently costly and wasteful in lives and money. It was also accompanied by a massive extension of state power. If anything society became far more rigid, intrusive and authoritarian than before.4

Russia under the old regime was in many ways a centralized, authoritarian state with some truly unpleasant features, but it appears in many respects Peter the Great’s reforms massively strengthened these features of the state.5

The creation of a bureaucratic system of police surveillance with a vast array of police spies and intrusive bureaucratic system went hand in hand with a systematic regularization of procedure, including the systematic use of torture. Hand in hand with this process went the vast expansion of the internal passport system and similar measures to control internal movement. Censorship and other forms of detecting and destroying thought-crime also were regularized. And of course the use of such means of punishment has exile; forced labour and execution were also systemitized.6

To quote:

The Peterine reforms were also the apotheosis of statism that in practice left no place until now for other (nonstate) forms of social existence. The era of the Peterine reforms was the time of the foundations of the totalitarian state, the graphic preaching and inculcation into mass consciousness of the cult of the strong personality – the boss, “the father of the nation,” “the teacher of the people.” It was also the time of the start-up of the “eternal prime mover” of a native bureaucratic machine that worked until now according to its own internal laws alien to society.7

If Peter the Great left behind a legacy that can be described as ambiguous what can one say about Catherine the Great?

Of course Catherine the Great has a huge horde of modern “western” fans who once again, like with Peter, writhe in ecstasy at the “reformer’s” feet. The legion of biographies taken in by her posturing and building, and very successful wars of conquest are characterized by fawning hero worship.8

The fact is Catherine continued the process of enforced “westernization” of Peter although with vastly less overt brutality. The power of the state was largely undiminished and so was the way in which the state operated. What changed was that Catherine decided to make the nobility her ally in the ruthless exploitation of Russia. Her “reforms” and “freeing” of the nobility were accompanied by giving to the nobility vastly greater autocratic powers over the peasantry. These powers already very large before Peter were increased by Peter and reached their apogee under Catherine. Even her founding of hospital’s orphanages etc., and of course the Noble Bank, which was basically nothing more than means to allow the nobility to loot the treasury.9

It is the peasantry that paid most of the price for the “westernization” of Russia and Russia’s development into a great power.

The fiscal and social exploitation of the peasantry by the state increased massively under the “westernization” regimes. This was accompanied by an increase in exploitation by the nobility, who like the state had to pay for their efforts to “westernize”.

Before Peter the Great became Tsar the overwhelming majority of Russian peasants had through state coercion become Serfs. Either serfs proper, bound to particular nobles, or state peasants. They had gradually over a period of several centuries been striped of their rights and partially enslaved. Eventually in fact serfs could be bought and sold.10

The great symbol of fiscal oppression by the state was the soul tax, which flagrantly disregarded the ability to pay, which each adult male was required to pay to the state. It was regressive and each village community or Mir was made responsible for the tax. The tax was devised and was implemented in the reign of Peter the Great. It was part of a whole series of taxes and impositions (labour, men for the army etc.) that imposed themselves on the peasantry and which the peasantry dealt with by reinforcing and strengthening ideas of communal responsibility. Further this constant and quite sustained fiscal etc., pressure from the state and landlord created among the peasantry a situation in which individual initiative was not rewarded but in fact punished. The result was the creation of a risk adverse culture among the peasantry, a lack of interest in rural development and especially agricultural development. The result was the backwardness of Russian agriculture.11

One of the most interesting features of the development of Russia during this time is the lack of interest by the state in developing roads. Why this is so is subject to much debate. It was perhaps the huge cost radically improving the road system combined with a reliance on water transport.12 It is possible that this neglect was in part because an improved road system although it would reduce the cost of moving goods considerably would also ease the flight of peasants away from their bondage.

The other taxes imposed by the state were similarly regressive and fell heavily on the peasantry that took refuge from the onerous obligations to state and landlord through collective responsibility. The fact that the state later on created institutions that gave massive largess to the nobility in return for their support further increased the fiscal oppression of the state. If you add in labour corves etc., the fiscal oppression of the peasantry was severe. To add to the peasantries woes the soul tax and other taxes increased substantially over time as well as the landlord’s demands.13

Everything else in Russian society was coloured by the ruthless fiscal oppression of the peasantry. The idea that the west could be emulated by obedience and coercion, that people could be regimented to be free was omnipresent. The habits of pre-peterine Russia of slavish obedience and the capricious and oppressive nature of authority that was not bound by agreed upon rules was if anything increased under the “westernization” regimes. Education produced not the autonomous individuals of the west but technocrats whose basic attitude was slavish subordination. The result was a continual need to import experts from the west. In many respects the backwardness of Russia was noticeably increased as “westernization” including a dynamic and expensive foreign policy, created such demands on society as to drain away the money and initiative to actually transform society.14

A classic example of the massive extension of state power under the “westernization” regimes was the treatment of the Church. In the pre-peterine period the Church had a certain degree of real autonomy; the result of Peter’s “reforms” and the actions of certain of his successors, especially Catherine the Great, was to turn the Church into a adjunct of the state and to greatly if not fatally damage the Church in spiritual terms. Basically the Church became an object of manipulation and abuse by the state. It became a cash cow of the state and another way of squeezing the population. If the Church had serious problems before Peter they became immeasurably worst under Peter and his successors.15

Economic and commercial development proceeded to a large extent without the creation of a self aware, self confident middle class / bourgeoisie, dependence on state help and manifold interference by the state was omnipresent and oppressive.16

The end result was a state and society whose “westernization was to a large extent superficial and based on intense coercion and oppression. In many respects features of pre-peterine Russia were intensified by “westernization”. Certainly not intended, but the actual results of the reformers efforts. Instead of freeing their society from the straight jacket of the past Peter and Catherine in fact basically reinforced and added new and brutal features to the oppressive system they had inherited. Behind the glitter was a rigid authoritarian system that was by the standards of the day uniquely oppressive, coercive and wasteful. And in the end it in the long run added further impediments on Russia’s ability to modernize.

In 1839 a Frenchman, the Marquis de Custine, visited Russia for a few months. Despite the brevity of his visit he produced what many regard has one of the greatest travel / political science books of all time.17 He also produced this verdict on the work of the “westernizers”:

Peter I. and Catherine II. have given to the world a great and useful lesson, for which Russia has had to pay: they have shown to us that despotism is never so much to be dreaded as when it pretends to do good, for then it thinks the most revolting acts may be excused by the intention; and the evil that is applied as a remedy has no longer any bounds. Crime exposed to view can triumph only for a day; but false virtues for ever lead astray the minds of nations. People, dazzled by the brilliant accessories of crime, by the greatness of certain delinquencies justified by the event, believe at last that there are two kinds of villainy, two classes of morals,, and that necessity, or reasons of state, as they were formerly called, exculpate criminals of high lineage, provided they have so managed that their excesses should be in accord with the passions of the country.18

Also Custine says:

In Russia, the government interferes with every thing and vivifies nothing. In that immense empire, the people, if not tranquil, are mute; death hovers over all heads, and strikes capriciously whom it pleases: man there has two coffins, the cradle and the tomb.19

Finally:

I must correct myself — there is no people of Russia: there is an emperor, who has serfs, and there are courtiers who have serfs also; but this does not constitute a people.20

De Custine went to Russia in the hope of finding an Autocracy that worked, what he instead found was an autocracy whose glittering surface features disguised and in fact reinforced it’s backwards autocratic features.

When in 1725 Peter the Great died someone produced a woodcut of mice burying the cat. The cat is clearly Peter and the sense of relief of the “mice” that the tormenting cat was no longer around is palatable.21 Like the rule of Stalin Peter’s reign had had great accomplishments but at a truly terrible price.

The people of Russia paid in spades for the “modernization”, and “westernization” of Russia because it was done as the first quote emphasizes by means which at the same time it pushed Russia forward pushed Russia backwards.

The Mice bury the Cat

1. Dixon, Simon, The Modernization of Russia 1676 – 1825, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999, p. 256.

2. See Anisimov, Evgenni V., The Reforms of Peter the Great, M. E. Sharpe, London, 1993, for a detailed description of this process. For St. Petersburg see pp. 239-243.

3. Anisimov, p. 177-178, 291-292.

4. Anisimov, p. 184-202, and Pipes, Richard, Russia under the Old Regime, Penguin Books, London, 1974, pp. 112-138.

5. For an overview of the pre-Peterine state see Pipes, pp. 85-111.

6. Anisimov, pp. 217-243.

7. IBID, p. 296.

8. Just Google you will find acres of such “biographies”, although hagiographies is more accurate.

9. Blum, Jerome, Lord and Peasant in Russia, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1961, pp. 382-385, 424-425, 428-431.

10. See IBID, pp. 247-276, 414-441.

11. Dixon, p. 64, Anisimov, pp. 170-183.

12. IBID, pp. 240-241.

13. IBID, pp. 64-65.

14. IBID, pp. 152-156, Anisimov, pp. 184-202.

15. Dixon, pp. 209-220, Blum, pp. 364-366, Pipes, pp. 221-248.

16. Dixon, pp. 225-255, Anisimov, pp. 170-183.

17. de Custine, Astolphe, The Empire of the Czar, (in three volumes), Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans, London, 1843.

18. IBID, v. 3, p. 317.

19. IBID, v. 3, p. 305.

20. IBID. v. 3, p. 328.

21. Anisimov, pp. 288-290.

Pierre Cloutier